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NGUYEN TRAN BAO PHUONG 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation discusses two questions in international economics. The first two 
chapters focus on the matter of global value chains. We first explore the participation 
of Singapore in the global value chains by characterizing the position of Singapore in 
the global network and identifying Singapore’s key upstream and downstream trade 
partners. This is done at both the country aggregate and at the sector level. We trace 
how the country’s position in global value chains has changed in the past two decades: 
whether it has moved upstream or downstream, how involved it is in global value 
chains, how its trend compares with other major Asian exporters (including Japan, 
Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong). In addition, the paper identifies the key 
sectors of Singapore which play a major role in the global trade networks.  
The second chapter expands the analysis to a larger trading block – the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). 
This is an example of a “mega-regional” free trade agreement, whose provisions on 
the rules of origin and trade facilitation can have potentially large impacts on the 
CPTPP-wide supply chains. We investigate whether the CPTPP members are key 
upstream and downstream trade partners to one another in the global value chains. In 
doing this, we hope to evaluate how closely connected the CPTPP members were 
with one another in the global value chains before the formation of CPTPP. Would 
alternative groupings with the addition of some third country enhance the tightness of 
the network? We develop formula of bilateral upstreamness and downstreamness, 
based on the gross-export decomposition framework of Koopman, Wang, and Wei 
(2014) and Borin and Mancini (2014). The chapter demonstrates how the 
decomposition of gross exports can be used to construct informative measures of the 
position of countries in the global value chains.  
The final chapter explores a question on the effects of fluctuations in the crude oil 
market on various external accounts. We employ a structural Vector Autoregression 
model to investigate the impact of oil price changes on the external balances of oil-
exporting and oil-importing countries. We look deeper into the non-oil trade balance of 
each country to determine the dynamics of the durable and non-durable trades in 
response to both demand and supply oil price shocks. We find that the source of crude 
oil price fluctuations lead to diverse effects on both the macroeconomic aggregates as 
well as the exports and the imports of goods. The paper reaffirms the importance of 
distinguishing shocks in the energy market when studying their effects and formulating 
appropriate policies.  
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International trade has played a dominant role in the growth of Singapore’s economy.
In recent years, Singapore’s external demand (net exports) has typically accounted
for more than 90% of its income growth (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2011–
2017). Its key trade partners include China, East and Southeast Asian countries, the
EU, US, and Australia.
This is against a backdrop where production processes are increasingly fragmented,
with parts and components now regularly sourced from several countries (trade in
intermediate inputs), and services procured across borders (trade in tasks). A lot
of evidence suggests that global production sharing is on the rise, as documented
by Campa and Goldberg (1997), Yeats (2001), Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), and
Johnson and Noguera (2012). This is made possible in large part by falling costs
of transportation and communication technology, and lower policy barriers due to
multilateral/preferential trade agreements.
In this paper, we characterize the position of Singapore in global value chains
and identify Singapore’s key upstream and downstream trade partners. We trace
how the position of Singapore in global value chains has changed in the past decade:
whether it has moved upstream or downstream, how involved it is in global value
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chains, how its trend compares with other major Asian exporting countries (China,
Japan, Korea and Taiwan), and which key sectors of Singapore play a major role
in these global trade networks. We also evaluate the importance of the CPTPP free
trade agreement to Singapore in terms of how critical the signatories to the treaty are
in Singapore’s global production network, and the counterfactual if China and/or
the US were part of the agreement.
Toward these goals, we use the OECD-WTO Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database.
The TiVA table traces the inter-country input-output linkages for 63 economies (and
a ROW) in 34 industrial sectors for the years 1995-2011.1 We apply the methods
of Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014) (hereafter KWW) and Borin and Mancini (2017)
(hereafter BM). Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014) provide a useful accounting framework
to decompose a country’s aggregate gross exports into domestic value-added (DVA),
foreign value-added (FVA) and pure double-counting components. Borin and Mancini
(2017) further provide accounting frameworks for such decomposition with respect
to each trading partner and sector. We review the related literature in Section 2.1.1
and elaborate on the methods in Section 1.2.
To the best of our knowledge, there have been no systematic studies analyzing
the value-added trade of Singapore and its participation in global value chains.
Singapore is typically included in large group studies without much mention (De
Backer and Miroudot, 2014; Gereffi, 2014). Chen and Shao (2017), in their discussion
of the challenges faced by Singapore in the new globalization era, mention Singapore’s
low participation in Southeast Asian production networks and the low value-added
ratio of its gross exports. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive study of Singapore’s
participation in global value chains, by applying the most current framework in the
literature to trace the value-added contents of Singapore’s gross trade flows and




1.1.1 Literature on global value chains
In the last three decades, production processes have become increasingly fragmented
among countries. Following the classic case study of Apple iPod by Dedrick, Kraemer
and Linden (2010), further research has been conducted that focuses on a single
product (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2011) or across a wider range of products (Timmer et al.,
2014). Although the extent of fragmentation may vary across products, it is undeniable
that intermediate inputs nowadays travel across multiple countries in several production
stages before reaching their final demand destination. According to Timmer et al.
(2014), the foreign value-added share in output increased from 28% to 34% during
1995–2008 for 85% of the 560 product chains investigated in their study. Along
with this fragmentation trend comes challenges for standard trade statistics to truly
represent demand and supply linkages across economies. Since intermediate inputs
cross international borders multiple times, the traditional trade statistics repeatedly
double-count the same value-added. This leads to a discrepancy between gross
export flows and the production value-added reported in national accounts. Johnson
(2014) summarizes five stylized facts about how value-added exports differ from
gross exports over time, across countries and bilateral trade partners, and between
manufacturing and service sectors. Such divergence can fundamentally change the
way economists and policymakers conduct empirical analysis and may also lead to
quantitatively different conclusions.
To track the flow of products across countries and industries, datasets known
as Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) tables have been developed. These tables
link harmonized national input-output tables with bilateral trade data in goods
and services by end-use category. At present, there are six major sources of data
on global input-output linkages. These include the Global Trade Analysis Project
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(GTAP) (Aguiar, Narayanan and McDougall, 2016), World Input-Output Database
(WIOD) (Timmer et al., 2015), OECD-WTO TiVA Database, Eora Multi-Region Input-
Output Table (MRIO), IDE-JETRO Asian Input-Output Table, and EXIOBASE Multi-
Regional Environmentally Extended Supply and Use / Input Output database (MR
EE SUT/IOT).2 While country-wise input-output tables are available at disaggregate
levels and for an extended period, most global input-output tables have been constructed
at a level of aggregation higher than available in primary sources, and currently
only cover the post-1990 period (and some databases provide tables for only certain
benchmark years) (Johnson, 2018). Despite their shortcomings, these global input-
output databases are currently the best resources to measure value-added trade and
GVC indicators. For this paper, we use the ICIO tables developed by the OECD-
WTO (in short, the OECD-WTO TiVA Database). The methodology and assumptions
underlying the construction of the OECD ICIO tables are provided in detail in OECD-
WTO (2012).
In addition to improvements in the construction of input-output database, new
methods have been developed to account for gross trade flows. Koopman, Wang
and Wei (2014) proposed a decomposition framework of aggregate gross exports
by source and destination of embedded value added. The accounting framework
decomposes a country’s aggregate gross exports into nine components (grouped
into domestic value-added, foreign value-added, and purely double-counted terms).
Subsequently, Los, Timmer and de Vries (2016) suggested an alternative framework
based on “hypothetical extraction” instead of accounting identities for the decomposition.
The KWW framework, being constructed for national aggregate exports, is further
generalized by the literature (e.g., Wang, Wei and Zhu, 2013) to bilateral and sector-
level trade. Nagengast and Stehrer (2016) highlighted the important distinction
2GTAP: www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu. WIOD: www.wiod.org. OECD-WTO TiVA: oe.cd/tiva.
Eora MRIO: worldmrio.com. IDE-JETRO: www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Io. EXIOBASE:
www.exiobase.eu.
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between source- and sink-based approaches in accounting for value added in gross
bilateral trade flows: the former from the perspective of the country where the value
added originates and the latter from the perspective of the country that ultimately
absorbs the value added in final demand. Most recently, Borin and Mancini (2017)
refined the KWW method using the two distinct perspectives of Nagengast and
Stehrer (2016) while correcting value-added assignments in the original KWW decomposition.
Another series of recent studies are dedicated to gauging the depth of a country’s
participation in global production chains. In the seminal article by Hummels, Ishii
and Yi (2001), the vertical specialization (VS) index was first introduced, where
the extent of a country’s participation in vertical specialization is measured by the
imported content in a country’s exports. The same study also proposed an alternative
index (VS1) that measures the extent of a country’s exports used as inputs in another
country’s production of exports. Subsequent works, utilizing ICIO tables, have
further suggested various measures of a country’s integration in the international
production network. These include Koopman et al. (2010), Daudin, Rifflart and
Schweisguth (2011), Johnson and Noguera (2012), and Los, Timmer and de Vries
(2015). In particular, Daudin, Rifflart and Schweisguth (2011) proposed a measure
(VS1*) that further distinguishes the part of VS1 that returns to the country of origin
as final goods. Johnson and Noguera (2012), in contrast, focused on value-added
exports, to measure a country’s domestic value-added absorbed abroad via final or
intermediate goods exports. They then used the ratio of value-added exports to
gross exports (“VAX ratio”) to summarize a country’s value-added content of trade.
Finally, Borin and Mancini (2017), through their modification of the decomposition
of bilateral exports, provided a measure for value-added that crosses national borders
more than once and hence a new way to calculate the share of GVC-related trade in
gross exports.
Another related literature studies the relative position of a country or sector
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within global production networks. Antràs et al. (2012) and Fally (2012) suggested
two GVC indices that measure the upstreamness of a sector. A sector (country)
is defined as being relatively more upstream in the production chain if it is more
distant from final demand (or if it sells a disproportionate share of outputs to relatively
upstream industries). On the other hand, Miller and Temurshoev (2017) and Fally
(2012) proposed two downstreamness indices, where a sector (country) is considered
to be relatively more downstream in the value chain if it is located farther away
from its source of value-added (or if it buys a disproportionate share of inputs from
relatively downstream industries). All these measures basically take into account
the forward and backward linkages of input-output relationship across sectors and
countries. However, as noted by Antràs and Chor (2018), the upstreamness and
downstreamness measures tend to be positively correlated (sectors that are considered
more upstream by the upstreamness measure also tend to be more downstream by
the downstreamness measure). The same pattern is observed in our analysis below
when applying their proposed measures. This suggests that these measures are
not ideal choices to characterize the GVC position of a country-sector. Wang et al.
(2017) suggested a modified GVC position index to circumvent this inconsistency
problem. The index is conceptually equivalent to the ratio of the upstreamness and
the downstreamness measures introduced above, although it focuses on the part
of forward/backward linkages that are GVC-related trade (and excludes purely
domestic linkages and those due to traditional trade).
1.2 Gross Export Decomposition Framework
As highlighted by BM, decomposition of a country’s bilateral gross exports (instead
of aggregate gross exports as in KWW) requires one to clearly identify the bilateral
export flow that a value-added component is assigned to, and other bilateral export
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flows where the component is labeled as purely double-counted (DC) from the
world GDP perspective, when the value-added component crosses country borders
several times. The assignment rule depends on whether one takes the source-based
or the sink-based approach.
In the source-based approach, a domestic value-added (DVA) component is attached
to the bilateral gross exports the first time the value-added component leaves the
country of origin (and is labeled as double-counted for the subsequent times it
leaves the country of origin). On the other hand, the sink-based approach attaches
a domestic value-added component to the bilateral gross exports the last time the
value-added component leaves the country of origin. For example, if a value-added
component originates from Singapore, is shipped to China, returns to Singapore,
and is further shipped to Malaysia before reaching the US as a final destination, the
Singapore value-added would be considered by the source-based approach to be
DVA in Singapore’s gross exports to China and domestic double-counted (DDC) in
Singapore’s gross exports to Malaysia. The assignment is reversed if one adopts the
sink-based approach.
In parallel, in the source-based approach, a foreign value-added component is
attached to the bilateral gross exports the first time the value-added component is re-
exported (and is labeled as double-counted for the subsequent times it crosses other
country borders). On the other hand, the sink-based approach attaches a foreign
value-added component to the bilateral gross exports the last time the value-added
component is re-exported. Using the example above, the Singapore value-added
component would be considered by the source-based approach to be FVA in China’s
gross exports to Singapore and foreign double-counted (FDC) in Malaysia’s gross
exports to the US. In contrast, it would be labeled by the sink-based approach to
be FVA in Malaysia’s gross exports to the US, but FDC in China’s gross exports to
Singapore.
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The choice obviously will affect the relative decomposition of value-added and
double-counted components (domestic or foreign) in a country’s bilateral exports
(e.g., Singapore to China, or Singapore to Malaysia). It will also affect the decomposition
of FVA and FDC (although not the DVA and DDC) of a country’s aggregate exports
(e.g., Singapore to the ROW). For example, a more upstream exporting country
may be assigned another country’s VA as FVA in its gross exports more often in
the source-based approach and less often in the sink-based approach. The two
approaches are equivalent only at the world exports level (as in either approach,
a VA is only accounted for once in a certain trade flow and considered double-
counted in all other trade flows). Which approach is more appropriate depends on
the application at hand. We justify the alternative choices below when we present
the various characterizations of Singapore’s participation in global value chains.
We repeat the BM decomposition framework below for easy reference. Let there
be N countries and G sectors. Let Ysr indicate the demand vector of final goods
produced in country s and consumed in country r (of dimension G × 1), A the
global matrix of input coefficients (of dimension NG × NG), B ≡ (I − A)−1 the
global Leontief inverse matrix, Vs the value added shares embedded in each unit of
gross output produced by country s (of dimension 1× G), Esr the vector of bilateral
exports from country s to country r (of dimension G× 1), and uG a 1× G unit row
vector.
1.2.1 Sink-based decomposition
The sink-based approach decomposes the bilateral exports from country s to country
r into domestic value-added (components 1 to 5), domestic double-counted (component
6), foreign value-added (components 7 to 9b), and foreign double-counted (9c to 9d)

































































































































where (i) Bts is the country-t to country-s section in the global Leontief matrix B,
which corresponds to the total input requirement from each sector of country t to
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produce a unit of final demand in each sector of country s, (ii) Asr is the country-s to
country-r section in the inter-country input coefficient matrix A, which corresponds
to the direct input requirement from each sector of country s to produce a unit of
gross output in each sector of country r, (iii) Es∗ is the aggregate export vector of
country s, and (iv) B̂ s ≡ (I − A s)−1 is the Leontief inverse matrix derived from
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TABLE 1.1: Decomposition of gross exports by sink-based approach
Gross exports from
country s to r
DVA
(1) in direct final goods exports Ysr
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed by direct importer r
(2a) as local final goods Yrr
(2b) as local final goods but only after additional
processing stages abroad
(3c) as final goods from third countries Ykr
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed by third countries
(2c) as local final goods Ykk
(3a) as final goods from direct importer Yrj
(3b) as final goods from direct importer Yrl but only after
further processing stages abroad
(3d) as final goods from other third countries Ykl
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed at home
(4a) as final goods of the bilateral importer Yrs
(4b) as final goods of the bilateral importer Yrs but only
after additional processing stages abroad
(4c) as final goods of a third country Yks
(5) as domestic final goods Yss
FVA, Vt 6=s
(7) in exports of final goods Ysr
(8) in exports of intermediate goods Asr directly absorbed
by the importing country Yrr
FVA by direct importer r,
Vr
in intermediate exports Asr,
re-exported by r directly to the
country of final absorption
(9a) via final goods exports Yrj
(9b) via intermediate exports Arj
purely double-counted
components
(6) of domestic content
(9c–9d) of foreign content
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Using the example introduced at the beginning of the section, by the sink-based
approach, the gross exports of Singapore to China consist of only double-counted
domestic content (component 6), while the gross exports of China to Singapore
consist of Chinese DVA (component 2c or 3d) and double-counted foreign content
contributed by Singapore (component 9d). The gross exports of Singapore to Malaysia,
in turn, consist of Singapore DVA (component 2c or 3a) and the double-counted
foreign content contributed by China (component 9c). Finally, the gross exports of
Malaysia to the US include Malaysian DVA (component 1 or 2a) and FVA by China
and Singapore (component 7 or 8).
Given the sink-based approach’s focus on the last time a DVA leaves its country
of origin or the last time a FVA is re-exported, it allows for all possible backward
linkages, as captured by the use of the global Leontief matrix Bts, pre-multiplied by
the value-added share vector Vt. The accounting also ensures that a foreign content
is considered as FVA in the gross exports (from s to r) under study, only if it is
not re-exported by third countries subsequently (as seen in the expressions 7–9b).
Similarly, a domestic content is counted toward DVA only if it is not subsequently
re-imported and leaves the country of origin s again (as facilitated by the use of the
restricted Leontief matrix B̂ s in components 2–5).
Finally, note that the sum of equation (1.1) across importing countries r and
across sub-components (2a–2c, 3a–3d, 4a–4c, 9a–9d) corresponds to the KWW decomposition
of a country’s aggregate gross exports. For example, KWW component (1) equals
Vs ∑r 6=s BssYsr (DVA in direct final goods exports). The remaining KWW components
are: (2) DVA in intermediate exports absorbed by direct importers, (3) DVA in
intermediates re-exported to third countries, (4) DVA in intermediate exports that
returns home via final goods imports, (5) DVA in intermediates that returns home
via intermediate imports, (6) double-counted intermediate exports originally produced
at home, (7) FVA in final goods exports, (8) FVA in intermediate goods exports, and
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(9) double-counted intermediate exports originally produced abroad.
Thus, the aggregate and bilateral decompositions of KWW and BM are consistent
algebraically, but with some caveats. First, the assignments of DVA absorbed by
the direct importer (component 2) and by third countries (component 3) in KWW
are not exact, as the BM decomposition indicates that component 2c is absorbed by
third countries while 3c is absorbed by the bilateral importer. Second, components
9a–9b are considered part of double-counted foreign contents by KWW, when they
are accounted for as FVA in BM that originates from the bilateral importer.
1.2.2 Source-based decomposition
The source-based approach similarly decomposes the bilateral exports from country
s to country r into domestic value-added (components 1* to 5*), domestic double-
counted (component 6*), foreign value-added (components 7* to 9b*), and foreign

















































































































































































TABLE 1.2: Decomposition of gross exports by the source-based approach
Gross exports from
country s to r
DVA
traditional trade (1a*) in final goods exports Ysr directly absorbed bybilateral importers
(2a*) in intermediate exports Asr absorbed by direct
importers as local final goods Yrr
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed by direct importer r
(1b*) as s’s final goods Ysr after further processing stages
(2b*) as local final goods Yrr but only after further
processing stages
(3c*) as final goods from third countries Ykr
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed by third countries
(1c*) as s’s final goods Ysk after further processing stages
(2c*) as local final goods Ykk
(3a*) as final goods from direct bilateral importer Yrj
(3b*) as final goods Yrl after further processing stages
(3d*) as final goods from other third countries Ykl
in intermediate goods exports Asr
absorbed at home
(4a*) as final goods of the bilateral importer Yrs
(4b*) as final goods of the bilateral importer Yrs but only
after additional processing stages
(4c*) as final goods of a third country Yks
(5*) as domestic final goods Yss
FVA, Vt 6=s
(7*) in exports of final goods Ysr
(8*) in exports of intermediate goods Asr directly absorbed
by the importing country Yrr
in intermediate exports Asr,
re-exported by r
(9a*) via final goods exports Yrj
(9b*) via intermediate exports Arj
purely double-counted
components
(6*) of domestic content
(9c*–9d*) of foreign content
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The alternative source-based approach decomposes the gross exports from country
s to r in a similar framework by DVA and FVA (and by where they are ultimately
absorbed).
Using the same example introduced above, now by the source-based approach,
the gross exports of Singapore to China consist of only Singapore DVA (component
2c* or 3d*), while the gross exports of China to Singapore consist of Chinese DVA
(component 2c* or 3d*) and FVA contributed by Singapore (component 9b*). The
gross exports of Singapore to Malaysia in turn consist of double-counted Singapore
content created in the first stage (component 6*), Singapore DVA created in the
second stage (component 2c* or 3a*), and FVA contributed by China (component
9a* or 9b*). Finally, the gross exports of Malaysia to the US include Malaysian
DVA (component 1a* or 2a*) and FVA by Singapore created in the second stage
(component 7* or 8*), and double-counted foreign content by Singapore created in
the first stage and by China (component 9c*).
Given that the source-based approach targets the first time a DVA leaves its
country of origin or the first time a FVA is re-exported, it uses the local Leontief
matrix (I−Ass)−1, pre-multiplied by the value-added share vector Vs. At the same
time, it allows for all possible forward linkages by which such VA components can
be routed (including repeatedly through the same country of origin or the same
re-exporter), as captured by the global Leontief matrix B before the final demand
vector Y.
1.3. Position of Singapore in the GVC: Key Upstream and Downstream Trade
Partners
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1.3 Position of Singapore in the GVC: Key Upstream
and Downstream Trade Partners
1.3.1 Key upstream trade partners
We start by identifying the key upstream trade partners of Singapore. To this end,
define SFCc,sgp as the Singapore contents in the gross exports Ec,sgp of country c to
Singapore. We calculate
Uc,sgp ≡
Ec,sgp − SFCc,sgp − 1a∗c,sgp − 2a∗c,sgp
∑s Es,sgp − SFCs,sgp − 1a∗s,sgp − 2a∗s,sgp
(1.3)
as a measure of the relative importance of a country in Singapore’s total imports
(net of Singapore’s contents and the exporter’s DVA directly absorbed in Singapore).
In a way, this indexes how much foreign contents in Singapore’s total imports are
intermediated by country c. A country c with a larger value of Uc,sgp relative to
another country c′ indicates that country c is a more important upstream trade
partner of Singapore than country c′, since relatively more foreign contents are
passed on from country c to Singapore for further processing before being exported
to third countries.
Specifically, SFCc,sgp corresponds to the sum of components 7*–9d* for t = sgp,
s = c, and r = sgp in equation (2.1) of the source-based approach. This includes
Singapore’s VA contribution to country c’s gross exports to Singapore, which may
be absorbed in Singapore (7* and 8*) as well as in third countries. In the latter
case, it takes into account all the potential forward linkages of Singapore through
final goods exports (Yrj in 9a*) as well as intermediate goods exports (ArjBjkYkl in
9b*). In addition, SFCc,sgp also includes Singapore’s VA that is double-counted from
the world GDP perspective (9c* and 9d*), which was accounted for as VA in some
third countries’ gross exports before being re-exported by country c again. In fact,
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using the sink-based approach in equation (1.1) and summing up foreign content
components 7–9 for t = sgp, s = c, and r = sgp will lead to the same amount of
SFCc,sgp, since the Singaporean content in country c’s exports is registered either as
country c’s FVA or its FDC.
The measure proposed in equation (2.6) also excludes the exporter’s DVA that
is directly absorbed in Singapore (components 1a* and 2a*), as it is associated with
traditional trade that crosses borders only once and is not associated with global
production chains (which require multiple production stages).
The results are reported in Tables 1.3–2.3 for 1995 and 2011 (the beginning and
ending years of the data available), respectively. In 1995, Singapore’s imports totaled
US$72 billion. Japan, US, and Malaysia were the top sources of imports, followed
by other countries in the region and Europe. Columns 2 and 3 report, respectively,
the Singapore content for each source of imports and the traditional trade associated
with each bilateral importer (TTc,sgp ≡ 1a∗c,sgp + 2a∗c,sgp). As indicated by Column 2,
the proportion of Singapore content SFCc,sgp relative to imports Ec,sgp was negligible,
at less than 1%. Meanwhile, about 40% of bilateral imports were associated with
traditional trade. This implies that on average approximately 59% of Singapore
imports were foreign contents associated with GVC trade. The ranking of bilateral
upstreamness across trade partners (Uc,sgp by equation (2.6)) followed closely the
ranking of these countries’ relative gross exports to Singapore. Thus, Japan and
the US were the key upstream trade partners of Singapore, from which Singapore
imported more than 35% of foreign contents associated with GVC trade. They were
followed by key regional upstream trade partners such as Malaysia, Korea, Thailand
and Saudi Arabia.
In 2011, Singapore’s imports almost tripled and totaled US$203 billion. The
key upstream trade partners changed in composition, with the US topping the list,
followed by China and the ROW. Japan and Malaysia dropped to 4th and 6th place,
1.3. Position of Singapore in the GVC: Key Upstream and Downstream Trade
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respectively. Korea and Thailand also lost significance. This is in contrast with the
rise of China and India. In addition, Singapore also became more diversified in its
sourcing, as the index Uc,sgp became less concentrated among the top trade partners.
Its network, in 2011, spread more evenly across regional as well as cross-continental
suppliers.
1.3.2 Key downstream trade partners
In this section, we identify the key downstream trade partners of Singapore. For
this purpose, we use the sink-based approach in equation (1.1) and calculate the
Singapore DVA absorbed abroad embedded in its gross exports Esgp,r for all r. This
corresponds to the sum of components 1–3d. The sum is further disaggregated
into those that are directly absorbed by the bilateral importer r (components 1–2a),
and those that pass through r with further processing stages before reaching final
destination markets (2b–3d). A trade partner r is considered a key downstream
partner if a significant portion of Singapore DVA is intermediated by the country
before reaching the final destination.
The sink-based approach is adopted here because the DVA components in this
approach pick up the Singapore content that leaves Singapore for the last time,
and hence is the closest possible to its final destination market for absorption. In
a way, this measure (following Borin and Mancini, 2017) focuses on the production
linkages toward the end of the global value chain (and the downstream trade partner
of Singapore in this spectrum). It is possible to construct alternative measures that
focus on the relatively early stages of the global value chain by applying the source-
based approach.
Tables 1.5 and 2.2 present the results for 1995 and 2011, respectively, by the region
where the Singapore DVA was finally absorbed. In 1995, a large portion of Singapore
DVA was absorbed by the countries in Asia Pacific, followed by NAFTA and Europe.
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On average, more than 80% of these were directly absorbed by the bilateral importer.
For the remaining 20%, the US and Malaysia were the most important downstream
trade partners.
In 2011, the fraction of Singapore DVA directly absorbed by the bilateral importer
decreased substantially (by about 10% on average), especially for non-Asian destinations.
This in a way signifies a longer (or more fragmented) value chain for Singapore
exports. In 2011, China also replaced the US as the most important downstream
trade partner of Singapore. Interestingly, the intermediary role of China was more
important for distant markets (Europe, NAFTA and Latin America) than for nearby
destinations.
We conduct similar analysis for key Asian exporters (Japan, Taiwan, China, and
Korea) for comparison. The key downstream trade partners of Japan were the US
and Taiwan in 1995, but were China and Korea in 2011. A large portion of Japanese
DVA that used to be directly absorbed by Europe, NAFTA and Latin America in
1995 now passed through China before reaching these destinations.
Taiwan’s export structures underwent similar transformations. Between 1995
and 2011, the fraction of Taiwanese DVA directly absorbed by the bilateral importer
dropped significantly (in fact, reaching the lowest level among this set of Asian
countries in 2011). China already played a significant role in 1995 as Taiwan’s key
downstream trade partner, and this importance was even more pronounced in 2011.
More than 25% of Taiwanese DVA destined for non-Asian markets passed through
China.
Korea had a very similar export structure as Taiwan in 1995, both relying on
China and US as key downstream trade partners. In 2011, it also became more
involved in the global value chain, although not as dramatically as Taiwan, with
China’s role as its key downstream trade partner heightened. Interestingly, Taiwan
and Korea became each other’s second most important downstream trade partners




The role China played as a key downstream trade partner to the countries above
(and others not reported) is also revealed by the extremely high fractions of its DVA
directly absorbed by bilateral importers. This was 88.7% in 1995, with a majority of
the remaining Chinese DVA intermediated by Hong Kong and US before reaching
the final destinations. Although the fraction decreased to 84.25% in 2011, the US
continued to be its key downstream trade partner, while Korea replaced Hong Kong
as its second most important downstream partner.
Singapore was a relatively important downstream trade partner of Taiwan, Korea,
and Japan in 1995, but by 2011, it only remained so in relation to Taiwan. For
regional trade in Asia, however, it continued to play a key role as a downstream
partner of Taiwan, Korea and China.
1.3.3 Downstreamness of Singapore
As indicated in Tables 1.5 and 2.2, the percentage of DVA directly absorbed by
the bilateral importer decreased between 1995 and 2011 for Singapore and other
major Asian exporting countries. This suggests that the DVA of these countries was
going through more production stages across countries before reaching the final
destinations. In this section, we characterize this trend across countries during 1995–
2011. As suggested by Figure 1.1, indeed, this index (the percentage of DVA directly
absorbed by bilateral importers) decreased overall for Singapore and the other major
Asian exporting countries. The downward trend is especially pronounced in the
case of Taiwan.
In a sense, we can regard this index as a country’s closeness to its final demand,
and hence, a measure of downstreamness. The smaller the fraction, the more upstream
the country is. Given this, China is the most downstream country in this group of
countries (and in fact, in the world). The remaining four countries were relatively
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similar in terms of downstreamness until 2001, when Taiwan started to break away
from the group and became increasingly more upstream, although the downward
trend tended to moderate after 2008.
Across different destinations, these Asian exporters were the most distant from
European destinations and closest to the regional Asian markets in terms of their
positions in the value chain. Taiwan in particular was in a very upstream position
for its DVA destined to Europe. Singapore’s downstreamness remained in the intermediate
range among this group of countries regardless of destination, although its relative
upstreamness compared to China was more pronounced for DVA destined to NAFTA
than to other markets. Surprisingly, Singapore DVA was closer to its final demand
in Latin American countries than the European continent, considering these two
markets’ relative physical distance from Singapore.
1.4 How Much of Singapore’s Exports are GVC Trade?
Following Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), several studies have documented the increasing
fragmentation of the global production chain. Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) proposed
an index of vertical specialization (VS), which measures the fraction of foreign contents
(foreign value-added and foreign double-counted) in a country’s gross exports. The
larger the fraction, the more a country sources internationally for its production of
gross exports. The subsequent literature typically used the sum of components 7–
9 in the KWW approach to construct the index. The augmented measure GVCKWW
suggested by Koopman et al. (2010) further adds domestic contents that are absorbed
in third countries via intermediate exports and that are absorbed by the exporting
country itself via re-imports. Thus, GVCKWW incorporates VS but also domestic
contents that are not directly absorbed by bilateral importers (and hence cross borders
more than once). This corresponds to the sum of components 3–9 in the KWW
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approach.3
As argued by BM, applying the above measures with the sink-based approach is
not a clean way to ascertain GVC trade, as each component in equation (1.1) contains
all potential backward linkages (with the use of the global Leontief matrix B). E.g.,
even component 1 in equation (1.1), not considered as GVC trade by the above
two measures, possibly incorporates foreign contents via the backward linkages. In
contrast, with the source-based approach, the decomposition in equation (2.1) can
identify the DVA components in a trade flow that cross national borders only once.
These correspond to components 1a* and 2a*. They can be regarded as the classic
type of trade, in contrast with trade flows involved in global value chains (which
require more than one international shipment). Thus, a GVC index following BM






where Es∗ = uGEs∗ is the aggregate gross exports of country s. We can also construct
the corresponding VS measure and the GVCKWW measure using the source-based
























The results are reported in Table 1.7 for Singapore and major exporting countries.
Foreign contents account for about 40% of Singapore exports across the years. Including
Singapore domestic contents not directly absorbed by bilateral importers (according
to the KWW decomposition) further increases the percentage to about 48%. Using
3Note the caveat discussed above with respect to components 2c and 3c.
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the most extensive definition of GVC by BM suggests that at least 53% of Singapore
exports are GVC trade. The magnitudes of VS or GVCKWW turn out to be numerically
similar whether the sink or the source-based approach is adopted.
We construct the same measures for the other major Asian exporters and the US
as well. As indicated in Table 1.7, Japan had the lowest fraction of foreign contents in
gross exports among this set of countries (6% in 1995). Over the 1995–2011 period,
its VS increased (15% in 2011) but remained the lowest compared with the other
countries. This also holds for GVCKWW and GVCBM, although in recent years Japan
became increasingly more involved in GVC in comparison with the US (another
country with a low level of VS). In 2011, 40% of Japanese exports were GVC trade.
Taiwan and China have very similar profiles of participation in GVC (about 30%–
40% of foreign contents and 40%–50% of GVC trade). In more recent years, however,
the trend of GVC slowed down in China but continued to intensify in Taiwan.
Taiwan ranked lower than Singapore by the VS measure (foreign contents only),
but overtook Singapore in 2005 by the GVCBM measure (63% versus 57%), with all
forward linkages included. This is consistent with the observations made in the
previous section that Taiwan’s position in the GVC became increasingly upstream
during the period studied.
Korea started with a medium degree of participation in GVC (22% of foreign
contents and 37% of GVC trade in 1995), but it reached the same depth of GVC
involvement as Singapore by 2011, if not more. Thus, although Singapore started off
as a country with a very high level of GVC trade, its unique status became diluted
over the years, with East Asian countries making great strides in this dimension.
1.4.1 Downstreamness of Singapore revisited
In Section 1.3.3, we used the closeness to the final demand of a country’s DVA
as a measure of a country’s downstreamness. We concluded that Singapore was
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comparable to Japan and Korea in its downstreamness during the period 1995–
2011. In Table 1.7, with further information on foreign contents in a country’s gross
exports, we see that of Singapore’s exports involved in GVC trade, a dominant
fraction was due to foreign contents (42% out of 53% in 1995 and 42% out of 57%
in 2011). In contrast, the proportion of foreign contents in Japan’s GVC trade was
substantially smaller (6% out of 26% in 1995 and 15% out of 40% in 2011), while
Korea’s profile was somewhere in between those two countries. Thus, although the
three countries are similar in terms of how much their DVA was directly absorbed
by the bilateral importers, they are systematically different in terms of how much of
their GVC trade was due to backward relative to forward linkages. Seen from this
perspective, in the global value chain, Japan is located relatively upstream (in the
same league as the US) and Singapore relatively downstream (in the same league
as China). Nonetheless, both of them have about the same fraction of their DVA
directly absorbed by their importers, and thus, about the same distance to their final
demand.
Finally, Taiwan’s deepening of GVC trade during 1995–2011 described above
was balanced between backward and forward linkages, with a relatively stable fraction
of foreign contents in its total GVC trade. Similar structural changes took place in
Korea.
1.5 GVC Participation of Singapore at the Sectoral Level
In this section, we further characterize the participation of Singapore in GVC at
the sectoral level. We disaggregate the gross exports of Singapore by sector of
exports. Define B̃ss ≡ (I − Ass)−1 and similarly B̃tt ≡ (I − Att)−1. They are the
local Leontief matrix of country s and t, respectively. The decomposition of equation
(2.1) by sector of exports is obtained by expanding VsB̃ss (a 1×G vector) to a G×G
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diagonal matrix with the value-added shares in final production (i.e., each element
of VsB̃ss) placed along the principal diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Similarly, the
vector VtB̃tt in equation (2.1) is replaced by its corresponding diagonal value-added
matrix. Given this sectoral disaggregation, the same GVCBM index in equation (2.4)
can be calculated for each export sector. For example, component 1a* of Singapore
exports of basic metals includes Singapore DVA from all domestic sectors embodied
in final goods exports (of basic metals) directly absorbed by bilateral importers.
Similarly, component 2a* of Singapore exports of basic metals includes Singapore
DVA from all domestic sectors embodied in intermediate goods exports (of basic
metals) absorbed by direct importers as local final goods. The other components
consist of Singapore contents embodied in Singapore exports of basic metals not
directly absorbed by bilateral importers, and foreign contents in Singapore’s exports
of basic metals. The resulting GVCBM index measures how much of Singapore’s
basic metals exports are associated with GVC trade.
Table 2.5 summarizes the findings. We highlight the sectors whose percentages
of GVC trade exceed the country’s average in the respective year, where the average
is as indicated in the Singapore section of Table 1.7 under the column GVCBM. The
sector of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel was found to be the most
GVC-intensive sector of Singapore in the period 1995–2011. Basic metals; computer,
electronic and optical equipment; rubber and plastic products; and fabricated metals
were also heavily involved in GVC trade. Chemicals and chemical products, and
electrical machinery and apparatus, nec., became more intensive, while motor vehicles
declined in this regard over the years. Overall, manufacturing exports of Singapore
were deeply intertwined in the global value chain. By the GVCBM measure, it was
as high as 85% for the sector of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel in
2011. The corresponding world average for the sector was 57%. Even service sectors
of Singapore such as R&D and other business activities, and financial intermediation
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were intensive in GVC trade (54% and 45%, respectively, in 2011), much higher
than the corresponding world average (43% and 37%).4 In contrast, the respective
measures in 2011 were 35% and 32% for Japan, 46% and 18% for Taiwan, 36% and
25% for Korea, and 41% and 12% for China.5
1.5.1 Alternative measures of downstreamness by Antràs and Chor
(2018)
As discussed in Section 2.1.1, Antràs et al. (2012), Fally (2012), and Miller and Temurshoev
(2017) have proposed alternative measures of upstreamness and downstreamness.
Antràs and Chor (2018) provide a summary of these measures. They are in essence
calculated based on the Ghosh (inverse) matrix and the Leontief (inverse) matrix.
Specifically, the upstreamness is measured by the total forward linkages of a country-
sector, which equals the column sum of the Ghosh matrix for the row corresponding
to the country-sector examined. On the other hand, the downstreamness is measured
by the total backward linkages of a country-sector, which equals the row sum of the
Leontief matrix for the column corresponding to the country-sector under study.
We provide such measurements for Singapore and key exporting countries in
Tables A.1 and A.2 in the appendix. As indicated in these tables, when a country-
sector is considered relatively upstream by the UAC measure, it also tends to be
downstream by the DAC measure. The two measures are positively correlated in
most cases. In fact, the weighted average (by sector output) or unweighted average
of the UAC measure across sectors for each country is very similar to that of DAC.
Thus, they are not informative indicators of the position of a country-sector in the
global value chain. Instead, the positive correlation between the two measures
implies that when a country-sector is characterized as having intensive forward
4Authors’ calculations are available upon request.
5Authors’ calculations are available upon request.
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linkages, it also tends to have intensive backward linkages. Tables A.1 and A.2
indicate that both measures increased overall from 1995 to 2011. By this modified
interpretation, the countries in the sample became more involved in the GVC during
this period in the sense that they developed more forward and backward linkages.
The exceptions are Singapore and the US. One or both of their measures did not
increase but instead decreased from 1995 to 2011. This last finding is inconsistent
with our conclusion above that the countries under study all experienced an increase
in GVC trade during this period. Thus, in this regard the upstreamness and downstreamness
measures proposed by this literature and summarized by Antràs and Chor (2018)
also do not serve as good indicators of GVC trade.
1.6 Importance of the CPTPP Free Trade Agreement
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)
is a free trade agreement signed by 11 countries: Australia, Brunei Darussalam,
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam.
It was concluded in 2018 without the US after Donald Trump decided to withdraw
from the agreement’s predecessor TPP in 2017. Using the framework introduced
above, we examine how important the CPTPP market is to Singapore and the counterfactual
scenario if the US and/or China were to join the agreement.
Table 1.9 indicates that about one quarter of Singapore gross exports and DVA
were absorbed by the CPTPP countries in 1995 and the importance declined to one
fifth in terms of DVA in 2011. The US would have been a critical CPTPP partner in
1995, as it accounted for another 12% of demand for Singapore’s exports and value-
added. The US was also a key downstream trade partner of Singapore in serving the
CPTPP countries (or the markets of the US and China). China played a relatively
minor role at the time, whether in terms of size of final demand or as a downstream
1.7. Conclusion 29
partner to Singapore.
In 2011, however, the relative importance of China rose and it replaced the US.
It was comparable to the US in terms of market size for Singapore’s exports. It also
became the major downstream trade partner of Singapore for DVA destined to the
CPTPP countries. Overall, however, the combined group of CPTPP (with China and
the US included) declined in terms of dominance in Singapore’s export composition.
In fact, some key downstream trade partners of Singapore (Taiwan, Korea, and
Thailand) are not part of the CPTPP, although their inclusion could in principle
bring about large benefits by streamlining the forward linkages of Singapore.
1.7 Conclusion
Singapore started in 1995 as a country with the highest level of GVC trade (53%)
among the major Asian exporting countries (e.g., 26% for Japan and 40% for China).
Its unique status, however, became diluted over the years, with Taiwan and Korea
taking over the leading positions by 2011. Of Singapore’s exports involved in GVC
trade, a dominant fraction was due to foreign contents (42% out of 53% in 1995
and 42% out of 57% in 2011). In contrast, the proportion of foreign contents in
Japan’s GVC trade was substantially smaller (6% out of 26% in 1995 and 15% out
of 40% in 2011), while Korea’s and Taiwan’s profiles were somewhere in between
Japan and Singapore. Seen from this perspective, in the global value chain, Japan is
located relatively upstream (in the same league as the US) and Singapore relatively
downstream (in the same league as China). All major Asian exporting countries
gradually became more upstream over the years, a trend that is most pronounced
in the case of Taiwan.
In 1995, Japan, the US and Malaysia were the key upstream trade partners of
Singapore, from which Singapore imported more than 45% of foreign contents associated
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with GVC trade. By 2011, China and India had risen significantly in the ranking,
with the US and China being the most important upstream trade partners of Singapore.
Nonetheless, Singapore had become more diversified in its sourcing network, with
much less concentration of its GVC trade intermediated by the top upstream trade
partners. Interestingly, the US and Malaysia in 1995 (and respectively, China in
2011) were also the most important downstream trade partners of Singapore. This
suggests that there is no clear sequential position of the Asian exporting countries
in the global value chain at the aggregate level. This may be because the relative
upstreamness of these countries differs across products or because the global value
chain of each product is not sequential but potentially roundabout.
Relative to Singapore’s high level of participation in GVC trade in aggregate,
some manufacturing sectors were in particular heavily involved in GVC trade. These
include the sectors of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; basic metals;
computer, electronic and optical equipment; rubber and plastic products; and fabricated
metals. Service sectors such as R&D and other business activities, and financial
intermediation also have high levels of participation in GVC trade.
Singapore has aggressively pursued free trade agreements, CPTPP being a prominent
example, in parallel with its multilateral obligations under the WTO. The current
CPTPP formation is not self-contained, however, as Singapore’s value-added destined
for CPTPP countries passes through some key trade partners not included in the
CPTPP. This includes China, Thailand, US and Korea. Despite the absence of the US
from the group, its importance is not irreplaceable; China plays an almost equivalent
role in terms of market size for Singapore’s gross exports and value-added. In either
scenario of enlargement with US or China, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are three
key trade partners that intermediate Singapore’s value-added to the CPTPP+USA
or CPTPP+China market (but excluded from the group). Seen from the global value
chain perspective, an initiative that includes these three countries will streamline
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cross-border production arrangements and create large gains from trade. An example
is the Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, an APEC initiative.
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1 JPN 13,660,229 7,916 5,988,790 0.56101 0.18966 0.18091
2 USA 13,084,505 12,716 5,817,608 0.55441 0.18167 0.17125
3 MYS 6,755,001 69,968 2,194,759 0.66473 0.09379 0.10600
4 KOR 3,525,312 6,935 1,296,625 0.63023 0.04895 0.05245
5 THA 3,006,252 23,165 1,066,016 0.63769 0.04174 0.04526
6 SAU 2,677,991 126 904,145 0.66233 0.03718 0.04187
7 ROW 2,696,052 1,003 979,405 0.63635 0.03743 0.04050
8 TWN 2,374,675 9,052 733,698 0.68722 0.03297 0.03852
9 GBR 2,647,294 1,999 1,129,433 0.57261 0.03676 0.03578
10 IDN 3,117,687 7,338 1,653,836 0.46718 0.04329 0.03438
11 DEU 2,265,421 1,011 1,034,194 0.54304 0.03145 0.02904
12 AUS 1,946,970 2,877 947,439 0.51190 0.02703 0.02353
13 FRA 1,669,819 1,186 693,122 0.58420 0.02318 0.02303
14 CHN 1,478,082 3,780 523,268 0.64342 0.02052 0.02245
15 HKG 1,610,688 4,634 695,138 0.56554 0.02236 0.02150
16 NLD 899,057 562 330,305 0.63198 0.01248 0.01341
17 PHL 720,658 4,993 196,366 0.72059 0.01001 0.01226
18 ITA 969,217 221 494,842 0.48921 0.01346 0.01119
19 CHE 731,326 178 296,963 0.59370 0.01015 0.01025
20 IND 760,200 709 364,372 0.51976 0.01055 0.00933
21 NOR 526,275 353 204,229 0.61126 0.00731 0.00759
22 SWE 444,113 333 177,466 0.59965 0.00617 0.00629
23 CAN 416,364 140 176,565 0.57560 0.00578 0.00566
24 DNK 274,098 611 94,766 0.65203 0.00381 0.00422
25 VNM 250,320 2,232 75,003 0.69145 0.00348 0.00409
26 BEL 269,698 83 99,229 0.63177 0.00374 0.00402
27 TUR 282,781 42 113,223 0.59946 0.00393 0.00400
28 BRA 279,386 96 116,245 0.58358 0.00388 0.00385
29 ESP 299,046 115 145,412 0.51336 0.00415 0.00362
30 ISR 291,376 311 142,402 0.51021 0.00405 0.00351
31 FIN 213,892 182 68,164 0.68047 0.00297 0.00344
32 LUX 176,030 23 46,253 0.73711 0.00244 0.00306
33 RUS 202,051 50 92,385 0.54252 0.00281 0.00259
34 IRL 116,306 1,621 22,054 0.79645 0.00161 0.00219
35 BRN 134,713 515 45,833 0.65595 0.00187 0.00209
36 AUT 171,924 54 84,507 0.50815 0.00239 0.00206
37 CHL 161,087 37 78,215 0.51423 0.00224 0.00196
38 ZAF 145,329 56 63,407 0.56332 0.00202 0.00193
39 NZL 133,069 257 52,886 0.60063 0.00185 0.00189
40 MEX 128,630 75 55,696 0.56642 0.00179 0.00172
41 MLT 64,947 2,052 7,065 0.85962 0.00090 0.00132
42 PRT 83,743 18 32,895 0.60698 0.00116 0.00120
43 ROU 72,511 13 27,437 0.62144 0.00101 0.00106
44 CZE 45,930 8 19,718 0.57054 0.00064 0.00062
45 POL 44,740 9 20,000 0.55278 0.00062 0.00058
46 HUN 35,410 9 10,677 0.69824 0.00049 0.00058
47 ARG 38,698 5 19,393 0.49872 0.00054 0.00046
48 GRC 22,830 4 10,176 0.55412 0.00032 0.00030
49 SVN 15,465 2 5,786 0.62577 0.00021 0.00023
50 CYP 9,223 3 3,513 0.61879 0.00013 0.00013
51 COL 11,888 1 6,679 0.43812 0.00017 0.00012
52 KHM 10,905 17 6,408 0.41082 0.00015 0.00011
53 CRI 8,036 2 3,795 0.52756 0.00011 0.00010
54 BGR 6,143 1 1,976 0.67814 0.00009 0.00010
55 LTU 6,435 1 3,106 0.51726 0.00009 0.00008
56 SVK 4,049 0 1,173 0.71020 0.00006 0.00007
57 LVA 4,226 0 1,587 0.62434 0.00006 0.00006
58 HRV 2,908 0 1,203 0.58631 0.00004 0.00004
59 EST 2,290 1 775 0.66123 0.00003 0.00004
60 ISL 2,177 1 864 0.60264 0.00003 0.00003
61 PER 6,721 0 5,535 0.17645 0.00009 0.00003
62 MAR 9,926 0 8,743 0.11917 0.00014 0.00003
63 TUN 1,267 0 469 0.62949 0.00002 0.00002
Total 72,023,392 169,699 29,493,235 0.58815 1 1
Note: The gross exports, Singapore contents, and traditional trade are in thousands. TTc,sgp ≡ 1a∗c,sgp + 2a∗c,sgp.
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1 USA 26,527,441 12,502 11,596,079 0.56239 0.13063 0.11407
2 CHN 16,708,279 30,969 6,103,889 0.63283 0.08228 0.08085
3 ROW 16,133,922 7,606 5,766,132 0.64214 0.07945 0.07922
4 JPN 12,591,010 9,519 3,894,230 0.68996 0.06200 0.06642
5 IND 13,567,018 26,161 4,923,164 0.63519 0.06681 0.06589
6 MYS 10,394,505 95,425 3,408,274 0.66293 0.05119 0.05269
7 SAU 8,970,694 1,321 2,962,128 0.66965 0.04417 0.04593
8 TWN 7,186,749 24,968 1,293,520 0.81654 0.03539 0.04487
9 GBR 9,935,548 12,246 4,110,309 0.58507 0.04893 0.04445
10 KOR 7,730,425 19,610 1,953,939 0.74470 0.03807 0.04402
11 IDN 7,581,100 19,654 2,760,921 0.63322 0.03733 0.03671
12 NLD 6,017,509 6,612 2,186,021 0.63562 0.02963 0.02925
13 DEU 5,738,821 4,833 2,016,238 0.64782 0.02826 0.02843
14 THA 5,224,229 20,089 1,494,061 0.71017 0.02573 0.02837
15 FRA 4,712,709 3,976 1,599,974 0.65965 0.02321 0.02377
16 AUS 5,470,737 11,686 2,389,785 0.56103 0.02694 0.02347
17 HKG 4,493,195 20,358 1,903,673 0.57179 0.02213 0.01964
18 CHE 3,668,260 1,835 1,749,444 0.52259 0.01806 0.01466
19 BRA 2,304,018 783 787,583 0.65783 0.01135 0.01159
20 NOR 1,970,136 4,795 505,912 0.74078 0.00970 0.01116
21 PHL 1,909,888 8,503 494,183 0.73680 0.00940 0.01076
22 IRL 1,809,273 1,529 611,884 0.66096 0.00891 0.00914
23 ISR 2,161,908 2,816 976,651 0.54694 0.01065 0.00904
24 CAN 1,627,596 748 497,042 0.69416 0.00801 0.00864
25 ITA 1,684,310 728 574,612 0.65841 0.00829 0.00848
26 LUX 1,301,442 10,140 250,643 0.79962 0.00641 0.00796
27 DNK 1,264,838 7,212 231,327 0.81141 0.00623 0.00785
28 RUS 1,184,866 432 267,251 0.77408 0.00583 0.00701
29 BEL 1,315,669 1,130 412,505 0.68561 0.00648 0.00690
30 GRC 1,006,520 2,110 202,983 0.79624 0.00496 0.00613
31 SWE 1,163,204 732 361,633 0.68848 0.00573 0.00612
32 ESP 1,016,498 378 268,695 0.73529 0.00501 0.00571
33 VNM 1,016,985 4,169 368,844 0.63322 0.00501 0.00492
34 PRT 951,285 552 315,916 0.66733 0.00468 0.00485
35 NZL 904,558 2,044 315,995 0.64840 0.00445 0.00448
36 ARG 932,108 401 421,793 0.54705 0.00459 0.00390
37 TUR 772,528 315 324,828 0.57912 0.00380 0.00342
38 HUN 359,175 894 65,237 0.81588 0.00177 0.00224
39 FIN 405,661 333 132,707 0.67204 0.00200 0.00208
40 MEX 487,611 516 220,093 0.54757 0.00240 0.00204
41 ZAF 612,756 293 359,653 0.41258 0.00302 0.00193
42 CHL 358,559 74 157,424 0.56075 0.00177 0.00154
43 AUT 277,825 106 90,447 0.67406 0.00137 0.00143
44 CZE 235,652 174 59,250 0.74783 0.00116 0.00135
45 COL 228,562 32 60,189 0.73652 0.00113 0.00129
46 POL 220,024 79 59,104 0.73102 0.00108 0.00123
47 MAR 219,365 693 131,832 0.39587 0.00108 0.00066
48 KHM 147,118 441 66,620 0.54417 0.00072 0.00061
49 CRI 122,336 49 47,668 0.60995 0.00060 0.00057
50 BGR 67,414 22 4,594 0.93152 0.00033 0.00048
51 ROU 81,256 19 32,130 0.60434 0.00040 0.00038
52 EST 52,497 31 10,311 0.80300 0.00026 0.00032
53 HRV 46,955 8 14,654 0.68775 0.00023 0.00025
54 BRN 43,646 220 16,453 0.61800 0.00021 0.00021
55 LVA 35,355 10 8,822 0.75018 0.00017 0.00020
56 SVN 27,356 12 8,633 0.68401 0.00013 0.00014
57 PER 59,635 1 49,660 0.16726 0.00029 0.00008
58 SVK 11,830 7 3,012 0.74477 0.00006 0.00007
59 LTU 9,341 3 1,380 0.85192 0.00005 0.00006
60 CYP 8,046 2 3,672 0.54338 0.00004 0.00003
61 MLT 4,952 27 1,152 0.76202 0.00002 0.00003
62 ISL 1,942 2 648 0.66548 0.00001 0.00001
63 TUN 1,685 1 429 0.74523 0.00001 0.00001
Total 203,076,335 382,933 71,907,835 0.64402 1 1
Note: The gross exports, Singapore contents, and traditional trade are in thousands. TTc,sgp ≡ 1a∗c,sgp + 2a∗c,sgp.
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TABLE 1.5: Key downstream trade partners of Singapore and other Asian
countries (1995)
SINGAPORE World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.76 50.85 17.39 23.76 1.68 6.07
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.61 46.52 19.32 24.28 2.20 7.29
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 83.02 89.39 70.11 82.64 80.14 78.69
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer USA (2.84) USA (1.81) USA (4.67) MYS (2.39) USA (7.06) USA (5.40)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer MYS (1.89) MYS (1.54) IRL (2.77) USA (2.20) MYS (1.51) MYS (1.71)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer TWN (1.12) CHN (0.84) MYS (2.24) TWN (1.61) ROW (1.07) TWN (1.25)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer CHN (1.03) THA (0.82) GBR (2.09) JPN (1.25) KOR (1.00) CHN (1.19)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer THA (1.02) TWN (0.79) DEU (1.79) CHN (1.22) TWN (0.94) GBR (1.06)
JAPAN World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.57 39.99 18.88 31.91 1.54 7.26
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.51 33.36 21.73 33.66 2.05 8.71
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 81.51 88.59 70.78 82.96 72.13 77.82
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer USA (3.18) USA (1.89) USA (4.87) TWN (2.53) USA (9.78) USA (6.02)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer TWN (2.22) TWN (1.76) DEU (2.54) USA (2.24) KOR (2.69) TWN (2.45)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer CHN (1.72) SGP (1.36) TWN (2.34) CHN (1.92) TWN (2.31) KOR (2.20)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer KOR (1.48) CHN (1.21) CHN (2.18) KOR (1.51) ROW (1.97) CHN (1.74)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer SGP (1.35) KOR (1.06) GBR (1.87) SGP (1.32) CHN (1.70) SGP (1.09)
TAIWAN World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.77 44.43 15.14 30.20 1.41 8.60
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.65 39.65 17.43 31.14 1.80 9.63
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 81.80 86.70 68.06 83.54 73.48 82.48
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer CHN (4.61) CHN (4.28) CHN (6.00) CHN( 4.62) USA (8.98) USA (4.39)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer USA (2.87) USA (2.07) USA (5.00) USA (1.88) CHN (4.10) CHN (3.50)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer SGP (0.96) SGP (0.99) DEU (2.44) JPN (1.03) ROW (2.15) HKG (1.02)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer JPN (0.88) MYS (0.83) ROW (1.84) SGP (0.90) KOR (1.11) JPN (0.82)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer MYS (0.86) HKG (0.70) GBR (1.42) CAN (0.88) HKG (1.09) KOR (0.73)
KOREA World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.65 44.11 16.97 25.40 2.59 10.58
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.57 39.00 19.26 26.98 2.93 11.40
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 82.61 87.79 71.31 81.77 84.24 85.55
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer CHN (3.01) CHN (2.79) USA (3.98) CHN (3.51) USA (4.75) USA (3.16)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer USA (2.45) USA (1.69) CHN (3.57) USA (1.90) ROW (1.69) CHN (1.95)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer TWN (1.37) SGP (1.15) DEU (2.05) TWN (1.77) CHN (1.63) TWN (1.09)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer SGP (1.13) TWN (1.15) ROW (1.89) JPN (1.43) TWN (0.88) JPN (0.84)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer JPN (1.06) JPN (0.77) TWN (1.47) CAN (1.37) SGP (0.82) HKG (0.67)
CHINA World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.88 45.46 19.58 26.23 1.15 7.45
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.81 44.84 19.81 25.43 1.34 8.39
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 88.70 92.99 80.70 89.21 76.00 85.10
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer HKG (1.59) HKG (1.38) USA (2.21) USA (1.34) USA (6.56) HKG (2.98)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer USA (1.54) USA (1.00) DEU (1.86) HKG (1.33) HKG (3.40) USA (2.72)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer KOR (0.99) KOR (0.86) HKG (1.68) JPN (1.18) ROW (2.33) KOR (1.48)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer JPN (0.90) JPN (0.67) ROW (1.31) KOR (1.04) KOR (2.24) JPN (1.00)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer TWN (0.65) TWN (0.54) ITA (1.23) TWN (0.83) JPN (1.42) TWN (0.81)
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TABLE 1.6: Key downstream trade partners of Singapore and other Asian
countries (2011)
SINGAPORE World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.44 62.19 15.25 11.06 1.74 9.20
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.13 51.41 17.57 16.37 2.49 11.28
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 74.52 82.49 60.62 66.87 65.49 72.90
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer CHN (5.0) MYS (3.78) CHN (6.48) CHN (9.57) CHN (9.31) CHN (5.53)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer MYS (3.74) CHN (2.71) DEU (3.02) MYS (4.77) MYS (4.28) MYS (3.28)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer KOR (1.60) KOR (1.44) MYS (2.88) KOR (2.03) USA (2.67) THA (2.20)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer THA (1.47) TWN (1.36) LUX (2.70) TWN (1.83) KOR (2.55) IND (1.95)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer TWN (1.32) THA (1.00) GBR (2.56) THA (1.35) THA (1.58) KOR (1.73)
JAPAN World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.50 56.57 12.55 18.89 1.70 9.78
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.38 42.96 16.41 24.23 2.75 13.03
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 72.36 81.47 57.42 69.03 56.97 70.61
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer CHN (9.03) CHN (4.16) CHN (13.83) CHN (12.92) CHN (17.16) CHN (10.09)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer KOR (3.28) TWN (2.89) KOR (3.70) KOR (2.87) KOR (5.41) KOR (4.35)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer TWN (2.61) KOR (2.88) DEU (3.06) TWN (2.63) USA (3.96) USA (2.33)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer USA (1.65) THA (1.61) TWN (2.52) MEX (2.05) TWN (2.97) THA (2.24)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer THA (1.56) MYS (1.34) USA (2.39) USA (2.03) THA (2.16) TWN (1.66)
TAIWAN World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.63 70.19 9.04 14.38 1.72 4.30
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.43 52.76 13.89 22.15 2.79 7.84
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 67.49 80.71 44.45 58.48 52.34 50.20
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer CHN (17.43) CHN (8.69) CHN (28.78) CHN (26.58) CHN (29.88) CHN (25.86)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer KOR (1.95) KOR (1.67) KOR (2.28) MEX (1.98) KOR (2.83) KOR (3.14)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer MYS (1.56) MYS (1.52) DEU (2.16) KOR (1.87) USA (2.75) USA (2.90)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer SGP (1.23) SGP (1.30) USA (2.13) MYS (1.54) MYS (1.59) MYS (1.90)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer USA (1.21) THA (0.91) MYS (1.52) USA (1.27) MEX (1.27) THA (1.89)
KOREA World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.86 56.96 13.11 14.16 3.15 12.48
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.77 42.66 17.17 20.23 4.08 15.63
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 73.53 82.27 59.35 63.85 73.27 77.86
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer CHN (12.33) CHN (7.36) CHN (17.02) CHN (20.25) CHN (14.62) CHN (9.90)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer TWN (1.38) TWN (1.66) ROW (2.51) MEX (2.89) USA (1.93) USA (1.41)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer USA (1.21) JPN (0.98) DEU (2.23) USA (1.63) ROW (1.48) DEU (1.05)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer JPN (1.00) SGP (0.89) USA (1.70) TWN (1.58) MEX (1.16) RUS (091)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer ROW (0.96) MYS (0.83) RUS (1.23) CAN (1.23) TWN (1.00) JPN (0.87)
CHINA World Asia Pacific Europe NAFTA Latin America ROW
% of total gross export 99.62 34.01 23.53 25.98 3.87 12.23
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 99.49 30.15 24.79 26.25 4.19 14.11
% of DVA absorbed by the direct importer 84.25 89.15 77.59 85.35 85.17 83.16
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer USA (1.67) KOR (1.22) DEU (2.17) MEX (2.65) USA (2.72) USA (2.28)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer KOR (1.29) USA (1.17) USA (1.76) USA (1.68) KOR (1.63) KOR (1.94)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer DEU (0.90) JPN (0.92) ROW (1.61) KOR (1.14) ROW (1.28) IND (1.06)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer MEX (0.89) SGP (0.73) FRA (1.29) CAN (1.11) MEX (1.28) JPN (0.99)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer JPN (0.88) THA (0.69) KOR (1.11) JPN (0.99) JPN (0.67) RUS (0.92)
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FIGURE 1.1: Downstreamness of Singapore (relative to major Asian exporters) 
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TABLE 1.7: Participation of Singapore in GVC (relative to other major
exporters)
SINGAPORE VS VS (source) GVCKWW GVCKWW (source) GVCBM (source)
1995 42.06% 42.02% 47.84% 47.80% 52.57%
2000 45.28% 45.22% 53.54% 53.48% 60.02%
2005 39.76% 39.66% 48.54% 48.43% 56.00%
2011 41.73% 41.59% 49.75% 49.61% 57.26%
JAPAN VS VS (source) GVCKWW GVCKWW (source) GVCBM (source)
1995 5.62% 5.61% 17.51% 17.49% 25.54%
2000 7.40% 7.38% 21.84% 21.82% 31.12%
2005 11.09% 11.07% 26.13% 26.10% 36.32%
2011 14.70% 14.66% 29.38% 29.34% 40.47%
TAIWAN VS VS (source) GVCKWW GVCKWW (source) GVCBM (source)
1995 30.65% 30.64% 38.17% 38.16% 43.91%
2000 32.21% 32.20% 42.28% 42.27% 49.32%
2005 37.40% 37.33% 50.12% 50.05% 59.07%
2011 43.51% 43.42% 54.41% 54.31% 62.71%
KOREA VS VS (source) GVCKWW GVCKWW (source) GVCBM (source)
1995 22.31% 22.26% 30.48% 30.42% 36.63%
2000 29.68% 29.56% 39.51% 39.39% 46.60%
2005 32.97% 32.91% 44.54% 44.48% 52.76%
2011 41.63% 41.59% 50.96% 50.92% 58.00%
CHINA VS VS (source) GVCKWW GVCKWW (source) GVCBM (source)
1995 30.98% 30.96% 35.89% 35.87% 39.54%
2000 35.93% 35.89% 41.31% 41.27% 45.27%
2005 37.37% 37.31% 44.12% 44.06% 48.93%
2011 32.11% 32.04% 40.15% 40.07% 45.82%
USA VS VS (source) GVCKWW GVCKWW (source) GVCBM (source)
1995 11.43% 11.43% 23.79% 23.79% 29.08%
2000 12.52% 12.52% 28.61% 28.60% 34.30%
2005 13.01% 12.99% 27.85% 27.84% 34.41%
2011 14.97% 14.95% 28.19% 28.18% 35.75%
Note: The measures are defined in equation (2.2) for VS (source), equation (2.3) for GVCKWW (source), and equation (2.4)
for GVCBM . The corresponding measures for VS and GVCKWW using the sink-based approach replace the components
in equations (2.2) and (2.3) with their counterparts from equation (1.1).
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TABLE 1.8: Participation of Singapore in GVC by sector
Sectors Year 1995 Sectors Year 2000
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 77.37% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 81.42%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 66.43% 11 Basic metals 75.70%
11 Basic metals 65.42% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 72.46%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 63.41% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 69.07%
09 Rubber and plastics products 59.47% 09 Rubber and plastics products 65.00%
12 Fabricated metal products 58.13% 12 Fabricated metal products 64.24%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 57.43% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 62.70%
02 Mining and quarrying 56.14% 4 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 61.30%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 55.79% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 61.27%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 55.05% 02 Mining and quarrying 61.14%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 54.43% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 61.02%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 53.42% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 58.47%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 51.82% 28 Computer and related activities 58.14%
20 Construction 51.36% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 56.32%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 50.34% 20 Construction 54.98%
17 Other transport equipment 49.26% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 54.87%
28 Computer and related activities 48.79% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 53.89%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 47.78% 23 Transport and storage 53.46%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 45.82% 29 R&D and other business activities 50.78%
23 Transport and storage 45.12% 17 Other transport equipment 50.34%
29 R&D and other business activities 44.92% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 50.08%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 43.89% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 45.49%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 37.73% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 43.84%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 35.41% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 41.19%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 35.17% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 41.01%
25 Financial intermediation 32.80% 25 Financial intermediation 37.77%
24 Post and telecommunications 27.77% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 37.60%
33 Other community, social and personal services 26.78% 24 Post and telecommunications 36.75%
22 Hotels and restaurants 25.54% 22 Hotels and restaurants 32.06%
32 Health and social work 19.63% 33 Other community, social and personal services 29.90%
31 Education 12.48% 32 Health and social work 20.28%
26 Real estate activities 12.14% 31 Education 14.03%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0% 26 Real estate activities 11.83%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Sectors Year 2005 Sectors Year 2011
02 Mining and quarrying 67.39% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 85.00%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 66.18% 11 Basic metals 81.78%
11 Basic metals 64.31% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 71.46%
12 Fabricated metal products 63.62% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 65.69%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 62.84% 12 Fabricated metal products 64.20%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 61.37% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 63.58%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 61.01% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 62.76%
09 Rubber and plastics products 60.34% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 62.49%
23 Transport and storage 60.22% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 59.68%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 60.07% 09 Rubber and plastics products 59.13%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 57.82% 02 Mining and quarrying 59.06%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 57.62% 28 Computer and related activities 58.71%
28 Computer and related activities 56.88% 23 Transport and storage 57.72%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 54.09% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 57.59%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 54.06% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 57.05%
29 R&D and other business activities 53.67% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 54.98%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 53.39% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 54.80%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 53.01% 29 R&D and other business activities 54.24%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 50.83% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 53.36%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 49.62% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 50.09%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 49.13% 24 Post and telecommunications 49.39%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 46.61% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 47.79%
17 Other transport equipment 46.44% 17 Other transport equipment 46.88%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 44.16% 20 Construction 46.13%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 43.00% 25 Financial intermediation 45.41%
24 Post and telecommunications 41.34% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 45.27%
20 Construction 41.33% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 44.94%
25 Financial intermediation 40.92% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 43.20%
32 Health and social work 29.71% 31 Education 41.73%
33 Other community, social and personal services 29.60% 33 Other community, social and personal services 35.12%
22 Hotels and restaurants 29.24% 32 Health and social work 34.37%
31 Education 18.83% 22 Hotels and restaurants 33.25%
26 Real estate activities 13.73% 26 Real estate activities 33.18%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
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TABLE 1.9: Significance of CPTPP to Singapore
YEAR: 1995 CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of total gross export 26.64 48.48 29.98 51.82
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 26.30 47.97 28.85 50.52
% of DVA absorbed by the country of direct importer 86.02 85.44 85.98 85.44
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer USA (4.0) USA (2.2) USA (3.8) USA (2.17)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer MYS (1.68) MYS (1.99) MYS (1.66) MYS (1.97)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer THA (1.12) TWN (1.24) THA (1.09) TWN (1.29)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer CHN (0.98) THA (1.14) TWN (1.05) THA (1.12)
% of DVA 5th intermediate importer TWN (0.94) CHN (1.1) CHN (0.89) CHN (1.05)
YEAR: 2011 CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of total gross export 23.60 33.35 35.88 45.63
% of total DVA absorbed in foreign countries 20.15 34.41 30.47 44.74
% of DVA absorbed by the country of direct importer 79.33 75.07 76.40 74.06
% of DVA 1st intermediate importer CHN (5.18) CHN (6.86) MYS (4.83) CHN (5.23)
% of DVA 2nd intermediate importer MYS (3.19) MYS (3.79) CHN (3.43) MYS (4.76)
% of DVA 3rd intermediate importer THA (1.68) KOR (1.55) KOR (2.17) KOR (2.09)
% of DVA 4th intermediate importer USA (1.55) THA (1.52) TWN (2.01) TWN (1.93)




Global Value Chains and the CPTPP
2.1 Introduction
The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”)
is a free trade agreement (“FTA”) signed in 2018 among 11 countries: Japan, Singapore,
Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei Darussalam, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico,
Chile and Peru. This is by far the largest FTA formed after the Uruguay Round
(1985–1994).
The initiative evolved from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP)
or “P4”, among Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, New Zealand and Chile. In 2010,
negotiations for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”’) were launched among the four
TPSEP members, Malaysia, Vietnam, Australia and Peru; the US, Canada and Mexico
joined in 2012, and Japan in 2013. Since its first proposal, 18 rounds of negotiations
were held. However, in January 2017 the US (with the change of administration)
decided to withdraw from the pending TPP agreement. After modifications in the
terms and conditions, the agreement was salvaged and concluded without the US
in 2018 under the new name “CPTPP”.
Among its many high-standard provisions, the agreement’s provisions on rules
of origin and trade facilitation have potentially large impacts on business incentives
to develop and consolidate CPTPP-wide supply chains. In particular, the “full accumulation”
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provision recognizes all value-added created/accumulated in the territory of the
members in justifying a good’s origin from the CPTPP territory, while a “self-certification
system” allows firms to self certify their goods’ origins, minimizing customs clearance
time. These benefits, in addition to the CPTPP’s broad tariff cuts, are likely to
encourage greater fragmentation of the manufacturing process among the member
territories.
Much of the existing work related to the CPTPP has mainly focused on the
welfare impact of the agreement on member countries and nonmembers; see, for
example, Li and Whalley (2014) on China and Narayanan and Sharma (2016) on
India. Although large-group GVC studies (see De Backer and Miroudot, 2014; Kowalski
et al., 2015; Antràs and Chor, 2018; Wang et al., 2017) have included individual
CPTPP countries in their analysis, none of them focus on the CPTPP per se, and
in particular, its grouping optimality.
In this paper, we evaluate how closely connected the CPTPP members were with
one another in the global value chain (GVC) before the formation of CPTPP. Is this
an ideal grouping in the sense that the members are key upstream or downstream
trade partners to each other? Would alternative groupings with the addition of some
third countries enhance the tightness and self-sufficiency of the network?
Using the most recent accounting framework to trace value-added trade embedded
in gross exports (Koopman, Wang and Wei, 2014; Borin and Mancini, 2017), we
develop formula of bilateral upstreamness and downstreamness to identify the key
upstream and downstream trade partners of each CPTPP country. These are further
disaggregated by the source of the value added (from the world, the CPTPP territories,
or alternative groupings of interest) for the upstreamness measure, and the final
absorption destination of the value added (by the world, the CPTPP markets, or
others) for the downstreamness measure. We also construct measures to characterize
the position of each CPTPP country in global value chains, and how they have
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moved upstream or downstream over the period of study. Through the analysis,
we demonstrate how the proposed formula can be used to provide informative
measures on the GVC positions of countries and to draw comparisons across sectors,
and different origins/destinations of the value added.
2.1.1 Related Literature
In the last three decades, production processes have become increasingly fragmented
in stages and yet integrated across countries. Several case studies on the fragmentation
of production have been conducted for products such as Apple’s Ipod and notebook
PCs (Dedrick, Kraemer and Linden, 2010), cars (Sturgeon, van Biesebroeck and
Gereffi, 2008), and smartphones (Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2011). Due to lower communication
and trade costs, trade in intermediate inputs has become prevalent. Inputs nowadays
travel across multiple countries in various production stages before reaching their
final destination of consumption. According to Timmer et al. (2014), foreign value-
added share in output increased from 28% to 34% during 1995–2008 for 85% of the
560 product chains they studied. These developments pose challenges in measuring
countries’ contributions to international production chains. Standard trade statistics
record the gross export flows, so the statistics “double count” the same value added
when intermediate inputs cross international borders more than once. Johnson
(2014), for example, characterizes the stylized facts on the discrepancies between
gross exports and production value added reported in national accounts. In Section 2.2,
we review the datasets and methodologies that have been developed in the recent
literature to trace the value-added trade across countries. The different components
of value-added trade will form the basis of our formula.
The rise of GVCs also raises the question of the specialization of countries and
firms in the global production network: How much does a country participate in
the network? Which sectors are relatively integrated with the GVC? Where is the
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position of a country in the global supply chains? A recent body of work has
proposed several measures of the depth of integration and the position of a country
and/or an industry in the GVC. The seminal article by Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001)
introduced the vertical specialization (VS) index. It measures the share of imported
inputs in a country’s gross exports. The same study also proposed another index
(VS1) that measures the extent of a country’s exports used as inputs in another
country’s production of exports. Daudin, Rifflart and Schweisguth (2011) proposed
a measure (VS1*) that further distinguishes the part of VS1 that returns to the country
of origin as final goods. Johnson and Noguera (2012), in contrast, focused on value-
added exports to measure a country’s domestic value added absorbed abroad via
final or intermediate goods exports. They then used the ratio of value-added exports
to gross exports (“VAX ratio”) to summarize a country’s value-added content of
trade. Koopman et al. (2010) suggested yet another index combining the share of
foreign inputs (upstream links) and the share of local intermediate goods used in
other countries’ exports (downstream links). Finally, Borin and Mancini (2017),
through their modification of the decomposition of bilateral exports, provided a
measure for value added that crosses national borders more than once and hence a
new way to calculate the share of GVC-related trade in gross exports. In Section 2.3,
we analyze the extent of GVC participation by the CPTPP countries based on some
of the above indicators, using the gross export decomposition carried out in Section 2.2.
In parallel, another branch of the literature studies the relative position of a
country or a sector within the GVC. Antràs et al. (2012) and Fally (2012) suggested
two GVC indices that measure the upstreamness of a sector. A sector (country)
is defined as being relatively more upstream in the production chain if it is more
distant from final demand (or if it sells a disproportionate share of outputs to relatively
upstream industries). On the other hand, Miller and Temurshoev (2017) and Fally
(2012) proposed two downstreamness indices, where a sector (country) is considered
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to be relatively more downstream in the value chain if it is located farther away
from its source of value added (or if it buys a disproportionate share of inputs from
relatively downstream industries). All these measures basically take into account
the forward and backward linkages of input-output relationship across sectors and
countries. However, as noted by Antràs and Chor (2018), the above upstreamness
measure tends to be positively correlated with the downstreamness measure (sectors
that are considered more upstream by the upstreamness measure also tend to be
more downstream by the downstreamness measure). This suggests that these measures
are not informative of the GVC position of a country-sector.1 In Sections 2.4 and 2.5,
we propose bilateral upstream/downstream measures to identify the key downstream
and upstream partners of the CPTPP countries. A country can simultaneously be
a key upstream and downstream partner of another country relative to another
trading partner (because the comparison is based on the volume of value-added
trade intermediated across trading partners). In Section 2.6, we then propose measures
(that are independent of gross export volume and hence scale-free) to characterize
the absolute position of a country in the GVC. Section 2.7 extends the analysis
further to the sector level.
Studies related to CPTPP have mainly analyzed its potential welfare impacts (or
those of the TPP, its predecessor) based on computable general equilibrium model
simulations (see Gilbert, Furusawa and Scollay, 2018, for a survey).2 Some focus on
individual countries, such as Vietnam (Nguyen et al., 2015), New Zealand (Strutt,
Minor and Rae, 2015), Japan (Lee and Itakura, 2014), and the US (USITC, 2014;
Thompson and Leister, 2015), while others analyze the impact of the agreement on
1Wang et al. (2017) suggested a modified GVC position index to circumvent this inconsistency
problem. The index is conceptually equivalent to the ratio of the upstreamness and the
downstreamness measures introduced above, although it focuses on the part of forward/backward
linkages that are GVC-related trade (and excludes purely domestic linkages and those due to
traditional trade).
2Because CPTPP was only concluded in 2018, there are not sufficient data to conduct ex post
analysis of the agreement.
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nonmembers that could have strong trade connections with the bloc. These include,
for example, China (Xin, 2014; Li and Whalley, 2014; Lu, 2015), India (Narayanan
and Sharma, 2016), Korea (Petri, 2016; Roh and Oh, 2016), and Brazil (Thorstensen
and Ferraz, 2014). There are, however, no systematic studies of the supply-chain
relationships of the CPTPP countries in the literature. This paper contributes to the
GVC literature and policy analysis of CPTPP in this regard.
2.2 ICIO Tables and Accounting Framework
2.2.1 ICIO Tables
To track input-output linkages on a global scale, datasets known as Inter-Country
Input-Output (ICIO) tables have been developed in recent years. These tables are
combined from a variety of sources including national accounts, country-level input-
output tables, and standard trade statistics. National input-output tables are harmonized
and reconciled with bilateral trade data in goods and services by end-use category.
While country-wise input-output tables are available at disaggregated levels and
for an extended period, most global input-output tables have been constructed at
a level of aggregation higher than available in primary sources and cover only the
post-1990 period (some only for certain benchmark years) (Johnson, 2018).
At present, there are six major ICIO tables. These are: Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP), World Input-Output Database (WIOD), OECD-WTO TiVA Database,
Eora Multi-Region Input-Output Table (MRIO), IDE-JETRO Asian Input-Output Table,
and EXIOBASE Multi-Regional Environmentally Extended Supply and Use / Input
Output (MR EE SUT/IOT) database.3
3GTAP: www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu. WIOD: www.wiod.org. OECD-WTO TiVA: oe.cd/tiva.
Eora MRIO: worldmrio.com. IDE-JETRO: www.ide.go.jp/English/Data/Io. EXIOBASE:
www.exiobase.eu.
2.2. ICIO Tables and Accounting Framework 47
For our analysis, we use the OECD-WTO TiVA Database (2016 edition). The
tables cover 63 economies (and one ROW) in 34 sectors for the period 1995–2011.4
All 11 CPTPP countries are included in the database. The methodology and assumptions
underlying the construction of the OECD ICIO tables are provided in details in
OECD-WTO (2012).
2.2.2 Gross Export Decomposition Framework
In addition to the construction of input-output tables, new methods have been developed
to account for gross trade flows. Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014) (hereafter KWW)
provide a useful accounting framework to decompose a country’s aggregate gross
exports into domestic value added (DVA), foreign value added (FVA) and pure
double-counting components. Borin and Mancini (2017) (hereafter BM) further provide
accounting frameworks for such decomposition with respect to each trading partner
and sector.5
As highlighted by Nagengast and Stehrer (2016), decomposition of a country’s
bilateral gross exports (instead of aggregate gross exports as in KWW) requires
one to clearly identify the bilateral export flow that a value-added component is
assigned to, and the other bilateral export flows where the component is labeled as
purely double counted (DC) from the world GDP perspective, if the value-added
component crosses country borders several times. The assignment rule depends on
whether one takes the source-based or the sink-based approach.
4Available at https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/inter-country-input-output-tables.htm. The 2018
edition of the TiVA database covers the period 2005–2015, with one more economy, and is based
on the industrial list of ISIC Rev.4 with 36 sectors (instead of Rev.3). More details are provided at
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/measuring-trade-in-value-added.htm.
5In particular, the KWW framework decomposes a country’s aggregate gross exports by source
and destination of embedded value added, into nine components (of DVA FVA, or purely double-
counted terms). This is further generalized by the literature (e.g., Wang, Wei and Zhu, 2013) to
bilateral and sector-level trade. Most recently, Borin and Mancini (2017) refined the KWW method
using the two distinct perspectives of Nagengast and Stehrer (2016) while correcting some value-
added assignments in the original KWW decomposition.
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In the source-based approach, a domestic value-added (DVA) component is attached
to the bilateral gross exports the first time the value-added component leaves the
country of origin (and is labeled as double-counted for the subsequent times it
leaves the country of origin). On the other hand, the sink-based approach attaches
a domestic value-added component to the bilateral gross exports the last time the
value-added component leaves the country of origin. For example, if a value-added
component originates from Singapore, is shipped to China, returns to Singapore,
and is further shipped to Malaysia before reaching the US as a final destination, the
Singapore value added would be considered by the source-based approach to be
DVA in Singapore’s gross exports to China and domestic double-counted (DDC) in
Singapore’s gross exports to Malaysia. The assignment is reversed if one adopts the
sink-based approach.
In parallel, in the source-based approach, a foreign value-added component is
attached to the bilateral gross exports the first time the value-added component is re-
exported (and is labeled as double-counted for the subsequent times it crosses other
country borders). On the other hand, the sink-based approach attaches a foreign
value-added component to the bilateral gross exports the last time the value-added
component is re-exported. Using the example above, the Singapore value-added
component would be considered by the source-based approach to be FVA in China’s
gross exports to Singapore and foreign double-counted (FDC) in Malaysia’s gross
exports to the US. In contrast, it would be labeled by the sink-based approach to
be FVA in Malaysia’s gross exports to the US, but FDC in China’s gross exports to
Singapore.
The choice obviously will affect the relative decomposition of value-added and
double-counted components (domestic or foreign) in a country’s bilateral exports
(e.g., Singapore to China, or Singapore to Malaysia). It will also affect the decomposition
of FVA and FDC (although not the DVA and DDC) of a country’s aggregate exports
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(e.g., Singapore to the world). For example, a more upstream exporting country
may be assigned another country’s VA as FVA in its gross exports more often in
the source-based approach and less often in the sink-based approach. The two
approaches are equivalent only at the world exports level (as in either approach, a
VA is only accounted for once in a certain trade flow and considered double counted
in all other trade flows).
In this paper, we take the BM source-based approach, because our proposed
formulas require information on bilateral value-added trade. Since it traces the
value-added flows that cross country borders for the first time, the source-based
approach will also help identify the value-added flows that cross country borders
only once (thus associated with traditional trade) and other value-added flows (that
cross country borders more than once and hence can be regarded as GVC-related
trade).
We repeat the BM source-based decomposition framework below for easy reference.
Suppose the world consists of N countries and G sectors. Define Ysr to be the
demand vector of final goods produced in country s and consumed in country r
(of dimension G× 1). Let A be the global matrix of input coefficients (of dimension
NG× NG), so that B ≡ (I−A)−1 is the global Leontief inverse matrix. In addition,
let Vs denote the value-added shares embedded in each unit of gross outputs produced
by country s (of dimension 1 × G), Esr the vector of bilateral gross exports from
country s to country r (of dimension G× 1), and uG a 1× G unit row vector.
The source-based approach decomposes the bilateral exports between country
s and country r into domestic value added (component 1∗ to 5∗), domestic double
counted (component 6∗), foreign value added (components 7∗ to 9b∗), and foreign





































































































































































where (i) Bts is the country-t to country-s section in the global Leontief matrix B,
which corresponds to the total input requirement from each sector of country t to
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produce one unit of final demand in each sector of country s, and (ii) Asr is the
country-s to country-r section in the inter-country input coefficient matrix A, which
corresponds to the direct input requirement from each sector of country s to produce
a unit of gross output in each sector of country r. Given that the source-based
approach targets the first time a DVA leaves its country of origin or the first time
a FVA is re-exported, it uses the local Leontief matrix (I−Ass)−1, pre-multiplied by
the value-added share vector Vs. At the same time, it allows for all possible forward
linkages by which such VA components can be routed (including repeatedly through
the same country of origin or the same re-exporter), as captured by the global Leontief
matrix B before the final demand vector Y.
Table 1.2 provides a summary of the interpretation of each term in equation
(2.1). In short, this framework decomposes bilateral gross exports from country s
to country r into DVA and FVA (and by where they are ultimately absorbed). The
DVA can be embodied in either final goods or intermediate goods exports that are
(i) absorbed directly in bilateral importers, (ii) absorbed in bilateral importers after
further processing stages in other countries, (iii) absorbed by third countries, and
(iv) reflected and absorbed at home. On the other hand, the FVA can be embedded
in exports by s of final goods and of intermediate inputs directly absorbed by the
importing country r, or in intermediate goods exports to r that are further processed
and re-exported by the importing country r.
2.3 GVC Participation
We begin the analysis by characterizing the extent to which the CPTPP countries
participated in the global value chains. Did they develop more backward linkages
and/or forward linkages over the years of study 1995–2011? And how do the
pattern and trend differ across the member countries?
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We first use the VS (vertical specialization) index of Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001),
which measures the fraction of imported inputs used in a country’s gross exports.
With the decomposition framework developed by KWW and BM, one can trace
precisely the foreign contents embodied in trade flows. We thus use the fraction
of foreign contents (foreign value added and foreign double counted) in a country’s
gross exports as the revised VS indicator. The larger the fraction of such foreign
contents, the more a country sources internationally in its production of gross exports
(and, loosely speaking, the more backward linkages it has).
We then use the measure GVCKWW suggested by Koopman et al. (2010). In
addition to foreign contents, it further adds the domestic contents in gross exports
that are not absorbed by bilateral importers. This includes domestic contents in
gross exports that are absorbed by third countries (after further processing in bilateral
importing countries) and that return home and are absorbed by the exporting country
itself. Thus, in a sense, it takes into account both backward (upstream) linkages and
forward (downstream) linkages in the consideration of a country’s involvement in
global value chains.
Finally, Borin and Mancini (2017) further added to the above the domestic contents
in gross exports that are absorbed by bilateral importers but only after additional
processing stages abroad. In other words, they isolated the domestic value-added
components that cross country borders only once (and are directly absorbed by bilateral
importers) and regard them as “traditional trade”. This corresponds to components
1a∗ and 2a∗ in the BM decomposition. A country’s gross exports net of these two
components are then regarded as its GVC-related trade flows.
Using the decomposition framework by BM, we calculate the three indices as


































[Es∗ − (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr)]/Es∗ , (2.4)
where Es∗ is the aggregate gross exports of country s. The VS index, by construct,
is a subset of the GVCKWW indicator, which is further a subset of the GVCBM index.
Thus, the magnitude increases as we use a more broadly defined measure of GVC.
Strictly speaking, the GVCKWWs index was proposed in the KWW accounting
framework, a sink-based framework. By using the global Leontief matrix in calculating
the value-added content VsBss instead of the local Leontief matrix Vs(I − Ass)−1
as in equation (2.1), it confounds domestic contents with all potential backward
linkages and hence is not a clean way to isolate GVC-related trade. Its decompositions
are also not exact in terms of the destinations where a certain value added is absorbed.
We thus take the BM accounting framework and identify the right components to
be used in (2.3) that are consistent with the spirit of the GVCKWWs index.
Table 2.1 reports the three GVC measures for the CPTPP countries in four benchmark
years (1995, 2000, 2005, and 2011). We also add China, the US, and the world as
reference points. In terms of the VS index, Japan and Brunei were among the lowest.
Although Japan’s VS gradually increased over the period (from 5.61% to 14.66%),
Brunei’s remained low and decreased (7.26% to 4.26%). Japan thus integrated more
foreign inputs in its production of exports over the years. Despite their low degrees
of vertical integration in terms of backward linkages, the two countries had equally
high degrees of GVC participation as many other CPTPP countries (40.47% for Japan
and 34.8% for Brunei in 2011 by the GVCBM measure). This suggests that they
participated in the GVC more via downstream linkages (contributing contents to
be used in further processing and integrated in other countries’ exports). Countries
with such similar profiles include Peru, Australia, and the US. In particular, the US
had low levels of VS (yet higher than Japan) and became more involved in the GVC
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in the last two decades. Nonetheless, the pace of its increase was relatively slow
compared to the world average.
In contrast to the countries above, Singapore and Malaysia had the highest VS
index. Their gross exports consisted of 40–50% foreign contents across the years.
Domestic contents other than those directly absorbed by bilateral importers contributed
another 10–15% of gross exports. These countries thus had intensive backward
linkages (but proportionally less intense forward linkages) in their international
production networks. Countries with such similar profiles include Vietnam, China
and Mexico.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the global value chain participation of CPTPP countries
together with China and the US across the years. The extent of GVC trade increased
for all CPTPP countries. In 1995, the average percentage of GVC participation across
all CPTPP countries was 32.88% of total gross exports. This number increased by
10 percentage points by 2011. The GVC trend tended to slow down after 2000 for
Singapore, Malaysia and China. In contrast, Vietnam grew steadily in its GVC
participation (from 33.55% in 1995 to 48.70% in 2011). Although Singapore and
Malaysia remained at the top (57% and 56% respectively in 2011) in GVC participation,
Vietnam overtook Mexico in 2005 and became the third among the CPTPP countries.
Besides Vietnam, Japan, Chile and Peru also experienced fast growth in their
GVC integration during the period. For example, Japan’s GVC trade increased from
25.5% in 1995 to 40.5% in 2011 (close to a 15 percentage point increase). In contrast,
countries such as Canada, New Zealand and Singapore experienced a much smaller
increase. Among the CPTPP members, Singapore had the highest level of GVC
trade in the 1990s, and Singapore used to have a big lead. However, its unique
status was diluted over the years as the other countries gradually caught up in their
GVC involvement.
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2.4 Key Downstream Partners
In this section, we introduce our formula of bilateral downstreamness and use it to
identify the key downstream partners of each CPTPP member country. Intuitively,
the formula measures how much of a country’s domestic content (domestic value
added and domestic double counted) in all its gross exports is intermediated by a
bilateral importer. The formula can be further refined to focus on specific destinations
where such domestic content is finally absorbed.
For this purpose, we define DCGsr as the domestic content of country s in the
gross exports of country s to r that is finally absorbed in the set G of destinations.
The bilateral downstreamness of country r to s is defined as:
DGsr =
DCGsr − 1[r ∈ G](1a∗sr + 2a∗sr)
∑c{DCGsc − 1[c ∈ G](1a∗sc + 2a∗sc)}
(2.5)
where 1[·] is an indicator function that takes value of 1 if the importer is part of the
final destination market. The measure excludes the exporter’s domestic content that
is directly absorbed by the bilateral importer (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr), since it crosses country
borders only once (and hence is not associated with GVC trade). The numerator
in (2.5) represents domestic contents of s that are further exported by the bilateral
importer r. A country r is considered to be a more important downstream partner
to country s than a country r′ (with respect to the subset of domestic content that
is finally absorbed by destinations in G) if a larger share of exporter s’s domestic
content (absorbed in G) is intermediated by r than r′.
Table 2.2 reports the key downstream partners of the CPTPP members in 2011.
We consider five regions of destination markets: the world, the CPTPP, the CPTPP
with the US, the CPTPP with China, and the CPTPP with China and the US. The
first row reports the relative shares of these markets in a country’s gross exports.
On average, the CPTPP countries sent 25% of their gross exports to the CPTPP
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market. The CPTPP market was most important to Brunei (59.83% of its gross
exports) and least to Canada (7.3%), Japan (9.75%) and Mexico (10.4%). Except for
Japan, the CPTPP market was important for all members in Asia and Australasia
(typically more than 20% of their gross exports). When China was included as a
destination, the shares rose above 35% for most countries (with the exception of
Canada and Mexico). On the other hand, when the US was included instead, the
importance of the destination market increased substantially for Canada (74.05%)
and Mexico (80.06%).
We then calculate, for each exporting country and destination market, the domestic
content (DC) that is directly absorbed by the bilateral importer (if it belongs to the
destination market under consideration). These amounts of traditional trade are
excluded from the calculation of bilateral downstreamness as indicated in equation
(2.5). We then rank each country’s bilateral importers by the share of GVC trade
intermediated by the importer, for the DC destined for each of the markets, and
highlight the top five downstream trade partners.
We find that in 2011, China was the most important downstream partner for
seven out of eleven countries in the CPTPP (Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Vietnam,
Australia, Chile, and Peru). Of the domestic content of these countries not directly
absorbed by bilateral importers, 20–35% was intermediated by China. Its importance
tends to increase when the destination is restricted to the CPTPP markets or the
CPTPP plus the US markets. China was also among the top three downstream
partners of all CPTPP members — with the exception of Brunei — illustrating China’s
role as the world’s assembly factory. The other important downstream partners of
the CPTPP countries in 2011 included members such as Japan and Singapore, but
also nonmembers such as Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The latter three regularly
ranked among the top five downstream trade partners of the CPTPP countries.
This highlights the important omission of these countries from the CPTPP grouping
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and the potential benefits they may bring to consolidate the CPTPP-wide supply
networks.
As expected, the US was the most important downstream trade partner of Mexico
and Canada. It intermediated more than half of these countries’ domestic contents
related to GVC trade, leading the second most important downstream partner (China
for Canada and Canada for Mexico) by a large margin of approximately 45 percentage
points. When restricting the focus to the CPTPP markets for final absorption, the
importance of the US as an intermediary only strengthens. This could be due to
the fact that the CPTPP includes four countries in the Americas, and the US is
geographically proximate to these destinations.
Interestingly, China was not among the top five downstream partners of Brunei.
Instead, Korea was the most important downstream partner of Brunei in 2011 (followed
by Australia, Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam). This remains the case even when the
final absorption market is restricted to CPTPP or CPTPP augmented with the US
or China. One possible explanation is that Brunei’s main exports were primary
commodities (such as metal products, non-metallic mineral products, and basic
metals). These sectors are relatively upstream and hence likely take a longer route
through the GVC before reaching the place of final demand. Thus, countries that
specialize in manufacturing assembly such as China may play a less significant role
in Brunei’s immediate downstream connections.
Geography appears to have affected downstream partner selection to some extent.
For example, Australia was the most important downstream partner of New Zealand,
and the US was of Canada and Mexico. Similarly, countries that are part of CPTPP
or located close to the CPTPP countries became more prominent as downstream
partners for DC destined to the CPTPP markets. For instance, in the case of Mexico,
Canada was its second most important downstream partner for the world market,
followed by China, Spain, and ROW. However, for the CPTPP market, China and
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Korea became relatively more important and ranked as the second and fourth leading
downstream partners of Mexico.
2.5 Key Upstream Partners
In this section, we identify the key upstream trade partners for each CPTPP member
and for value added originating from a specified group of countries (such as the
world or the CPTPP region). From an importing country’s perspective, another
country is an important upstream trade partner in the GVC network if the country
passes on a large amount of foreign contents from third countries to the importer
for absorption or for further processing before being exported again. Formally, we
define the bilateral upstreamness of country s to country r as:
UGsr =
FCG◦sr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrsr
∑c{FCG◦cr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrcr}
(2.6)
where FCG◦sr measures all foreign contents originating from the countries in group G
that are embedded in bilateral exports from country s to country r. It corresponds
to the sum of components 7∗–9∗ in Table 1.2 across all countries t 6= s in group
G. This includes the foreign contents absorbed in r (components 7∗–8∗) but also
those re-exported by country r and absorbed in third countries (component 9∗). We
exclude the importer r’s content in country s’s gross exports to r since it is not clear
in this case which country is upstream (or downstream) in relation to the other. As
a result, the numerator of (2.6) corresponds to the GVC-trade in which exporter s
passes on third countries’ contents to r. A country s with a higher value of UGsr than
country s′ is regarded as a more important upstream trade partner of country r since
it passes on a larger portion of third-country contents to the importer r among all
third-country contents that r receives in its imports.
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Table 2.3 summarizes the results for 2011, with each column corresponding to a
specified source of contents (G in our formula). First, the CPTPP countries imported
10.33–41.71% of their goods/services from each other. Brunei was the smallest
importer (with a gross value of US$4.2 billion in 2011) but had the highest share of
imports from the region. For the CPTPP countries in the Americas (Canada, Mexico,
Chile and Peru), imports from the CPTPP were around 10–15% of each country’s
total imports. For the members in Asia, the proportion was substantially higher,
with an average of about 26%. When the US and China are included as a source of
imports, the shares increase significantly to around 50% for all countries (with the
exception of Singapore). The US was in particular an essential source of imports
for Canada and Mexico: the share increases from 10% to 60% when the source of
imports is expanded from the CPTPP region to include the US.
Next, in calculating (2.6), we exclude the importer’s contents embedded in its
bilateral gross imports. For most of the CPTPP countries, the importer’s own content
embedded in its gross imports was negligible (at less than 1%, not reported in
the table). Canada, Mexico and Japan were on the high side, with 1.1–2% for the
corresponding figures. The ranking of bilateral upstream partners by the index UGsr
in equation (2.6) indicates that China was the most important upstream partner of
Japan, Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Peru. In particular, for Japan
and Vietnam, more than 25% of third-country contents they imported were intermediated
by China. A majority (65%) of these third-country contents imported from China by
Japan was absorbed in Japan (with 35% being re-exported again). In contrast, a
majority (52%) of the third-country contents imported from China by Vietnam was
re-exported after further processing in Vietnam. Thus, China played two distinct
roles as an upstream partner: one as the world assembly factory for goods close to
final demand as indicated in the previous section, and the other as the intermediary
of intermediate inputs in the GVC. Invariably, China ranked among the top five
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upstream partners of all the CPTPP countries.
The US, on the other hand, was the most important upstream partner of Canada
and Mexico, and also had a significant role as upstream partner of Chile and Peru.
Singapore was the most important upstream partner of Malaysia and Brunei, while
Singapore itself had a very diversified set of upstream partners with a low concentration
at the top. Korea is a nonmember that stands out as a major upstream trade partner
of CPTPP members, even for the Latin American countries. Taiwan and Thailand
were similarly two important nonmembers that were critical upstream partners of
several CPTPP countries.
When the source of content is restricted to the narrowest grouping of the CPTPP
countries, typically Asian countries replaced European countries as important upstream
partners (such as Thailand versus the UK for Brunei, Korea/Taiwan versus the
UK/Germany for Canada, Taiwan/Malaysia versus Germany/Canada for Mexico,
and Japan versus Germany for Chile). When the source of contents is restricted to
the CPTPP plus the US or China (or both), the set (and the ranking) of key upstream
partners for each of the members remains very similar to the case of the world. This
reflects the importance of the US or China in world GDP (and their valued added in
the GVC).
As noted from the analysis above, many countries were simultaneously important
upstream and downstream trade partners of the CPTPP countries. This to some
extent reflects the relative size of trade volumes across countries. A large trading
country (such as China) will tend to intermediate large amounts of intermediate
inputs from and to other countries, relative to a country with small trade volume
(such as Brunei). Nonetheless, bilateral distance and underlying production technologies
still play a role, as suggested by the close linkages among the American countries,
and the minor role China played in Brunei’s GVC linkages. In Section 2.7, we look
at the bilateral supply chain relationships at the sector level, which reveal some
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interesting heterogeneous patterns of upstream-downstream relationships across
sectors (which might reflect the influence of trade cost and production technologies
to different extents).
In the appendix, we discuss potential generalizations of the bilateral downstream/upstream
indices, which encompass a larger set of gross-export decomposition components.
The comparison of the narrow and broad indices will provide extra insights into the
bilateral linkages across countries. But as will be shown, the general conclusions on
the key downstream/upstream partners remain similar.
2.6 Position in Global Value Chains
In this section, we ask a slightly different question. Instead of ranking trading
partners in terms of the intermediate inputs they intermediate for a country, we
evaluate for each country the relative importance of different segments of GVC
trade it engages in. In so doing, the measure neutralizes the impact of economic
size (which played a significant role in the bilateral downstreamness/upstreamness
measures), since the different segments of GVC trade are normalized relative to
gross exports. The resulting measures characterize the absolute position (downstreamness)
of the countries under study. We explore two potential indicators.
First, based on the BM decomposition, we examine the fraction of domestic
content directly absorbed by bilateral importers, i.e., the amount of traditional trade
(TTs∗), relative to domestic content (DCs∗) in a country’s gross exports. This fraction








where in the last term, the numerator is the fraction of domestic content directly
absorbed by bilateral importers in gross exports and the denominator is the fraction
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of domestic content in gross exports. We can regard this as an index of a country’s
closeness to final demands or the downstreamness of a country in the supply chains.
The results are summarized in Figure 2.2 for 2011. We find that more than half of
domestic content from the CPTPP countries was directly absorbed by their bilateral
importers, ranging from 68.10% for Brunei to 84.53% for New Zealand. The levels
were however quite similar across CPTPP countries, and also close to the world
average. Thus, it is not a very informative measure of downstreamness.
Next, we look at the fraction of foreign content in a country’s total amount of
GVC-related gross exports, that is:
D2s ≡
FCs∗





where FCs∗ and DCs∗ are respectively the foreign content and domestic content
in country s’s total gross exports. A larger D2s implies that a larger fraction of
GVC-related exports of country s is contributed by foreign contents and less by
domestic contents. In other words, the country has more backward linkages relative
to forward linkages; hence, the country is positioned relatively downstream in the
global value chains.
The results for this index are reported in Table 2.4 for two benchmark years,
1995 and 2011. In 1995, Singapore, Mexico, Canada, Malaysia and Vietnam were
located relatively downstream in the global value chains (similar to China), while
Japan, Brunei, Peru and Australia were the opposite (in the same league as the US).
Between 1995 and 2011, countries such as Brunei, Peru and Australia moved even
more upstream, while Japan became more downstream. Vietnam experienced the
biggest changes, and became the most downstream country among the group in
2011. Malaysia similarly moved further downstream, although less dramatically
than Vietnam.
Relative to CPTPP countries, China’s position was relatively downstream in 1995,
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with its D2s index only second to Singapore’s. However, it moved upstream in the
chains over the years (even though it was still on the relatively downstream side).
The US, on the other hand, moved downstream. Thus, the two large trading blocs
became closer competitors in their GVC positions.
2.7 CPTPP and Global Value Chains at Sector Levels
In this section, we characterize the GVC participation of the CPTPP countries at the
sector level. We disaggregate the bilateral gross exports of a country s by sector of
exports. In equation (2.1), we define B̃cc ≡ (I− Acc)−1 for c = s, t. Recall that it is
the local Leontief matrix of country c. The decomposition of equation (2.1) by sector
of exports is obtained by expanding VcB̃cc (a 1 × G vector) to a G × G diagonal
matrix with each element of VcB̃cc placed along the principal diagonal and zeros
elsewhere.
2.7.1 GVC Participation
Given the sectoral disaggregation, we calculate the GVC participation index GVCBM
as in equation (2.4) for each export sector. For example, component 1a* of country
s’s exports of electronics includes country s’s DVA from all its domestic sectors
embodied in electronics exports (as s’s final goods) directly absorbed by the bilateral
importer r. Similarly, component 2a* of country s’s exports of electronics includes
country s’s DVA from all its domestic sectors embodied in electronics exports (as
intermediate inputs for further processing in the bilateral importer) and absorbed by
the bilateral importer as r’s local final goods/services. The remaining components
consist of country s’s domestic contents embedded in country s’s exports of electronics
not directly absorbed by bilateral importers, and also foreign contents in s’s exports
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of electronics. The resulting GVCBM index measures how much of country s’s
electronics exports are associated with GVC trade.
The results are presented in Table 2.5. For each country, we highlight sectors
whose percentages of GVC-related trade in gross exports exceed the country’s in the
aggregate, where the country’s overall GVC participation is as indicated in Table 2.1
under the column GVCBM. We note that manufacturing sectors in CPTPP countries
were deeply intertwined in the global value chains. Basic metals was a particularly
GVC-intensive sector for most countries in the group, with the lowest level for
Mexico (46.99%) and the highest for Singapore (81.78%). This is against a world
average of 64.00%. The other industries typically involved in GVC of CPTPP countries
included computer, electronic and optical equipment, fabricated metal products,
rubber and plastics, chemicals and chemical products. Coke, refined petroleum
products and nuclear fuel was a GVC-active sector in some CPTPP countries such
as Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and Chile. On the other hand, Canada, Mexico and
the US were characterized with a very high level of GVC trade in motor vehicles
(65.50%–53.26%), relative to a world average of 49.64%.
The service sectors of CTPPP countries in general were not heavily engaged in
GVC. Nonetheless, R&D and other business activities, and financial intermediation
were two service industries that appeared to be highly GVC-intensive for some
countries. For instance, New Zealand had 44.03% of financial intermediation and
38.59% of R&D activities associated with GVC. The corresponding figures were
43.93% and 49.07% for Malaysia, 45.41% and 54.24% for Singapore, and 50.52%
and 53.19% for Vietnam. In comparison, the world averages of GVC trade were
37% for financial intermediation and 42.71% for R&D. Thus, all these countries
stood out in terms of GVC participation in the sector of financial intermediation,
but the three Southeast Asian countries stood out even more in the sector of R&D
and other business activities. It is also noteworthy that Mexico’s construction sector
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(51.28%) and Chile’s transport and storage services (50%) were prominent in their
GVC participation, against the world benchmarks of 29.79% and 39.97% respectively.
2.7.2 Upstream/Downstream Partners
We now select five sectors that are GVC-intensive (as analyzed above) and identify
the key upstream/downstream partners for the CPTPP countries in each of these
sectors. These include rubber and plastics products (Sector 9), basic metals (Sector
11), computer, electronic and optical equipment (Sector 14), electrical machinery and
apparatus, nec (Sector 15), and motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (Sector 16).
This exercise provides a more comprehensive understanding of the supply chain
relationship across countries in GVC-intensive sectors. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 summarize
the results. The ranking is based on the world as the final destination of contents
for the downstreamness measure and the world as the source of contents for the
upstreamness measure.
Overall, in 2011 China was a critical partner for most CPTPP countries, especially
in computers and electrical machinery. Next to China, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand also
played important downstream intermediary roles for several CPTPP countries in
these two industries. The four countries together also played significant downstream
intermediary roles in rubber and plastics products, and in basic metals, for CPTPP
countries in Asia.
Nonetheless, Tables 2.6 and 2.7 indicate there are substantial heterogeneities
across sectors in bilateral GVC linkages. For example, China was a dominant downstream
partner of Japan in computers and electrical machinery, but this status was replaced
by the US in Japan’s car exports. Similarly, the dominance of China and Malaysia
as downstream partners of Singapore in computers and electrical machinery was
replaced by Indonesia and ROW in the car industry. Thailand and Japan were,
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respectively, Malaysia’s and Vietnam’s most important downstream partners in the
car industry.
The US was an essential downstream partner of Canada and Mexico in all five
industries, with the US intermediating typically more than half of their GVC-related
domestic contents. This is especially pronounced in Canada’s car exports, with
87.24% of Canada’s domestic contents in forward linkages intermediated by the
US. There are, however, exceptions. In the computer industry, China intermediated
equally large amounts (nearly 30%) of Canada’s domestic contents as the US in
forward linkages. In addition to the big two, European countries such as Germany,
Norway, Hungary and the UK were often among the top five downstream partners
of Canada. On the other hand, Chile and Peru had more diversified and regional
forward linkages.
In turn Table 2.7 shows that in sectors of rubber/plastics, computers, and electrical
machinery, the set of top five upstream trade partners often overlapped with those
of downstream partners. However, for heavy items such as basic metals and cars,
this was less the case. For example, in basic metals, Thailand and Malaysia were key
downstream partners of Japan (but not its key upstream partners), while Russia and
South Africa were key upstream partners of Japan (but not the other way around).
Similarly, in the car industry, Russia was among the top five downstream partners
of Japan (but not upstream), while Germany topped the list of Japan’s upstream
partners (but not downstream). Thus, the direction of the GVC in these two industries
had a more defined pattern of upstream-downstream relationships. This is likely
due to the higher transportation cost involved in these industries, and as a result,
lower frequencies of back-and-forth shipping across countries in production arrangements.
While China still was a dominant upstream partner to most CPTPP countries
in most sectors, Germany clearly stood out as a key upstream partner of all in
the car industry (except Chile and Peru). For example, it transferred 25–26% of
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third-country contents to Singapore and Japan. Thailand (and Taiwan to a lesser
extent) also played an important upstream role in the rubber and plastics industry
for CPTPP countries, with their joint share sometimes rivaling that of China. Finally,
Taiwan and Korea were prominent upstream partners in the computer industry
(next to China), while Japan and Germany were non-negligible upstream players
in the sector of basic metals.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, by decomposing a country’s gross exports à la Koopman, Wang and
Wei (2014) and Borin and Mancini (2017), we propose formulas that measure the
relative importance of bilateral trading partners in intermediating a country’s backward
and forward linkages. By exploiting the relative proportion of foreign contents and
domestic contents in a country’s GVC-related gross exports, we also suggest a GVC-
positioning index that measures a country’s absolute downstreamness in the global
production network. These formulas and indices can be further generalized to the
sector level and/or with respect to a subset of market destinations for absorption or
countries of origin of contents.
We apply these measures to study whether the grouping of CPTPP countries is
ideal in the sense that members are important downstream/upstream partners of
one another. Given their dominant economy sizes, we also analyze the interaction
of China and the US with the CPTPP countries in the GVC. We find that the CPTPP
countries were deeply integrated in the global value chains with strong dependence
on one another. In 2011, at least one third of every country’s gross exports was
associated with GVC trade. Among the eleven countries, Singapore had the highest
level of GVC trade (57.26%) and Brunei the lowest (34.80%). Of their GVC-related
gross exports, countries such as Singapore had a dominant proportion made up
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of foreign contents (41.59% out of 57.26%), while others such as Japan had a large
fraction consisting of domestic contents that are further processed and embedded
in other countries’ gross exports. Such differences show that CPTPP countries such
as Japan (as well as Brunei, Peru and Australia) were located relatively upstream,
while countries such as Singapore (and similarly, Mexico, Malaysia and Vietnam)
were located relatively downstream in the global value chains. Relative to CPTPP
countries, China’s position was relatively downstream in 1995, only second to Singapore.
However, it moved upstream in the chains over the years (even though it was still
on the relatively downstream side). The US (in the same league as Japan in 1995),
on the other hand, moved downstream. Thus, the two large trading blocs became
closer competitors in their GVC positions.
China and the US, although not part of the partnership, were often among the
top five downstream and upstream partners of CPTPP countries. The US played
a particularly important role for Canada and Mexico, for both intermediating their
domestic contents to final absorption destinations as well as transferring third-country
contents to these two countries for absorption or for further processing. China, on
the other hand, was a critical downstream and upstream partner of CPTPP members
in Asia but also in South America. Relative to Canada and Mexico, the other CPTPP
members had more diversified forward and backward linkages across trading partners.
The linkages were typically strong among Asian/Australasian CPTPP members
and less so across the Pacific. Nonmembers such as Korea, Taiwan and Thailand
stood out as dominant downstream and upstream trade partners of many CPTPP
countries. Their omission from the partnership thus implies some potential ramifications
on the re-alignment of the supply chains in the region.
Relative to CPTPP’s high levels of participation in GVC trade in the aggregate,
several manufacturing and service sectors of these countries were even more involved
in the global value chains. These included rubber and plastics products, basic metals,
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computer, electronic and optical equipment in manufacturing, as well as R&D, construction,
and financial intermediation in services. Leading upstream and downstream partners
at the sector level exhibited more fundamental heterogeneities across industries
compared to those at the aggregate trade level. While China continued to play a
dominant intermediary role in both downstream and upstream linkages in computers
and electrical machinery, sectors characterized by high trade cost such as cars typically
had distinct sets of key downstream partners from upstream partners. The set
of important trade partners were also more diversified at the sector levels, with
European and South American countries also playing significant roles in different
sectors for different CPTPP members.
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TABLE 2.1: Participation of CPTPP members in GVC
JAPAN VS GVCKWW GVCBM AUSTRALIA VS GVCKWW GVCBM
1995 5.61% 24.64% 25.54% 1995 11.97% 26.81% 27.00%
2000 7.38% 30.05% 31.12% 2000 15.69% 33.15% 33.43%
2005 11.07% 35.38% 36.32% 2005 11.97% 31.78% 32.04%
2011 14.66% 39.46% 40.47% 2011 13.90% 35.89% 36.24%
SINGAPORE VS GVCKWW GVCBM NEW ZEALAND VS GVCKWW GVCBM
1995 42.02% 52.12% 52.57% 1995 16.79% 25.77% 26.23%
2000 45.22% 59.45% 60.02% 2000 22.09% 33.33% 34.02%
2005 39.66% 55.38% 56.00% 2005 15.67% 27.10% 27.70%
2011 41.59% 56.48% 57.26% 2011 16.76% 29.36% 30.18%
MALAYSIA VS GVCKWW GVCBM CANADA VS GVCKWW GVCBM
1995 30.40% 43.10% 43.51% 1995 24.15% 33.21% 34.44%
2000 47.64% 60.09% 60.52% 2000 26.80% 35.56% 36.81%
2005 45.85% 58.48% 58.86% 2005 23.39% 32.78% 33.87%
2011 40.51% 55.67% 56.17% 2011 23.55% 37.95% 38.77%
VIETNAM VS GVCKWW GVCBM MEXICO VS GVCKWW GVCBM
1995 21.43% 31.70% 33.55% 1995 27.27% 36.01% 36.82%
2000 27.15% 42.04% 42.84% 2000 34.33% 42.20% 43.11%
2005 30.93% 44.72% 45.27% 2005 32.98% 40.92% 41.63%
2011 36.33% 48.52% 48.70% 2011 31.65% 43.21% 44.02%
BRUNEI VS GVCKWW GVCBM CHILE VS GVCKWW GVCBM
1995 7.26% 23.88% 24.09% 1995 14.10% 29.68% 30.10%
2000 5.35% 29.59% 29.91% 2000 21.34% 38.73% 40.60%
2005 4.64% 31.80% 32.16% 2005 18.72% 40.57% 41.73%
2011 4.26% 34.39% 34.80% 2011 19.98% 43.29% 44.75%
CHINA VS GVCKWW GVCBM PERU VS GVCKWW GVCBM
1995 30.96% 39.23% 39.54% 1995 9.85% 27.57% 27.89%
2000 35.89% 44.68% 45.27% 2000 10.71% 29.81% 30.51%
2005 37.31% 48.38% 48.93% 2005 12.31% 34.86% 35.42%
2011 32.04% 45.22% 45.82% 2011 11.79% 38.42% 38.97%
WORLD VS GVCKWW GVCBM USA VS GVCKWW GVCBM
1995 17.87% 32.71% 33.32% 1995 11.43% 28.75% 29.08%
2000 21.40% 38.42% 39.16% 2000 12.52% 33.87% 34.30%
2005 22.75% 40.51% 41.15% 2005 12.99% 33.87% 34.41%
2011 24.32% 43.02% 43.74% 2011 14.95% 35.25% 35.75%
Note: The measures are defined in equation (2.2) for VS, equation (2.3) for GVCKWW , and equation (2.4) for GVCBM .
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TABLE 2.2: Key downstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.50 9.75 25.27 34.77 50.29
1st downstream partner CHN (34.37) CHN (37.08) CHN (40.58) CHN (28.06) CHN (34.51)
2nd downstream partner KOR (11.86) USA (12.06) KOR (9.94) KOR (14.98) KOR (12.73)
3rd downstream partner TWN (9.53) KOR (10.44) TWN (8.95) TWN (14.58) TWN (12.25)
4th downstream partner USA (6.48) TWN (9.02) USA (7.78) USA (9.25) USA (7.01)
5th downstream partner THA (5.83) THA (8.02) THA (5.75) THA (7.60) THA (5.97)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.44 23.60 33.35 35.88 45.63
1st downstream partner CHN (19.81) CHN (23.79) CHN (26.66) MYS (20.94) CHN (21.19)
2nd downstream partner MYS (14.84) MYS (16.64) MYS (15.81) CHN (16.25) MYS (18.72)
3rd downstream partner KOR (6.25) THA (7.92) KOR (6.10) KOR (8.93) KOR (7.90)
4th downstream partner THA (5.76) USA (7.19) THA (6.05) TWN (8.31) TWN (7.33)
5th downstream partner TWN (5.15) KOR (6.04) TWN (5.35) THA (7.34) THA (6.17)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.76 21.58 30.42 47.06 55.90
1st downstream partner CHN (32.26) CHN (33.49) CHN (39.57) CHN (26.35) CHN (33.85)
2nd downstream partner SGP (7.82) SGP (9.56) SGP (7.32) KOR (9.60) KOR (8.02)
3rd downstream partner THA (7.32) THA (9.39) THA (7.17) THA (9.40) TWN (7.69)
4th downstream partner KOR (7.06) KOR (7.08) KOR (6.29) TWN (9.16) THA (7.63)
5th downstream partner TWN (6.24) AUS (6.73) TWN (5.87) SGP (9.01) SGP (7.45)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 22.55 37.81 36.39 51.65
1st downstream partner CHN (21.08) CHN (23.61) CHN (27.54) CHN (16.90) CHN (22.14)
2nd downstream partner MYS (11.82) MYS (12.95) KOR (11.05) MYS (14.70) KOR (13.05)
3rd downstream partner KOR (11.03) KOR (11.58) MYS (10.99) KOR (14.39) MYS (12.62)
4th downstream partner AUS (8.33) AUS (11.03) AUS (8.05) AUS (13.24) AUS (10.23)
5th downstream partner JPN (6.46) USA (9.11) JPN (6.32) JPN (7.12) JPN (7.35)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 59.83 61.95 64.38 66.51
1st downstream partner KOR (24.52) KOR (23.91) KOR (23.98) KOR (26.23) KOR (25.75)
2nd downstream partner AUS (20.71) AUS (22.24) AUS (19.14) AUS (24.92) AUS (22.18)
3rd downstream partner JPN (19.13) IDN (15.23) JPN (18.34) JPN (17.16) JPN (18.86)
4th downstream partner IDN (11.67) JPN (15.22) IDN (13.37) IDN (12.96) IDN (12.20)
5th downstream partner VNM (5.48) NZL (8.28) NZL (7.07) NZL (6.08) NZL (5.75)
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AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 26.37 31.75 53.18 58.56
1st downstream partner CHN (27.78) CHN (28.84) CHN (31.85) KOR (23.51) CHN (26.19)
2nd downstream partner KOR (17.12) KOR (19.31) KOR (16.89) CHN (21.39) KOR (20.24)
3rd downstream partner JPN (10.55) JPN (9.82) JPN (10.23) JPN (12.36) JPN (11.83)
4th downstream partner TWN (7.73) TWN (8.67) TWN (7.93) TWN (10.84) TWN (9.55)
5th downstream partner IND (5.32) THA (7.09) THA (5.50) THA (6.27) THA (5.32)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.36 39.51 49.31 50.27 60.06
1st downstream partner AUS (25.15) AUS (31.61) AUS (25.01) AUS (36.31) AUS (29.86)
2nd downstream partner CHN (17.45) CHN (20.06) CHN (23.24) CHN (13.93) CHN (18.25)
3rd downstream partner SGP (7.86) SGP (9.37) SGP (7.94) SGP (8.50) SGP (7.69)
4th downstream partner KOR (5.73) USA (6.01) KOR (5.80) KOR (6.99) KOR (6.70)
5th downstream partner JPN (4.66) KOR (5.59) MYS (4.23) MYS (5.30) JPN (4.91)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.87 7.30 74.05 12.19 78.93
1st downstream partner USA (52.67) USA (72.27) USA (60.62) USA (66.73) USA (58.48)
2nd downstream partner CHN (8.98) CHN (7.59) CHN (10.10) CHN (6.90) CHN (9.26)
3rd downstream partner KOR (4.15) KOR (3.57) MEX (6.49) KOR (5.37) MEX (5.71)
4th downstream partner GBR (4.03) MEX (1.89) KOR (3.67) JPN (2.16) KOR (4.90)
5th downstream partner MEX (3.20) GBR (1.58) GBR (2.60) TWN (1.90) GBR (2.58)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.82 10.40 80.06 13.54 83.21
1st downstream partner USA (57.60) USA (78.22) USA (59.89) USA (73.90) USA (59.40)
2nd downstream partner CAN (10.43) CHN (4.78) CAN (18.46) CAN (4.92) CAN (16.91)
3rd downstream partner CHN (6.03) CAN (4.69) CHN (5.89) CHN (4.48) CHN (5.56)
4th downstream partner ESP (5.27) KOR (1.88) ESP (2.67) KOR (2.93) ESP (2.61)
5th downstream partner ROW (2.49) ESP (1.30) KOR (1.86) ROW (1.52) KOR (2.53)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.05 18.80 29.11 42.52 52.83
1st downstream partner CHN (34.19) CHN (39.57) CHN (39.58) CHN (31.50) CHN (35.02)
2nd downstream partner KOR (9.41) USA (11.63) KOR (8.64) KOR (14.08) KOR (10.88)
3rd downstream partner USA (5.60) KOR (10.72) CAN (7.08) USA (9.78) USA (6.70)
4th downstream partner JPN (5.12) TWN (5.84) USA (6.97) TWN (8.09) TWN (6.65)
5th downstream partner TWN (5.00) JPN (5.13) MEX (5.84) JPN (7.25) CAN (6.28)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 25.92 40.54 46.10 60.73
1st downstream partner CHN (19.05) CHN (24.25) CAN (30.08) KOR (19.93) CAN (26.51)
2nd downstream partner CAN (16.62) KOR (15.91) CHN (19.97) CHN (18.35) CHN (17.59)
3rd downstream partner KOR (11.24) USA (13.05) KOR (10.28) CHL (13.09) KOR (13.35)
4th downstream partner CHL (8.78) CAN (11.58) CHL (7.52) CAN (10.76) CHL (9.57)
5th downstream partner ESP (8.23) CHL (9.99) USA (6.84) USA (10.40) USA (6.49)
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TABLE 2.3: Key upstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 15.37 28.07 36.72 49.43
1st upstream partner CHN (29.28) CHN (32.57) CHN (32.47) CHN (22.18) CHN (25.60)
2nd upstream partner KOR (10.97) USA (14.52) KOR (11.18) KOR (14.17) KOR (12.05)
3rd upstream partner USA (7.19) KOR (13.64) USA (8.32) USA (14.07) USA (9.33)
4th upstream partner THA (4.31) THA (5.31) AUS (4.55) THA (6.23) THA (5.25)
5th upstream partner TWN (3.94) AUS (5.21) THA (4.46) TWN (5.48) TWN (5.10)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 16.22 29.29 24.46 37.52
1st upstream partner MYS (9.18) CHN (14.60) CHN (12.35) USA (12.63) MYS (11.01)
2nd upstream partner CHN (9.11) USA (13.37) MYS (10.18) MYS (11.66) CHN (9.64)
3rd upstream partner TWN (8.83) TWN (12.21) TWN (9.66) TWN (10.60) KOR (9.15)
4th upstream partner IND (7.99) MYS (10.65) KOR (9.00) KOR (10.18) USA (9.13)
5th upstream partner KOR (7.44) KOR (10.40) USA (8.62) CHN (10.16) TWN (9.06)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 26.96 35.59 40.78 49.40
1st upstream partner SGP (17.96) CHN (24.71) CHN (22.49) CHN (17.32) CHN (17.48)
2nd upstream partner CHN (17.56) THA (12.89) SGP (15.34) SGP (13.63) SGP (15.47)
3rd upstream partner THA (9.39) SGP (12.67) THA (10.84) THA (12.50) THA (11.00)
4th upstream partner TWN (7.58) TWN (10.51) TWN (9.20) TWN (10.35) TWN (9.37)
5th upstream partner KOR (6.01) KOR (7.90) KOR (7.20) KOR (8.32) KOR (7.66)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 20.70 25.05 43.57 47.92
1st upstream partner CHN (25.09) CHN (30.78) CHN (29.37) CHN (23.94) CHN (24.25)
2nd upstream partner KOR (16.19) KOR (18.20) KOR (17.54) KOR (20.02) KOR (19.08)
3rd upstream partner TWN (13.51) TWN (15.30) TWN (13.84) TWN (15.16) TWN (13.98)
4th upstream partner THA (9.53) THA (11.16) THA (10.03) THA (11.27) THA (10.31)
5th upstream partner SGP (6.16) MYS (4.48) SGP (5.01) MYS (5.01) SGP (5.17)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 41.71 62.03 49.35 69.67
1st upstream partner SGP (28.91) SGP (24.63) SGP (30.25) SGP (25.34) SGP (29.47)
2nd upstream partner MYS (19.73) MYS (22.73) MYS (19.93) MYS (22.00) MYS (20.03)
3rd upstream partner USA (11.80) USA (19.60) USA (13.20) USA (19.20) USA (14.39)
4th upstream partner GBR (5.35) CHN (7.15) CHN (6.38) THA (5.17) CHN (4.90)
5th upstream partner CHN (5.30) THA (5.71) THA (4.69) CHN (4.93) THA (4.52)
74 Chapter 2. Global Value Chains and the CPTPP
AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 23.57 37.34 39.03 52.80
1st upstream partner CHN (19.60) CHN (28.59) CHN (26.11) CHN (20.68) CHN (20.91)
2nd upstream partner SGP (10.26) USA (15.10) USA (9.80) USA (14.68) USA (10.56)
3rd upstream partner USA (7.74) THA (10.25) SGP (8.64) THA (10.03) SGP (8.90)
4th upstream partner THA (6.35) SGP (7.63) THA (8.22) SGP (8.27) THA (8.46)
5th upstream partner KOR (5.68) KOR (5.87) KOR (5.28) KOR (6.27) KOR (5.69)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 34.98 45.01 45.89 55.92
1st upstream partner CHN (15.12) CHN (22.58) CHN (19.95) CHN (16.32) CHN (15.98)
2nd upstream partner AUS (12.44) AUS (12.75) AUS (14.22) AUS (14.50) AUS (15.18)
3rd upstream partner SGP (10.64) USA (11.03) SGP (9.64) USA (10.95) SGP (9.73)
4th upstream partner KOR (6.73) SGP (9.07) USA (7.15) SGP (9.35) USA (7.86)
5th upstream partner USA (6.10) KOR (8.67) KOR (7.06) KOR (8.25) KOR (7.08)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.33 59.70 19.86 69.22
1st upstream partner USA (37.25) USA (50.26) USA (34.46) USA (51.10) USA (39.08)
2nd upstream partner CHN (14.68) CHN (21.06) CHN (19.63) CHN (14.12) CHN (14.68)
3rd upstream partner MEX (8.14) MEX (5.31) MEX (14.94) MEX (7.56) MEX (14.24)
4th upstream partner GBR (3.82) KOR (3.85) KOR (3.61) KOR (3.91) KOR (3.71)
5th upstream partner DEU (3.67) TWN (2.91) TWN (2.60) TWN (2.78) TWN (2.58)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.72 62.20 23.49 74.96
1st upstream partner USA (38.56) USA (49.08) USA (37.18) USA (50.07) USA (40.43)
2nd upstream partner CHN (20.73) CHN (26.18) CHN (26.25) CHN (19.51) CHN (20.85)
3rd upstream partner KOR (5.01) KOR (5.77) CAN (7.34) KOR (6.62) CAN (6.66)
4th upstream partner DEU (4.61) TWN (3.00) KOR (6.01) TWN (3.18) KOR (6.65)
5th upstream partner CAN (4.27) MYS (2.47) TWN (2.96) MYS (2.77) TWN (3.11)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 11.75 32.64 25.68 46.30
1st upstream partner CHN (19.28) USA (34.79) CHN (23.39) USA (31.62) USA (22.92)
2nd upstream partner USA (19.09) CHN (25.67) USA (23.20) CHN (19.51) CHN (19.32)
3rd upstream partner ROW (8.45) KOR (7.42) ROW (7.33) KOR (8.20) ROW (8.76)
4th upstream partner KOR (5.95) ROW (5.55) KOR (6.62) ROW (7.95) KOR (7.32)
5th upstream partner DEU (4.63) JPN (3.26) MEX (6.41) MEX (3.96) MEX (6.67)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 14.71 34.19 30.45 49.92
1st upstream partner CHN (22.76) CHN (30.74) CHN (26.26) USA (25.75) CHN (21.62)
2nd upstream partner USA (16.05) USA (27.66) USA (17.58) CHN (22.98) USA (18.03)
3rd upstream partner MEX (7.79) KOR (6.84) MEX (13.00) KOR (7.66) MEX (13.13)
4th upstream partner ROW (6.03) MEX (5.42) KOR (5.92) MEX (7.52) KOR (6.66)
5th upstream partner KOR (5.37) THA (3.58) ROW (4.37) ROW (4.82) ROW (5.17)
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TABLE 2.4: Position of CPTPP countries in the GVC (1995 and 2011)
1995 2011
VS GVCBM Ratio VS GVCBM Ratio
Japan 5.62% 25.54% 0.22 Brunei 4.26% 34.80% 0.12
Brunei 7.26% 24.09% 0.30 Peru 11.79% 38.97% 0.30
Peru 9.85% 27.89% 0.35 Japan 14.70% 40.47& 0.36
United States 11.43% 29.08% 0.39 Australia 13.90% 36.24% 0.38
Australia 11.97% 27.00% 0.44 United States 14.97% 35.75% 0.42
Chile 14.11% 30.10% 0.47 Chile 20.21% 44.75% 0.45
New Zealand 16.83% 26.33% 0.64 New Zealand 16.82% 30.18% 0.56
Vietnam 21.62% 33.55% 0.64 Canada 23.57% 38.77% 0.61
Malaysia 30.41% 43.51% 0.70 China 32.11% 45.82% 0.70
Canada 24.21% 34.44% 0.70 Mexico 31.69% 44.02% 0.72
Mexico 27.28% 36.82% 0.74 Malaysia 40.58% 56.17% 0.72
China 30.98% 39.54% 0.78 Singapore 41.73% 57.26% 0.73
Singapore 42.06% 52.57% 0.80 Vietnam 36.33% 48.70% 0.75
Note: The measures are defined in equation (2.2) for VS, and equation (2.4) for GVCBM. The
ratio is defined by VS/GVCBM.









JAPAN SINGAPORE MALAYSIA VIETNAM BRUNEI AUSTRALIA NEW
ZEALAND
CANADA MEXICO CHILE PERU CHINA USA WORLD
Backward Linkages Forward Linkages
Note: Backward linkage is measured by VS in equation (2.2); forward linkage is measured by
GVCBM in equation (2.4) net of VS in equation (2.2).
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TABLE 2.5: Participation in GVC by sector
Sectors JPN Sectors AUS
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 70.11% 11 Basic metals 62.23%
11 Basic metals 60.60% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 49.79%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 56.11% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 47.58%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 55.99% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.09%
09 Rubber and plastics products 50.95% 12 Fabricated metal products 39.89%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 50.80% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 39.27%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 46.00% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 39.19%
02 Mining and quarrying 46.00% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 39.02%
12 Fabricated metal products 44.36% 02 Mining and quarrying 38.98%
24 Post and telecommunications 42.02% 17 Other transport equipment 38.79%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 41.53% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 38.73%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 40.91% 29 R&D and other business activities 38.48%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 39.91% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 38.39%
23 Transport and storage 39.83% 24 Post and telecommunications 38.21%
29 R&D and other business activities 34.88% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 35.32%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 34.65% 20 Construction 34.55%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 33.48% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 34.17%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.32% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.62%
25 Financial intermediation 31.80% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 32.92%
17 Other transport equipment 27.19% 23 Transport and storage 30.52%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 25.90% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 30.32%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 21.88% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 29.53%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 21.55% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 28.90%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 17.70% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 25.20%
33 Other community, social and personal services 16.91% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 22.51%
28 Computer and related activities 15.99% 25 Financial intermediation 22.28%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 13.87% 28 Computer and related activities 21.47%
20 Construction 13.38% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 21.44%
22 Hotels and restaurants 9.93% 32 Health and social work 14.78%
32 Health and social work 9.20% 33 Other community, social and personal services 12.55%
26 Real estate activities 5.67% 22 Hotels and restaurants 10.79%
31 Education 3.23% 31 Education 5.15%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 0% 26 Real estate activities 4.68%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Sectors SGP Sectors NZL
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 85.00% 11 Basic metals 57.80%
11 Basic metals 81.78% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 54.20%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 71.46% 02 Mining and quarrying 50.85%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 65.69% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 44.36%
12 Fabricated metal products 64.20% 25 Financial intermediation 44.02%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 63.58% 29 R&D and other business activities 38.59%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 62.76% 09 Rubber and plastics products 38.07%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 62.49% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 37.90%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 59.68% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 37.83%
09 Rubber and plastics products 59.13% 20 Construction 37.44%
02 Mining and quarrying 59.06% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 37.42%
28 Computer and related activities 58.71% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 37.35%
23 Transport and storage 57.72% 17 Other transport equipment 36.77%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 57.59% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 34.76%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 57.05% 12 Fabricated metal products 34.47%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 54.98% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 33.92%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 54.80% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 33.89%
29 R&D and other business activities 54.24% 24 Post and telecommunications 33.08%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 53.36% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 32.19%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 50.09% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 28.98%
24 Post and telecommunications 49.39% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 28.09%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 47.79% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 27.99%
17 Other transport equipment 46.88% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 27.58%
20 Construction 46.13% 23 Transport and storage 24.80%
25 Financial intermediation 45.41% 28 Computer and related activities 21.90%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 45.27% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 19.23%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 44.94% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 17.98%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 43.20% 26 Real estate activities 16.15%
31 Education 41.73% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 15.94%
33 Other community, social and personal services 35.12% 32 Health and social work 15.52%
32 Health and social work 34.37% 33 Other community, social and personal services 15.34%
22 Hotels and restaurants 33.25% 22 Hotels and restaurants 13.01%
26 Real estate activities 33.18% 31 Education 12.75%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
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Sectors MYS Sectors CAN
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 78.99% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 65.50%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 74.55% 11 Basic metals 62.56%
11 Basic metals 73.92% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 49.82%
12 Fabricated metal products 67.70% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 49.77%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 64.81% 12 Fabricated metal products 49.04%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 61.55% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 48.08%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 61.35% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.76%
09 Rubber and plastics products 59.25% 17 Other transport equipment 46.26%
17 Other transport equipment 59.23% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 45.52%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 57.92% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 37.34%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 57.88% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 36.65%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 56.99% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 34.24%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 56.29% 02 Mining and quarrying 32.41%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 54.87% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 32.21%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 52.18% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 32.10%
29 R&D and other business activities 49.07% 20 Construction 31.76%
23 Transport and storage 48.35% 23 Transport and storage 28.96%
25 Financial intermediation 43.93% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 28.22%
02 Mining and quarrying 43.90% 29 R&D and other business activities 28.07%
20 Construction 43.17% 24 Post and telecommunications 27.27%
28 Computer and related activities 40.30% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 26.71%
32 Health and social work 39.82% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 25.74%
24 Post and telecommunications 39.79% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 25.69%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 39.13% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 23.56%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 37.75% 33 Other community, social and personal services 20.18%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 37.49% 25 Financial intermediation 18.57%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 33.21% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 17.70%
33 Other community, social and personal services 32.51% 32 Health and social work 17.06%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 28.98% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 14.31%
22 Hotels and restaurants 23.66% 28 Computer and related activities 14.16%
31 Education 13.51% 22 Hotels and restaurants 13.07%
26 Real estate activities 5.93% 31 Education 7.63%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0% 26 Real estate activities 6.72%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Sectors VNM Sectors MEX
11 Basic metals 81.32% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 69.31%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 79.21% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 57.12%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 76.80% 12 Fabricated metal products 57.00%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 76.01% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 54.54%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 74.90% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 51.76%
09 Rubber and plastics products 73.10% 09 Rubber and plastics products 51.46%
12 Fabricated metal products 67.59% 20 Construction 51.28%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 67.56% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 48.96%
17 Other transport equipment 67.27% 11 Basic metals 46.99%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 64.19% 17 Other transport equipment 43.86%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 58.14% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 41.33%
29 R&D and other business activities 53.19% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 41.20%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 53.06% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 41.08%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 51.67% 29 R&D and other business activities 38.37%
25 Financial intermediation 50.52% 24 Post and telecommunications 32.77%
02 Mining and quarrying 46.92% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 32.74%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 46.22% 28 Computer and related activities 30.57%
20 Construction 45.25% 02 Mining and quarrying 29.51%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 44.80% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 28.88%
23 Transport and storage 42.41% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 27.01%
24 Post and telecommunications 36.28% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 23.46%
28 Computer and related activities 35.32% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 21.42%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.86% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 20.58%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 30.97% 23 Transport and storage 20.34%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 29.52% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 19.41%
32 Health and social work 28.17% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 14.98%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 26.43% 25 Financial intermediation 14.32%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 23.33% 33 Other community, social and personal services 5.72%
26 Real estate activities 22.69% 32 Health and social work 4.75%
33 Other community, social and personal services 14.74% 22 Hotels and restaurants 4.07%
22 Hotels and restaurants 13.40% 26 Real estate activities 2.53%
31 Education 12.96% 31 Education 1.39%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 11.38% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
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Sectors BRN Sectors CHL
12 Fabricated metal products 71.70% 11 Basic metals 59.94%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 62.38% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 59.21%
11 Basic metals 60.61% 23 Transport and storage 50.05%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 57.10% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 47.42%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 55.44% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.54%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 54.81% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 45.75%
09 Rubber and plastics products 54.39% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 43.38%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 53.70% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 42.31%
29 R&D and other business activities 48.44% 02 Mining and quarrying 42.07%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 48.36% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 40.28%
17 Other transport equipment 46.26% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 36.19%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 45.16% 12 Fabricated metal products 35.54%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 44.95% 29 R&D and other business activities 33.86%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 42.16% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 33.58%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 39.85% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 33.18%
20 Construction 39.14% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 32.34%
25 Financial intermediation 38.83% 17 Other transport equipment 31.95%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 37.95% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 31.48%
02 Mining and quarrying 35.03% 25 Financial intermediation 30.54%
24 Post and telecommunications 34.28% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 28.96%
22 Hotels and restaurants 31.11% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 28.33%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 28.97% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 26.92%
23 Transport and storage 28.88% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 25.83%
28 Computer and related activities 26.10% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 25.68%
33 Other community, social and personal services 25.81% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 24.38%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 22.92% 24 Post and telecommunications 22.76%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 18.82% 28 Computer and related activities 20.60%
31 Education 11.64% 20 Construction 19.53%
26 Real estate activities 3.76% 22 Hotels and restaurants 14.56%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 2.18% 31 Education 13.45%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 0% 26 Real estate activities 11.60%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0% 32 Health and social work 11.05%
32 Health and social work 0% 33 Other community, social and personal services 10.75%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
Sectors CHN Sectors PER
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 66.63% 11 Basic metals 60.89%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 61.89% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 54.10%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 60.84% 12 Fabricated metal products 50.19%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 60.81% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.33%
11 Basic metals 57.32% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 43.25%
12 Fabricated metal products 55.87% 02 Mining and quarrying 41.45%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 55.24% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 40.71%
09 Rubber and plastics products 55.04% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 39.88%
02 Mining and quarrying 54.34% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 35.41%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 49.85% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 30.33%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 43.71% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 29.24%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 43.62% 29 R&D and other business activities 27.39%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 41.55% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 27.02%
29 R&D and other business activities 40.93% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 25.62%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 40.25% 23 Transport and storage 25.58%
17 Other transport equipment 38.71% 17 Other transport equipment 24.44%
24 Post and telecommunications 36.01% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 24.39%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 34.02% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 24.28%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 33.00% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 24.04%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 30.41% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 24.01%
28 Computer and related activities 29.61% 28 Computer and related activities 22.54%
23 Transport and storage 29.16% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 21.16%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 26.14% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 20.63%
20 Construction 24.31% 25 Financial intermediation 17.55%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 22.50% 24 Post and telecommunications 17.49%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 19.87% 33 Other community, social and personal services 15.98%
33 Other community, social and personal services 14.75% 22 Hotels and restaurants 10.84%
25 Financial intermediation 11.50% 32 Health and social work 8.80%
32 Health and social work 10.05% 31 Education 3.67%
26 Real estate activities 8.14% 26 Real estate activities 1.57%
22 Hotels and restaurants 5.28% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 0%
31 Education 5.09% 20 Construction 0%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 0%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%
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Sectors WORLD Sectors USA
11 Basic metals 64.00% 11 Basic metals 68.33%
14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 60.09% 16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 53.26%
07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 57.48% 07 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 47.39%
09 Rubber and plastics products 57.03% 15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 47.14%
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 55.10% 09 Rubber and plastics products 46.93%
12 Fabricated metal products 53.70% 12 Fabricated metal products 46.08%
08 Chemicals and chemical products 53.12% 08 Chemicals and chemical products 44.10%
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 49.64% 02 Mining and quarrying 43.57%
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 46.85% 14 Computer, electronic and optical equipment 40.98%
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 45.24% 13 Machinery and equipment, nec 40.19%
17 Other transport equipment 44.73% 29 R&D and other business activities 39.37%
29 R&D and other business activities 42.71% 27 Renting of machinery and equipment 38.51%
06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 42.20% 17 Other transport equipment 36.96%
05 Wood and products of wood and cork 41.15% 10 Other non-metallic mineral products 36.76%
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 40.74% 06 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 36.48%
23 Transport and storage 39.97% 05 Wood and products of wood and cork 34.92%
02 Mining and quarrying 39.05% 24 Post and telecommunications 32.53%
18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 39.03% 18 Manufacturing nec, recycling 29.78%
25 Financial intermediation 37.46% 04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 29.07%
04 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 36.93% 25 Financial intermediation 28.92%
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 36.74% 32 Health and social work 28.83%
24 Post and telecommunications 35.62% 30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 27.95%
28 Computer and related activities 35.35% 28 Computer and related activities 27.25%
21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 31.16% 23 Transport and storage 27.16%
20 Construction 29.79% 21 Wholesale and retail trade, repairs 25.73%
03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 29.50% 01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 24.44%
30 Public admin. and defense, compulsory social security 29.14% 19 Electricity, gas and water supply 23.15%
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 28.12% 31 Education 20.34%
33 Other community, social and personal services 22.21% 03 Food products, beverages and tobacco 20.24%
22 Hotels and restaurants 19.80% 20 Construction 17.68%
32 Health and social work 18.32% 33 Other community, social and personal services 15.44%
31 Education 13.91% 22 Hotels and restaurants 7.92%
26 Real estate activities 9.16% 26 Real estate activities 6.33%
34 Private households with employed persons 0% 34 Private households with employed persons 0%













TT/GE (DC-TT)/GE Percentage of DC directly absorbed by bilateral importers
Note: The fraction of traditional trade in gross exports, TT/GE, is measured by: TTs∗/Es∗ = ∑r 6=s(1a∗sr +
2a∗sr)/Es∗ . The fraction of DC not directly absorbed by bilateral importers, (DC − TT)/GE, is measured by:
(DCs∗ − TTs∗ )/Es∗ = ∑r 6=s(1∗sr + 2∗sr + 3∗sr + 4∗sr + 5∗sr + 6∗sr − 1a∗sr − 2a∗sr)/Es∗ . The fraction of domestic content
directly absorbed by bilateral importers is measured by TTs∗/DCs∗ = ∑r 6=s(1a∗sr + 2a∗sr)/(1∗sr + 2∗sr + 3∗sr + 4∗sr +
5∗sr + 6∗sr).
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TABLE 2.6: Key downstream trade partners for selected sectors (2011)
JAPAN Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (27.82) CHN (25.82) CHN (51.21) CHN (55.98) USA (20.01)
2nd downstream partner KOR (20.50) KOR (20.99) TWN (10.80) KOR (7.96) CHN (12.09)
3rd downstream partner TWN (13.71) THA (14.04) KOR (8.10) THA (6.00) CAN (9.69)
4th downstream partner THA (6.48) TWN (11.79) MYS (7.17) DEU (3.89) RUS (8.80)
5th downstream partner USA (3.90) MYS (5.98) USA (3.85) MEX (3.82) THA (5.48)
SINGAPORE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner MYS (25.20) MYS (31.79) CHN (25.62) MYS (26.68) IDN (13.54)
2nd downstream partner CHN (20.50) TWN (10.37) MYS (25.42) CHN (24.39) ROW (13.17)
3rd downstream partner THA (10.72) CHN (6.64) KOR (11.18) IDN (8.83) KOR (8.55)
4th downstream partner KOR (5.58) THA (6.54) TWN (10.85) THA (8.20) DEU (8.41)
5th downstream partner IDN (4.66) JPN (5.26) USA (3.64) KOR (3.91) THA (8.34)
MALAYSIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (39.12) CHN (35.11) CHN (64.77) CHN (39.59) THA (20.66)
2nd downstream partner USA (6.97) THA (11.10) USA (4.74) THA (11.93) IDN (11.50)
3rd downstream partner THA (6.34) KOR (9.73) MEX (4.56) MEX (8.63) JPN (10.55)
4th downstream partner JPN (6.17) JPN (6.58) TWN (4.31) DEU (6.82) CHN (8.10)
5th downstream partner SGP (4.56) TWN (5.66) KOR (3.44) SGP (5.79) ROW (7.93)
VIETNAM Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner MYS (13.46) THA (15.52) CHN (42.84) CHN (41.09) JPN (34.85)
2nd downstream partner JPN (13.09) KOR (13.87) MYS (7.03) JPN (21.31) KOR (13.72)
3rd downstream partner CHN (11.30) MYS (13.58) THA (5.15) KOR (9.27) CZE (11.46)
4th downstream partner USA (6.46) TWN (11.34) TWN (4.15) THA (5.22) USA (8.52)
5th downstream partner DEU (5.66) JPN (6.99) RUS (3.91) USA (4.07) CHN (7.19)
BRUNEI Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (39.25) MYS (23.70) MYS (48.60) MYS (28.11) MYS (58.61)
2nd downstream partner TWN (19.21) THA (20.60) SGP (22.40) SGP (20.34) KOR (17.59)
3rd downstream partner AUS (13.07) USA (19.91) GBR (10.08) DEU (17.31) ROW (6.00)
4th downstream partner MYS (5.73) SGP (13.49) DEU (7.74) TWN (16.27) USA (4.17)
5th downstream partner SGP (4.49) CHN (6.10) TWN (4.12) THA (6.50) GBR (3.44)
AUSTRALIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (23.09) CHN (24.40) CHN (22.97) CHN (31.17) KOR (35.54)
2nd downstream partner NZL (13.74) THA (19.20) USA (12.93) KOR (10.45) CHN (12.00)
3rd downstream partner MEX (6.93) KOR (10.79) MYS (9.64) MYS (8.70) ROW (10.32)
4th downstream partner ROW (6.77) TWN (8.56) GBR (8.46) THA (6.27) USA (7.02)
5th downstream partner MYS (6.50) MYS (6.63) KOR (7.16) DEU (4.71) CAN (4.86)
NEW ZEALAND Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner AUS (49.20) AUS (30.23) CHN (22.10) AUS (25.51) AUS (36.56)
2nd downstream partner CHN (8.75) JPN (25.81) USA (14.50) CHN (14.15) ROW (13.65)
3rd downstream partner THA (4.75) KOR (12.52) FRA (7.51) KOR (12.58) USA (10.20)
4th downstream partner USA (4.62) USA (5.27) TWN (6.91) USA (7.04) GBR (4.79)
5th downstream partner GBR (4.51) GBR (3.52) MYS (6.86) GBR (4.87) CHN (3.50)
CANADA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner USA (70.92) USA (55.41) CHN (29.73) USA (43.50) USA (87.24)
2nd downstream partner MEX (11.47) NOR (9.61) USA (29.23) CHN (16.13) MEX (6.82)
3rd downstream partner CHN (5.43) GBR (6.90) HUN (9.80) MEX (14.73) CHN (1.24)
4th downstream partner DEU (1.13) CHN (5.67) MEX (6.42) DEU (3.07) ROW (0.68)
5th downstream partner KOR (1.01) MEX (5.61) GBR (3.30) GBR (3.01) DEU (0.55)
MEXICO Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner USA (57.01) USA (57.49) USA (55.73) USA (63.26) USA (51.27)
2nd downstream partner CAN (9.25) CAN (13.2) CHN (14.56) CAN (12.98) CAN (30.39)
3rd downstream partner CHN (6.31) KOR (5.64) CAN (7.59) CHN (9.51) DEU (8.04)
4th downstream partner CRI (4.30) CHN (5.47) KOR (2.27) DEU (3.07) CHN (1.49)
5th downstream partner ROW (3.82) JPN (2.56) JPN (1.84) KOR (1.07) ARG (1.24)
CHILE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner MEX (21.82) CHN (41.31) ROW (74.35) CHN (27.36) ARG (24.89)
2nd downstream partner USA (19.89) KOR (9.43) DEU (5.42) PER (8.01) ROW (11.14)
3rd downstream partner ARG (14.98) TWN (7.85) VNM (3.20) KOR (5.32) CAN (10.68)
4th downstream partner ROW (14.08) ITA (6.92) MEX (3.17) MEX (5.03) BRA (10.50)
5th downstream partner BRA (7.21) USA (6.29) IRL (2.37) COL (4.96) MEX (10.44)
PERU Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st downstream partner CHN (27.91) CAN (55.41) ROW (65.36) CRI (40.02) ROW (71.45)
2nd downstream partner COL (21.78) ITA (11.13) MAR (10.45) ROW (25.30) MAR (15.22)
3rd downstream partner MEX (16.31) CHN (8.91) KOR (4.24) CHL (7.75) COL (9.14)
4th downstream partner USA (6.69) USA (8.48) FRA (3.59) COL (3.99) USA (1.12)
5th downstream partner CHL (6,55) TWN (3.99) USA (2.97) MAR (3.99) CHL (1.05)
Sector descriptions: Sector 9 – Rubber and plastics products, Sector 11 – Basic metals, Sector 14 – Computer, electronic and optical
equipment, Sector 15 – Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec, and Sector 16 – Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers.
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TABLE 2.7: Key upstream trade partners for selected sectors (2011)
JAPAN Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (40.55) KOR (24.67) CHN (61.16) CHN (55.67) DEU (26.09)
2nd upstream partner TWN (9.08) CHN (9.32) TWN (5.90) VNM (9.33) CHN (13.92)
3rd upstream partner KOR (8.36) RUS (8.06) MYS (5.81) THA (6.74) THA (7.86)
4th upstream partner THA (7.87) TWN (7.23) KOR (5.34) MYS (4.01) USA (6.05)
5th upstream partner MYS (6.43) ZAF (6.09) USA (3.50) KOR (3.57) KOR (5.47)
SINGAPORE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner MYS (24.64) CHN (10.82) CHN (28.60) CHN (28.54) DEU (24.18)
2nd upstream partner CHN (17.16) MYS (10.34) MYS (18.05) MYS (19.08) USA (12.07)
3rd upstream partner USA (6.92) JPN (9.50) TWN (14.23) IDN (7.62) IND (8.28)
4th upstream partner THA (6.18) KOR (9.00) KOR (8.86) USA (6.18) GBR (6.25)
5th upstream partner DEU (5.13) TUR (6.73) USA (3.22) DEU (4.82) MYS (5.83)
MALAYSIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (22.27) KOR (14.77) CHN (32.83) CHN (41.23) THA (37.43)
2nd upstream partner THA (19.44) JPN (12.96) SGP (16.61) THA (16.41) DEU (15.89)
3rd upstream partner VNM (10.12) TWN (12.52) TWN (9.76) USA (5.04) JPN (14.43)
4th upstream partner JPN (6.52) CHN (8.20) KOR (6.32) DEU (4.44) CHN (8.36)
5th upstream partner SGP (6.06) AUS (7.00) JPN (6.28) JPN (3.94) KOR (5.08)
VIETNAM Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (26.14) KOR (27.62) CHN (54.80) CHN (51.32) THA (25.94)
2nd upstream partner THA (16.05) TWN (17.23) KOR (18.23) THA (12.71) KOR (25.89)
3rd upstream partner KOR (13.65) CHN (12.23) MYS (4.92) KOR (9.65) CHN (16.98)
4th upstream partner TWN (12.38) JPN (9.08) JPN (4.62) JPN (4.01) DEU (4.42)
5th upstream partner JPN (11.02) AUS (6.01) TWN (3.27) MYS (3.75) JPN (4.01)
BRUNEI Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner MYS (31.22) MYS (27.75) SGP (30.84) MYS (19.98) THA (25.41)
2nd upstream partner SGP (16.67) CHN (19.09) CHN (20.71) THA (15.12) JPN (17.62)
3rd upstream partner CHN (11.66) JPN (17.67) MYS (10.45) ITA (13.98) MYS (15.91)
4th upstream partner THA (7.59) USA (6.40) TWN (9.15) SGP (10.75) KOR (11.42)
5th upstream partner KOR (7.29) SGP (4.67) USA (5.55) GBR (7.32) DEU (11.21)
AUSTRALIA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (30.77) ROW (15.27) CHN (61.30) CHN (38.46) THA (20.75)
2nd upstream partner THA (8.73) THA (14.73) MYS (7.02) DEU (6.97) KOR (15.04)
3rd upstream partner MYS (6.10) GBR (7.37) USA (3.39) USA (5.64) DEU (13.21)
4th upstream partner TWN (5.92) CHN (6.64) SGP (2.70) GBR (4.40) JPN (12.05)
5th upstream partner USA (5.55) JPN (6.58) TWN (2.30) MYS (3.77) USA (8.15)
NEW ZEALAND Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (25.60) AUS (27.91) CHN (54.46) CHN (30.98) JPN (14.93)
2nd upstream partner AUS (14.76) RUS (16.14) MYS (7.98) AUS (13.13) THA (14.31)
3rd upstream partner THA (8.02) TWN (11.55) AUS (5.62) DEU (8.69) DEU (13.93)
4th upstream partner TWN (5.69) KOR (7.33) SGP (4.22) MYS (4.28) AUS (12.18)
5th upstream partner MYS (5.37) CHN (6.70) USA (3.46) USA (3.98) KOR (10.76)
CANADA Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner USA (36.61) USA (29.27) CHN (51.11) CHN (29.88) USA (60.47)
2nd upstream partner CHN (25.87) PER (6.48) MEX (14.90) MEX (22.33) MEX (18.82)
3rd upstream partner TWN (4.14) ROW (6.03) USA (8.05) USA (21.46) DEU (5.48)
4th upstream partner MEX (3.91) DEU (5.61) TWN (4.45) DEU (4.37) KOR (4.57)
5th upstream partner DEU (3.57) ARG (5.42) MYS (3.34) MYS (1.69) JPN (3.03)
MEXICO Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner USA (35.64) USA (31.58) CHN (60.55) CHN (39.61) USA (53.88)
2nd upstream partner CHN (19.64) CAN (12.32) KOR (8.62) USA (22.68) DEU (9.24)
3rd upstream partner DEU (6.07) CHN (9.28) MYS (7.31) DEU (5.16) CAN (8.41)
4th upstream partner KOR (5.81) DEU (7.68) USA (5.05) MYS (4.51) KOR (5.31)
5th upstream partner CAN (5.79) ITA (7.33) TWN (3.74) KOR (3.48) JPN (4.41)
CHILE Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner ROW (30.41) CHN (23.44) CHN (61.32) CHN (32.57) KOR (20.71)
2nd upstream partner CHN (21.57) KOR (9.63) MEX (11.14) DEU (8.11) USA (11.31)
3rd upstream partner USA (5.39) BRA (9.48) ROW (8.44) USA (7.63) MEX (10.74)
4th upstream partner ARG (5.35) ESP (6.68) USA (3.49) ESP (7.24) CHN (10.11)
5th upstream partner BRA (3.87) DEU (6.17) KOR (1.65) MEX (5.06) THA (7.40)
PERU Sector 9 Sector 11 Sector 14 Sector 15 Sector 16
1st upstream partner CHN (21.80) TUR (17.69) CHN (57.32) CHN (35.74) KOR (17.30)
2nd upstream partner MEX (13.04) CHN (17.68) MEX (14.56) USA (13.03) CHN (13.72)
3rd upstream partner USA (8.29) KOR (10.57) MYS (4.99) MEX (6.35) MEX (10.11)
4th upstream partner ROW (5.59) USA (8.90) KOR (3.95) ROW (5.51) USA (9.90)
5th upstream partner KOR (4.51) MEX (8.28) ROW (3.29) ESP (4.81) THA (9.82)
Sector descriptions: Sector 9 – Rubber and plastics products, Sector 11 – Basic metals, Sector 14 – Computer, electronic and optical




Oil Price Shocks and Trade Accounts
3.1 Introduction
“An oil price shock is typically a large, unexpected increase in the relative price
of energy that affects the economic decisions of firms and households.” (Kliesen
(2008)) Oil price shocks used to be considered too small to affect aggregate macroeconomic
behavior. However, after nine out of ten recessions that occurred between 1948
and 2001 were preceded by a rise in oil prices (Hamilton (2005)), more studies have
been concentrating on the macroeconomic consequences of oil price shocks. A large
body of literature focus on the response of real economic growth (domestic output,
GDP, etc) and prices in oil-importing countries to oil price changes (Hamilton (2003),
Cavallo and Wu (2006)), etc). There is evidence that oil price shock is accountable for
recessions, inflations, reduction in productivity, etc. A smaller literature studies the
impact of oil price shocks on trade balances, including Ostry and Reinhart (1992),
Gavin (1990), Gavin (1992). A common premise in policy discussions is that oil
price shocks tend to have harmful effects on external accounts as those shocks force
countries to borrow from abroad to offset unfavorable terms of trade.
Recently, the relationship between oil prices and external balances have been
brought back into discussion due to fluctuation in oil price since 2003 as well as the
emergence of global external imbalances (Rebucci and Spatafora (2006)). Not only
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the topic, but also the methodologies are being reexamined. Our paper provides a
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between oil prices and external balances.
We engage recent advances in the measurement of shocks in the oil market in our
methodology to document the dynamic effects of demand and supply shocks on
external balances of oil-exporting and oil-importing economies. These advances
include controlling for reverse causality from global macroeconomic aggregates to
the real price of oil, focusing on both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, and
differentiating demand shocks from supply shocks. Some current studies look into
the effects of shocks in the crude oil market on the oil-trade balance and the non-
oil trade balance, and the role of the non-oil trade balance has been highlighted
in offsetting trade deficits (see Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009), Bodenstein,
Erceg and Guerrieri (2011)). In our paper, we take a step further and decompose
the non-oil trade balance to study the mechanism that brings about such effects.
Understanding such mechanism of the response of the non-oil trade balance provide
a useful benchmark for the design of oil trade policy.
Our empirical analysis is motivated by the empirical study by Kilian, Rebucci
and Spatafora (2009) as well as the theoretical framework of Huynh (2016a). We
investigate the responses of trade in durables versus trade in nondurables towards
oil price shocks. To the best of our knowledge, this has not been done in the literature.
Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009) did not consider the composition of non-oil
trade balance. Explicit analysis of the responses of durables and non-durables in
the non-oil trade balance allows insights into non-energy trade balance with regards
to energy price shocks. The framework of Huynh (2016a) shows that the volatile
nature of durables trade contributes to the diverse response of the non-energy trade
balance. Understanding these responses assists in the formulation of appropriate
trade policy. In addition, we extend the empirical analysis by Kilian, Rebucci and
Spatafora (2009) by decomposing the oil market specific demand shocks into oil
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market specific demand shocks from the consumers and oil market specific demand
shocks from the producer. Such distinction is necessary as fluctuation in oil prices
have different effects on industrial producers and on household consumers. Finally,
we introduce new proxies that help backing out the aggregate demand shocks and
the oil-market specific demand shocks. Since there are two sources for oil-market
specific demand shocks, such new measures can explain the diverse impacts oil
price shocks have on energy market. It also provides a new perspective on identifying
suitable indexes for oil market research.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical evolution
of oil price shocks research. We dive in to various impacts of oil price shocks
on business cycle, as well as on the external balances. The methodology for our
empirical analysis is presented in section 3. The next section describes the datasets.
Section 5 presents the results of the structural VAR and discusses the connections
with the theoretical model. The final section contains concluding remarks. In the
appendix, we present all tables and figures summarizing the results of our studies.
3.2 Theoretical Background
Theoretical models of the effect of oil price shocks on the economy have typically
been constructed under the premise that oil price innovations are driven by exogenous
changes in supply (see Finn (2000); Leduc and Sill (2004)). This is due to a common
belief that there is a close link from political events in the Middle East to changes in
the price of oil, and in turn from oil price changes to macroeconomic performance.
Nevertheless, recent history demonstrates that Middle East disturbances do not
necessarily raise the price of oil and that major oil price increases may occur even in
the absence of such shocks (Barsky and Kilian (2004)). There are also good theoretical
reasons and strong empirical evidence that on one hand changes in real price of
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oil affect macroeconomic performance of oil-importing countries while on the other
hand fluctuations in macroeconomic conditions affect price of oil (see Kilian (2008b),
Kilian (2008a)). Besides, another common approach in earlier literature was to not
distinguish between demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. Kilian
(2009), however, used structural VAR analysis to argue that demand shocks have
played a much larger role in driving oil price fluctuations than acknowledged in
most of the literature. He argued that shocks to oil supply and oil demand must be
separately identified [also see, e.g., Kilian and Murphy (2012), Kilian and Murphy
(2014)]. There are a few recent studies incorporating these recent advances, separating
demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri
(2011) constructs a DGSE two-country model - one is oil importer and the other is
oil-exporter. Crude oil is both an input in the production of the tradable good and a
part of household consumption bundle. The paper investigates how oil price shocks
affect the trade balance and terms of trade of the two countries in incomplete and
complete financial market.
The theoretical analysis most closely related to our paper is Huynh (2016a). It
sets up a two-country DSGE model comprising multiple sectors and endogenous
energy production with convex cost. The paper studies the impact of several demand
and supply shocks - wider set of shocks compared to Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri
(2011) - in the crude oil market on external balances. In addition, the paper looks at
the composition of the non-energy trade balance. The presence of durables highlights
the immediate channel through which energy prices impact the non-energy trade
balance.
This section presents the predictions of economic theory for the responses of
external balances to oil demand and oil supply shocks. Section 3.1 reviews the
effects various energy price shocks have on the economy. Section 3.2 describes
the responses of external balances different to demand and supply shocks in the
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bilaterally setting of Huynh (2016a). Lastly, section 3.3 briefly discusses the dynamics
of goods with varying degrees of energy depending.
3.2.1 Energy Price Shocks and Business Cycle
Before going into the responses of external balances towards oil price shocks, we will
discuss about the impact various demand and supply shocks have on energy price
and the business cycle. Huynh (2016b) set up an endogenous energy production
framework with convex costs to study those dynamics for three main kinds of shocks
to the energy market.
a) Energy Supply Shock
Oil supply disruption is analogous to a traditional exogenous oil price increase.
Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011) show that in response an oil supply disruption,
real price of oil exhibits a temporary increase. Therefore, in Huynh (2016b), a negative
productivity shock to the energy sector acts as an energy supply crunch and is
calibrated such that it causes a 10% increase in energy price. Note that this is
a decline in the productivity of the energy sector only, not a broad productivity
decline. Huynh shows in their model that an energy price increase leads to decrease
in value added and a contracting business cycle. Investments in durables as well as
consumption in non-durables drop.
b) Aggregate Demand Shock
This is a demand shock that affects all industrial commodities across the board.
Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011) conclude that there are a myriad of different
shocks that affect aggregate demand, so it is difficult to predict the effect of those
shocks on the real price of oil. Related empirical research by Kilian (2009) suggests
that aggregate demand shock acts as a stimulus to oil-importing economies within
the first year, but subsequently the adverse effect associated with higher oil prices
dominates. In Huynh (2016b), they cause a positive TFP shock to the productivity
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of the durables and nondurables sectors (the non-energy sectors). As a result, the
overall demand for energy is pushed up, energy price rises, and business cycle
expands. With regard to the economic expansion, consumption of nondurables
increases. Yet higher energy price discourages the household from durables investment
as well as reduces energy consumption.
c) Energy Market Specific Demand Shocks
There have been various propositions regarding indexes for energy market specific
demand shocks. Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011) model this shock as an
exogenous taste shock. They show that it has similar effects and operates through
the same channels as supply shocks. Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009) use precautionary
demand as an alternative explanation in their empirical study. Precautionary demand
arises from the uncertainty about shortfalls of expected supply relative to expected
demand. In response to such uncertainty, the real price of oil jumps up and overshoots.
Most recently, Huynh (2016b) analyzes two cases for the energy market specific
demand shock: 1) shock to the energy intensity of durables and 2) shock to the
energy intensity of capital. In response to the first shock, energy price shoots up
and energy production rises. Household reduces its durable usage correspondingly.
On the other hand, shock to the energy intensity of capital can be interpreted as a
demand shock specific to the energy market but coming from the producers. This
shock causes a larger increase in both energy price and energy supply than the
shock to the energy intensity of durables. Households in this case reduce its capital
investment much more than its durables investment. Energy-market specific demand
shocks have an impact on the business cycle qualitatively similar to the energy
supply shock. However, quantitatively, they cause more severe contractions in the
business cycle than the supply shock. In conclusion, the two energy-market-specific
demand shocks display key differences in terms of impact and transmission from
each other as well as from the energy supply shock. Where the two demand shocks
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principally differ from each other is that each shock is amplified on a different side
of the economy. Henceforth, we distinguish the two energy-market-specific demand
shocks in our empirical analysis.
3.2.2 Energy Price Shocks and External Balances
The distinction between oil demand and oil supply shocks matters not just for the
business cycle, but also for the dynamics of external balances. Kilian, Rebucci and
Spatafora (2009) provide two reasons for this. Firstly, each shock has different implications
for the timing, magnitude, and persistence of the path of oil prices. Secondly, oil
demand shocks may have effects on oil-importing countries that do not operate
through real price of oil. For instance, fluctuations in global business cycle can
have direct stimulating effect on economic growth in addition to the indirect adverse
effect of higher oil price.
With these insights in mind, we review the implications of the DSGE model of
Huynh (2016a) for the responses of trade account towards different demand and
supply shocks below.
a) Energy Supply Shock
While this shock has been mostly modeled as a direct shock to energy price, the
model in Huynh (2016a) models energy supply shock as a negative shock to the
productivity of the oil-exporter (Foreign) energy sector. As a result, energy trade
balance of the oil importing economy (Home) deteriorates whereas the non-energy
trade balance improves. The non-oil trade surplus is greater, so the overall trade
balance improves. Similar to Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009), the gain in total
balance is small and short-lived. The responses of the oil-exporting economy mirror
those of the oil-importing economy.
b) Aggregate Demand Shock
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Higher oil price triggered by a positive aggregate demand shock results in Home
experiencing higher energy import. Therefore, there is a larger and more persistent
oil trade deficit than in the case of an energy supply shock. The responses of Home‘s
non-energy and total trade balance are also quite different. Home productivity cause
a short-lived total trade balance deterioration, while Foreign productivity expansion
produces a large, persistent improvement. The differences are largely determined
by the non-oil trade balance. While Home productivity expansion causes non-oil
trade balance to deteriorate, Foreign expansion causes it to improve.
c) Oil-market Specific Demand Shocks from the Consumers (ie. Preference
shock, increase demand of oil used for heating in the winter (weather))
Energy-market specific demand shocks from the consumers can be preference
shock as in Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011), or weather shocks such as unexpectedly
cold winters (that raise demand for oil), etc. In the model of Huynh (2016a), these
shocks result in higher energy price as the demand for more energy comes about.
The energy trade balance registers a persistent deterioration and there is a total trade
balance deficit. Contrary to the supply shock, non-energy trade balance does not
improve. There is rather a persistent deterioration after the 1st quarter.
d) Oil-market Specific Demand Shocks from the Producers (ie. Precautionary
demand shock; change in production technology that results more intensive energy
use)
Energy-market specific demand shock coming from the producers is analogous
to the precautionary demand model described in Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora
(2009). Due to the positive shock, energy prices increase more than it does for the
oil-market specific demand shocks from the consumers. The responses of external
balances should be qualitatively similar to those toward an oil supply shock. We
would expect an energy trade balance deficit and a non-oil trade surplus.
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3.2.3 Energy Price Shocks and Non-energy Trade Balance
Within the framework to investigate the impact oil price shocks have on external
balances, Huynh (2016a) also analyzes the composition of non-energy trade balance
for the responses of non-energy trade balance play a crucial role in determining the
overall trade balance. Durables and nondurables differ in their degree of energy
dependence, so their responses to oil price shocks also vary.
a) Oil Supply Shocks
The surplus in non-energy trade balance is spurred partly by a decline in Home‘s
terms of trade as it makes Home‘s imports more costly. Yet that is not the main
reason. Looking into the composition of non-energy trade balance, the non-oil trade
surplus is mainly driven by Home‘s durable imports as it is more volatile than
non-durable imports. A higher energy price causes contraction in Home‘s durables
demand, leading to a large decrease in Home‘s durables import.
b) Aggregate Demand Shocks
Regarding trade in durables and nondurables, productivity expansion in Home
country results in a sharp rise in Home‘s durables imports. This dominates the non-
oil trades, resulting in the non-oil trade balance deterioration. On the other hand,
when the productivity expansion occurs abroad, Home‘s imports rise. Yet Home‘s
durables exports also increase because Foreign demands more durables. The export
dominates, and there is a large improvement in Home‘s non-energy trade balance.
c) Oil-market Specific Demand Shocks
The decomposition of non-energy trades again emphasizes the essential role of
trade in durables in determining the response of non-oil trade balance. In response
to preference shock, Foreign‘s non-energy prices rise more dramatically relative to
Home‘s non-energy prices due to the upward shift in Foreign‘s durables demand.
As a consequence, Home‘s terms of trade deteriorate. Foreign‘s durables imports
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also decline considerably after the 1st quarter in terms of oil price elasticity. These
two effects cause Home‘s non-energy trade balance to deteriorate after 1st quarter.
In short, even though oil-market specific demand shocks cause oil price increases
that are mostly identical the one caused by supply shock, the non-energy trade
balance responds differently.
3.3 Empirical Methodology
A common approach in empirical study of shocks in the crude oil market on external
accounts is to evaluate the impacts of varying the price of oil while holding all other
variables constant. This method has been proven to be not credible. Kilian (2008b)
presents empirical evidence that real price of oil is under the influence of global
economic fluctuations. As noted by Alquist, Kilian and Vigfusson (2013), “since
1974, the real price of oil like the real price of other industrial commodities has been
endogenous with respect to global macroeconomic conditions.” Due to this reverse
causality, a structural model is necessary when identifying cause and effect in the
relationship between real price of oil and macroeconomic aggregates. In addition to
the endogeneity issue, it is important to distinguish demand and supply shocks in
the oil market. Recent studies Kilian (2008b), Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009),
Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011), etc) show the effects of demand and supply
shocks on macroeconomic aggregates are qualitatively and quantitatively different.
Our empirical methodology addresses both of these concerns while allowing us to
assess the effects of oil demand and oil supply shocks on external accounts.
In their recent empirical study, Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009) found that
non-oil trade balance plays a crucial role in the different responses of external balances
to supply and demand shocks. However, they did not look into the composition
of the non-energy trade balance. Then through a theoretical framework, Huynh
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(2016a) decomposes the non-oil trade balance and finds that durable trade plays a
bigger part in the mechanism. We would like to confirm this theory using a new
empirical approach.
We build a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model to trace the fluctuations
in real price of oil to the underlying demand and supply shocks in the crude oil
market as well as the responses of the trade accounts to those shocks. We then use
historical decomposition to determine the extent to which historical fluctuation in
external balances were driven by specific demand and supply shocks.
Following the identification strategy of Kilian (2009), we construct four types of
demand and supply shocks in the crude oil market. The SVAR representation of the
model take the form of
Aozt = α + ∑
i=1
Aizt−i + εt (3.1)
where vector time zt consists of eight data series. These include global crude oil
production, one measure of global real economic activities in industrial commodity
markets, future oil price for precautionary demand, the real price of crude oil, and
the four series for exports and imports of durable and non-durable goods. For the
index of global real economic activity, Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009) uses
representative single voyage freight rates. In this paper, we acquire a different
measure for the real economic activity: the commodity index. The VAR model
allows for one quarter’s worth of lags. εt denotes the vector of serially and mutually
uncorrelated structural innovations. The structural innovations are deprived by
imposing exclusion restrictions on A−10 in et = A
−1
0 εt.
We attribute fluctuations in real price of oil to four structural shocks. ε1t denotes
shocks to the global physical availability of crude oil such as wars, OPEC’s decision
to cut down on oil production, etc. (“oil supply shock”); ε2t captures shocks to the
global demand for all industrial commodities, including crude oil, that are driven
by fluctuations in global business cycle (“aggregate demand shock”); ε3t captures
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speculative demand shocks from the producer (“oil market specific demand shock
from the producers”); and lastly ε4t denotes innovations that cause households to
change their oil usage (“oil market specific demand shock from the consumers”).
Distinguishing oil market specific demand shock between the producers and the
consumers is an innovation of this paper. Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora (2009)use
an oil-market specific demand shock to capture shifts in precautionary demand for
crude oil that reflect concerns about future oil supply shortfalls. Yet we believe
industrial producers and households react differently to changes in future oil supply
as they use oil in different quantity and for different purposes. Since producers tend
to engage in hedging using future oil price, we use fluctuations in future oil price
to capture the specific demand shock coming from the producers, and employ the
fluctuations in real price of oil for the specific demand shock from the consumers.
We assume that
1. Crude oil supply does not respond to oil demand shocks within the same
month due to the costs of adjusting oil production, though it is free to respond
to lagged values of oil prices, future oil prices, commodity index, and oil
production.
2. Innovations to global real economic activity that cannot be explained by supply
shocks will be referred to as aggregate demand shocks. This exclusion restriction
means that increases in the real price of oil driven by demand shocks that are
specific to the oil market will not lower the commodity index in industrial
commodity markets within the same month. This is consistent with the sluggish
behavior of global real economic activity after major oil increases (Kilian (2008b)).
3. Innovations to real price of oil that cannot be explained by oil supply shocks or
aggregate demand shocks will reflect changes in demand for oil as opposed to
changes in demand for industrial commodities (“oil-specific demand shocks”
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for short). However, these shocks can come from either the consumers or the
product suppliers. Since producers involve hedging on oil future prices in
their production planning, changes in real price of oil driven by oil-market
specific demand shock from the consumers do not affect oil’s future prices
within the same month.
4. Innovations to real price of oil that cannot be explained by any of the other
three shocks must be demand shock specific to the oil market that are from the
consumers.













a11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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The upper left 4x4 matrix describes the effects of demand and supply shocks
on different economic factors. In particular, the response of real price of oil to the
four structural shocks εjt, j = 1, 2, 3, 4 is reported in Figure 1. As predicted in the
theoretical framework, there are striking differences in terms of timing, persistence,
and magnitude of the responses depending on the source of the shocks.
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3.4 Data
This study focuses on the impact of oil price shocks on various trade accounts over
the period spanning from 1992Q1 to 2017Q4. The country sample consists of three
economies: USA, Japan, and Canada. They represent distinct characteristics in
terms of oil as USA and Japan are oil-importing countries and Canada is an oil-
exporting country.
In order to back out the various types of oil price shocks, we obtain data series
of crude oil production, commodity index, current oil price and oil price futures.
Data on global oil production is from the Monthly Energy Review of the Energy
Information Administration (EIA). For measure of global economic activity, we utilize
the commodity index obtained from the IMF Primary Commodity Index 1 and available
from 1992. We detrend the log of the two series to obtain a gap measures. In his
extensive study on oil price shocks, Kilian advocates using the Baltic Dry Index
(BDI) as a more accurate measurement for global economic activity. In our robustness
check, we use Kilian index as a proxy for economic activity to back out the aggregate
demand shock instead. With regards to oil-market specific shocks, we use two
measures. For the oil-market demand shocks from the suppliers, we use the future
contracts of crude oil as an measure for future oil price since suppliers tend to hedge
oil price in advance for their operations. We obtain the data from NYMEX Futures
Prices provided by the Energy Information Administration. Current price of oil is
the crude oil price in the IMF Primany Commodity Index. The value is a simple
average of three spot prices: Dated Brent, West Texas Intermediate, and the Dubai
Fateh. Both the future oil prices and current prices of oil are defined in real terms
by deflating the nominal value (USD per barrel) by the US CPI with 2005 as the base
year. Both series are then expressed in log terms.
1https://www.imf.org/../media/Files/Research/CommodityPrices/Monthly/ExternalData.ashx
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Data on sector-specific trade accounts for three major economies are acquired
from the country’s department of statistics and denominated in nominal terms.
Below we describe the data sources and the construction of durable and non-durable
trade accounts for each of the countries in our study. As the trade data are expressed
in domestic currency, they are converted to current US dollars using nominal exchange
rates (USD/local currency) obtained from the IMF‘s International Financial Statistics,
and then to real terms using US CPI.
US exports and imports data are acquired from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). The data is available from January 1989 to December 2017. BEA
uses end-use classification system to segregate sectors. We rely on the description
to separate durable and non-durable trades as in table 3.1.
Japan trade data come from Trade Statistics of Japan (Ministry of Finance)2.
Values are reported in thousands Yen from January 1988 to December 2016. We
first convert Yen value to US dollar using the nominal exchange rate, then calculate
the real terms using US CPI. We sort the sectors into durables and non-durables
following table 3.2.
Merchandise imports and exports of Canada are obtained from Statistics Canada
3. Values are available in millions of Canadian dollars. The time range is from
1988 to 2016. The products in the database are classified using North American
Product Classification System (NAPCS) 2007. We attribute values to durables and
non-durables baskets as in table 3.3. We also convert the data into US dollar and
compute the real value using USA CPI.
Since the shocks implied by our VAR model are measured at quarterly frequency,
we compute the quarter international trade data as averages of the monthly values.
2https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/
3https://www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/
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3.5 Estimation Results
The first set of results demonstrate the various responses of global oil production,
real economic activity, future oil price and the real price of oil to different shocks in
the crude oil market. As suggested by Kilian (2009), Kilian, Rebucci and Spatafora
(2009) and Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2011), we again observe diverse effects
of demand and supply shocks on macroeconomic aggregates. In particular, figure
3.1 describes the reactions of the real price of oil to the four structural shocks. An
unexpected positive shock to the global oil production causes a larger supply of oil.
At the same time, such shock triggers a small decrease in the future oil price as well
as the real price of oil on impact. On the other hand, the effect of an unanticipated
aggregate demand expansion causes a persistent increase in the real price of oil. The
price of oil spikes in the second month and then gradually deteriorates. The effect
of aggregate demand shock to real price of oil is larger compared to that of supply
shock. This also follows the theoretical results of Kilian (2009). Unanticipated increase
in oil-market specific demand shock have an immediate, though insignificant, effect
on the real price of oil. In this study, we separate oil-market specific demand shock
into two types: those coming from the suppliers, and those coming from the consumers.
Possibly, such distinguish dampens the effect of oil-market demand shocks. In
general, the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to different shocks reiterate the
importance of distinguishing between supply and demand shocks of the crude oil
market in empirical study.
Not only macroeconomic aggregates respond to shocks in the crude oil market
differently, so do external accounts. According to Huynh (2016a), durable goods
and non-durable goods rely on energy differently, so shocks in crude oil market also
have diverse effects on these trade accounts. Figure 3.2 presents the responses of
exports of imports of durable goods as well as of non-durable goods to the four
shocks. When there is a positive shock to the oil supply, oil-exporting country (the
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US) exports less durable goods. Non-durable goods exports decreased as well, but
it was delayed until the third quarter. On the other hand, imports of both durable
and non-durable experience insignificant changes.
When fluctuations in crude oil market is caused by demand shock rather than a
supply one, responses of the trade balance bear some differences. For instance, an
unanticipated aggregate demand expansion, such as productivity boom, leads to an
increase in trade of durable and non-durable goods. Exports in general experience a
larger and more persistent increased than imports. Between the two types of goods,
durable goods experience a lower and less persistent increase in exports than non-
durables. However, import of durable goods is higher. These results are in line with
the theoretical prediction in Huynh (2016a). The fluctuation caused by aggregate
demand shock produces a more persistent energy price increase; thus, the economy
experiences higher energy import due to higher demand for investment.
Between two positive oil-market specific demand shocks, the shocks coming
from the supplier side have insignificant impacts on the trade accounts. On the
other hand, a positive oil-market specific demand shocks from the customers leads
to a persistent increase in imports. Increase in export accounts of oil-exporting
country is delayed by four quarters. The responses of oil-importing country are
quite differently. As illustrated in figure 3.3, oil-market specific demand shocks
bring a decline in exports and imports of goods. In addition, the non-energy (non-
durable goods) trade balance experiences a deterioration. Thus, specific demand
shocks cause energy price to change in a similar way compared to changes caused
by energy supply shock, the trade accounts responds quite differently, not only
between the types of goods a country exports and imports, but also between oil-
exporting and oil-importing countries. The magnitude of responses of an oil-importing
country (Japan) tend to be higher than those of an oil-exporting country (US) to the
shocks.
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3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides an empirical analysis of energy price shocks on trade accounts
of oil exporting and oil importing countries. The paper employs a Structural Vector-
Autoregression model on a number of supply and demand shocks. We distinguished
between oil price changes driven by oil supply shocks, changes driven by shocks to
the global aggregate demand, and oil changes driven by oil-market specific demand
shocks from the suppliers as well as from the consumers. The results re-affirm
that energy shocks of different sources bring forward different reactions of both
the macroeconomic aggregates and the external balances. Therefore, it is crucial to
separate demand and supply shocks in the energy market, especially when studying
their effects on external balances.
In addition, we observe diverse reactions between durable goods and non-durable
goods to different oil price shocks. Energy price fluctuations tend to have larger
impact on durables. The responses are also diversified between oil-importing and
oil-exporting countries. These results reinforce the importance of looking beyond
energy price to the source of the shock in the energy market, as well as the type of
goods in trading, in the discussion and formulation of suitable policies.
Further examination into the sources of energy shock is necessary to develop a
better understanding of their effects on trade balance. Here we study export and
import accounts separately, so it would be useful to look at the impacts of energy
price shock on the external balance account directly. In addition, a larger group of
countries (both oil exporting and oil importing) will provide a clearer picture of how
they react to different oil price shocks.
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Tables and Figures
DURABLES NON-DURABLES
Steelmaking & ferroalloying Food, feeds & beverage
Iron & steel products Cotton, incl. linters-raw
Nonferrous & other metals Other agricultural materials
Finished metal shapes paper & paper base stocks
Plastic materials Fertilizers, pesticides & insecticides
Other nonagricultural industrial Industrial inorganic chemicals
Capital goods Industrial organic chemicals
Automotive Other chemicals
Consumer durables, manufactured Consumer nondurables, manufactured-except rugs
Consumer durables, nonmanufactured Consumer nondurables, unmanufactured
Special catergory (military type goods) Industrial textile fibers, yarn, fabic
Selected building materials, except metals
Exports, nec/reexports
TABLE 3.1: US Trade by Durables and Nondurables
DURABLES NON-DURABLES
Consumer durable goods Consumer non-durable goods
Crude materials Food and direct consumers
Metals Industrial chemicals
Other industrial supplies Textiles
Capital Equipment Others
TABLE 3.2: Japan Trade by Durables and Nondurables
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DURABLES NON-DURABLES
Metal ores and Non-metallic minerals Farm, fishing & intermediate food products
Metal ores and Non-metallic products Forestry products, building
Basic & industrial chemical, and packaging materials
plastic & rubber products Food, beverage & tobacco products
Industrial machinery, equipment and parts Clothing, footwear, textile products
Electronic, electrical equipment & parts Paper and published products
Motor vehicles and parts Pharmaceutical and medicinal products
Aircraft & other transportation equipment Cleaning products and toiletries
Furniture and fixtures Miscellaneous goods and supplies
Appliances
TABLE 3.3: Canada Trade by Durables and Nondurables
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Response of LRPO to Oil-Market Demand Shock from Consumers
Response to Structural VAR Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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Response of LOG(US_NONDURIMP) to Shock4
Response to Structural VAR Innovations ± 2 S.E.
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TABLE A.1: GVC position in 1995 by the measures of Antràs and Chor (2018)
SINGAPORE JAPAN TAIWAN KOREA CHINA USA
Sector Description Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 31 6.553 1.658 11 3.742 2.690 2 3.975 1.664 2 3.767 1.591 2 4.048 2.243 11 3.504 2.506
2 Mining and quarrying 28 3.457 3.170 2 3.367 1.892 11 3.456 2.937 11 3.760 3.161 11 3.794 2.968 2 3.169 1.839
3 Food products, beverages and tobacco 2 3.287 2.027 6 3.269 2.062 8 3.297 2.738 6 3.100 2.379 19 3.599 2.264 5 2.795 2.462
4 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 7 3.130 2.820 8 2.765 2.241 27 3.122 1.710 8 3.043 2.650 6 3.581 3.044 12 2.782 2.177
5 Wood and products of wood and cork 29 3.102 2.253 29 2.753 1.658 6 3.041 2.666 19 2.933 1.876 7 3.465 2.843 9 2.618 2.357
6 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 24 3.040 2.096 5 2.693 2.251 7 2.989 2.012 9 2.921 2.672 8 3.448 2.771 10 2.587 2.068
7 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 11 3.001 2.730 9 2.628 2.304 29 2.972 1.911 29 2.846 1.610 9 3.390 2.939 8 2.520 2.256
8 Chemicals and chemical products 19 2.997 2.615 27 2.603 1.560 9 2.948 2.615 7 2.809 2.395 25 3.180 1.666 1 2.443 2.225
9 Rubber and plastics products 8 2.974 2.447 10 2.421 1.989 12 2.876 2.690 5 2.738 2.451 12 3.038 2.966 6 2.426 2.219
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 6 2.930 2.171 12 2.420 2.269 19 2.737 1.872 27 2.716 1.538 5 2.932 2.823 29 2.390 1.607
11 Basic metals 9 2.875 2.498 25 2.410 1.577 10 2.656 2.434 10 2.705 2.344 23 2.911 2.069 13 2.376 2.324
12 Fabricated metal products 23 2.839 2.443 7 2.356 1.828 5 2.652 2.471 12 2.671 2.820 28 2.876 2.573 27 2.351 1.490
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 27 2.724 2.050 19 2.241 1.741 28 2.592 1.883 24 2.561 1.629 24 2.818 2.137 23 2.303 1.946
14 Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 5 2.682 2.615 18 2.236 2.451 26 2.573 1.418 25 2.559 1.641 16 2.483 3.147 14 2.257 2.351
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 21 2.576 1.984 1 2.147 1.834 31 2.392 1.309 28 2.538 1.951 4 2.480 3.140 15 2.210 2.257
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 14 2.549 3.052 21 2.083 1.598 17 2.280 2.703 21 2.279 1.690 21 2.464 2.051 7 2.193 2.377
17 Other transport equipment 12 2.543 2.722 24 2.081 1.435 14 2.263 2.806 14 2.237 2.613 10 2.440 2.643 28 2.090 1.539
18 Manufacturing nec; recycling 15 2.490 2.703 28 2.041 1.682 15 2.189 2.921 22 2.216 2.146 15 2.384 3.062 21 2.020 1.645
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 10 2.489 2.617 16 1.975 2.776 21 2.152 1.501 1 2.089 1.677 29 2.369 1.908 24 2.006 1.584
20 Construction 26 2.152 1.537 14 1.896 2.289 1 2.114 2.091 26 1.967 1.508 13 2.251 2.998 19 1.917 1.582
21 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 13 2.106 2.559 17 1.842 2.429 23 2.022 1.891 4 1.903 2.692 1 2.198 1.894 25 1.916 1.650
22 Hotels and restaurants 17 2.059 2.524 23 1.806 1.501 4 1.992 2.699 13 1.836 2.813 17 2.175 3.152 16 1.837 2.763
23 Transport and storage 32 2.049 1.966 13 1.727 2.300 13 1.909 2.856 16 1.765 2.900 14 2.107 2.739 17 1.790 2.427
24 Post and telecommunications 25 2.046 1.597 15 1.688 2.226 24 1.735 1.162 18 1.711 2.518 22 2.049 2.335 18 1.612 2.195
25 Financial intermediation 4 2.003 2.574 22 1.615 1.970 18 1.730 2.569 3 1.692 2.578 26 1.912 1.369 33 1.597 1.766
26 Real estate activities 1 1.840 2.172 4 1.566 2.181 16 1.594 2.927 17 1.666 2.690 33 1.822 2.534 4 1.597 2.387
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 33 1.674 2.210 3 1.435 2.164 3 1.583 2.504 15 1.644 2.805 3 1.791 2.375 3 1.552 2.491
28 Computer and related activities 18 1.618 2.549 33 1.367 1.591 33 1.305 1.866 23 1.640 1.480 18 1.493 1.977 26 1.446 1.464
29 R&D and other business activities 3 1.547 2.650 26 1.225 1.244 30 1.282 1.735 33 1.442 1.740 27 1.193 1.722 22 1.383 2.031
30 Public admin. and defense; compulsory social security 16 1.456 2.875 20 1.195 2.065 22 1.276 1.839 31 1.430 1.321 31 1.178 2.137 20 1.255 2.109
31 Education 20 1.314 2.754 32 1.072 1.861 20 1.249 2.544 32 1.233 1.796 32 1.085 2.479 31 1.191 1.437
32 Health and social work 22 1.210 2.161 30 1.033 1.578 25 1.175 1.475 20 1.170 2.229 20 1.074 2.883 30 1.143 1.777
33 Other community, social and personal services 30 1.168 2.376 31 1.021 1.213 32 1.118 1.926 30 1.000 1.690 30 1.000 2.238 32 1.039 1.678
Correlation -0.188 0.333 0.125 0.136 0.263 0.310
Unweighted average 2.499 2.399 2.082 1.953 2.280 2.192 2.260 2.170 2.455 2.488 2.070 2.030



















TABLE A.2: GVC position in 2011 by the measures of Antràs and Chor (2018)
SINGAPORE JAPAN TAIWAN KOREA CHINA USA
Sector Description Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC Sector UAC DAC
1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 8 3.473 2.847 2 16.063 2.113 11 3.920 3.512 11 4.136 3.528 2 4.508 2.491 11 3.486 2.903
2 Mining and quarrying 19 3.374 2.349 11 4.444 3.410 8 3.776 3.197 8 3.811 3.257 19 4.320 3.078 2 3.123 1.882
3 Food products, beverages and tobacco 11 3.372 2.413 6 3.163 2.033 6 3.437 2.906 7 3.405 2.582 7 3.931 2.882 5 2.732 2.426
4 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 27 3.335 2.094 8 3.085 2.707 7 3.290 2.406 9 3.387 3.087 5 3.890 3.279 12 2.717 2.434
5 Wood and products of wood and cork 2 3.277 1.960 9 2.781 2.575 2 3.222 2.353 2 3.303 2.041 9 3.887 3.527 27 2.525 1.589
6 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 29 3.261 2.162 10 2.737 2.114 19 3.183 2.347 29 3.300 1.841 11 3.798 3.555 10 2.513 2.256
7 Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 6 3.256 2.236 5 2.735 2.265 29 3.169 1.799 5 3.297 2.898 6 3.797 3.227 9 2.504 2.409
8 Chemicals and chemical products 9 3.240 2.542 29 2.728 1.575 9 3.104 3.070 19 3.231 2.349 8 3.758 3.127 8 2.444 2.333
9 Rubber and plastics products 7 3.183 3.028 12 2.669 2.577 5 2.902 2.738 6 3.144 2.736 12 3.545 3.090 1 2.413 2.202
10 Other non-metallic mineral products 21 3.147 1.936 27 2.589 1.422 10 2.816 2.630 10 3.142 2.677 25 3.201 1.804 29 2.412 1.572
11 Basic metals 10 3.096 2.315 7 2.478 2.238 12 2.814 3.165 12 3.016 3.180 29 3.028 2.805 6 2.391 2.224
12 Fabricated metal products 24 3.095 2.166 19 2.366 2.125 14 2.751 2.917 15 2.944 3.167 27 2.991 3.016 13 2.375 2.451
13 Machinery and equipment, nec 12 3.078 2.735 18 2.362 2.485 21 2.533 1.493 21 2.882 1.953 23 2.914 2.218 28 2.266 1.683
14 Computer, Electronic and optical equipment 14 2.906 3.033 21 2.302 1.712 15 2.419 3.181 14 2.846 3.208 21 2.906 1.909 23 2.252 1.885
15 Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec 28 2.875 3.077 1 2.284 2.095 27 2.392 1.797 28 2.752 2.120 1 2.850 2.057 14 2.107 1.759
16 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 15 2.858 2.851 15 2.284 2.601 25 2.327 1.505 24 2.706 2.282 28 2.747 2.823 7 2.098 2.342
17 Other transport equipment 5 2.825 2.360 28 2.211 1.578 4 2.199 2.993 27 2.701 1.898 22 2.740 2.555 15 2.043 2.391
18 Manufacturing nec; recycling 23 2.694 2.448 16 2.194 3.089 13 2.121 3.244 25 2.560 1.701 4 2.733 3.307 21 1.965 1.648
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 13 2.564 2.749 14 2.182 2.492 17 2.004 3.120 13 2.343 3.216 15 2.689 3.504 25 1.937 1.763
20 Construction 1 2.534 1.962 24 1.917 1.756 1 1.938 2.288 16 2.343 3.452 13 2.648 3.475 24 1.834 1.849
21 Wholesale and retail trade; repairs 17 2.148 2.505 17 1.892 2.544 28 1.786 1.820 23 2.341 2.036 10 2.641 3.097 17 1.815 2.416
22 Hotels and restaurants 16 2.078 2.582 13 1.867 2.587 33 1.720 2.032 1 2.281 2.116 16 2.563 3.802 19 1.789 1.423
23 Transport and storage 18 2.011 2.470 23 1.853 1.529 16 1.719 3.193 18 2.193 3.088 33 2.477 2.490 16 1.765 3.120
24 Post and telecommunications 3 1.990 2.670 25 1.777 1.513 24 1.678 1.457 17 2.050 3.150 18 2.444 2.391 18 1.648 2.110
25 Financial intermediation 20 1.914 3.062 22 1.627 2.076 23 1.632 1.568 4 1.994 2.894 3 2.434 2.940 33 1.521 1.734
26 Real estate activities 26 1.831 1.553 4 1.588 2.287 3 1.579 2.767 26 1.780 1.580 14 2.359 3.470 3 1.512 2.574
27 Renting of machinery and equipment 33 1.624 2.072 3 1.542 2.229 26 1.528 1.398 3 1.768 2.957 24 2.334 2.017 4 1.477 2.205
28 Computer and related activities 4 1.564 2.736 33 1.369 1.604 22 1.506 2.066 33 1.614 2.187 17 2.057 3.402 26 1.443 1.483
29 R&D and other business activities 25 1.555 1.299 20 1.269 2.094 18 1.351 2.874 32 1.167 2.056 26 1.785 2.062 20 1.339 2.002
30 Public admin. and defense; compulsory social security 31 1.550 1.665 26 1.214 1.288 20 1.334 2.851 20 1.158 2.740 32 1.426 2.703 22 1.329 1.911
31 Education 32 1.487 2.023 31 1.043 1.361 32 1.239 1.858 30 1.146 1.760 31 1.335 2.081 31 1.162 1.466
32 Health and social work 22 1.463 2.154 30 1.036 1.611 30 1.181 1.558 22 1.104 2.628 20 1.058 3.168 30 1.130 1.894
33 Other community, social and personal services 30 1.318 2.296 32 1.030 1.858 31 1.106 1.442 31 1.085 1.518 30 1.045 2.287 32 1.032 1.704
Correlation 0.279 0.161 0.440 0.348 0.248 0.361
Unweighted average 2.545 2.374 2.566 2.107 2.293 2.410 2.513 2.542 2.813 2.837 2.033 2.062




Alternative measures of bilateral
downstreamness and upstreamness
In this section, we propose an augmented version of the bilateral downstreamness
formula in (2.5) and also for the bilateral upstreamness formula in (2.6). To identify
the key downstream trade partners, we have taken a local GDP perspective in (2.5)
and examined how much of local content is intermediated by a bilateral importer
in forward linkage in the GVC. We can argue that a bilateral importer r can also
be considered an important downstream partner of country s if it receives a lot of
third country contents embedded in exports of country s to country r for absorption
locally or for further processing before being exported again. With this taken into
account, the augmented bilateral downstream formula instead takes the following
form:
D̃Gsr =
FC◦Gsr − FCrGsr + (DCGsr − 1[r ∈ G](1a∗sr + 2a∗sr))
∑c{FC◦Gsc − FCcGsc + (DCGsc − 1[c ∈ G](1a∗sc + 2a∗sc))}
(B.1)
where FC◦Gsr is the foreign content embedded in the gross exports of country s to
country r absorbed in destinations G, FCrGsr is the content of country r re-exported
by country s to country r absorbed in destinations G, DCGsr is the domestic content of
country s in gross exports of s to r absorbed in destinations G, and (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr) is the
domestic content of country s directly absorbed by bilateral importer r. A bilateral
importer r is a more important downstream partner to country s than importer r′
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if country r receives a larger portion of third country contents from country s or
intermediates a larger portion of exporter s’s domestic content to third countries
than does importer r′.
Similarly, we can augment the bilateral upstreamness formula of country s to
country r in (2.6) as:
ŨGsr =
FCG◦sr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrsr + 1[s ∈ G](DCsr − (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr))
∑c{FCG◦cr − 1[r ∈ G]FCrcr + 1[c ∈ G](DCcr − (1a∗cr + 2a∗cr))}
(B.2)
where FCG◦sr is the foreign content originating from countries in G that are passed
on by country s to country r, FCrsr is the importer r’s content re-exported by country
s, DCsr is the domestic content of country s in its exports to r, and (1a∗sr + 2a∗sr) is
the content of country s directly absorbed by bilateral importer r. The first part of
(B.2) corresponds to the GVC-trade in which the exporter s passes on third countries’
contents to r, while the second part in (B.2) accounts for the exporter’s content that is
further processed and re-exported by r. A country s is regarded as a more important
upstream trade partner of country r than country s′ if country s passes on a larger
portion of foreign contents from third countries to the importer, or contributes a
larger portion of its domestic content to importer r’s gross exports.
Tables B.1 and B.2 summarize the results. China remained among the top five
downstream trade partners of all CPTPP countries except Brunei. Nonetheless, its
dominance decreased overall compared to Table 2.2, which is based on the narrow
index of bilateral downstreamness in (2.5). This suggests that the CPTPP countries
tended to export their domestic contents to China for further processing before
reaching third-country destinations. Third-country contents, however, did not pass
on from CPTPP countries to China as predominantly, and other downstream countries
such as the US and Japan weighed more heavily in this regard. Similarly, Korea’s
overall importance as a downstream partner of the CPTPP countries also decreased
with the broad definition of bilateral downstreamness in (B.1). In contrast, the
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US’s dominance as a downstream partner of Canada and Mexico further increased
when taking into account third-country contents received by the US from these two
countries (in addition to these two countries’ domestic contents intermediated by
the US). This might reflect the US’s status as a large final demand destination of
third-country contents.
Turning to key bilateral upstream partners of CPTPP members in Table B.2,
China and the US remained key upstream partners of these countries based on
the alternative broad definition in (B.2). But again, China’s importance tended to
decrease while that of the US with respect to Canada and Mexico increased (by
around 5 percentage points) compared to Table 2.3 based on formula (2.6). This
suggests that China did not pass on domestic contents to be incorporated in bilateral
importers’ gross exports as substantially as it passed on third countries’ contents to
its bilateral importers. The reverse is true in the case of the US with respect to its two
neighboring countries. In other words, the US domestic contents were heavily used
in the gross exports of Canada and Mexico, more so than the proportion of third-
country contents passed on by the US to the two countries. These observations are
consistent with the finding in Section 2.6 that China is relatively downstream in the
GVC, while the US is relatively upstream.
With the exception of Canada and Mexico, most CPTPP countries were rather
diversified in their sourcing, as the index ŨGsr was not highly concentrated at the
top. The top upstream partner typically intermediated around 20% of GVC-related
gross imports of the bilateral importer, followed closely by the second key upstream
partner of the bilateral importer. Canada and Mexico imported foreign contents
disproportionally from the US, at more than 40% and up to 65% if we focus on
contents sourcing from the CPTPP region plus the US.
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TABLE B.1: Key downstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011) by
formula (B.1)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.50 9.75 25.27 34.77 50.29
1st downstream partner CHN (30.64) CHN (30.07) CHN (32.33) CHN (36.15) CHN (35.46)
2nd downstream partner KOR (11.10) USA (9.65) USA (16.93) KOR (11.36) USA (13.22)
3rd downstream partner USA (8.77) KOR (8.86) KOR (8.27) TWN (10.94) KOR (9.94)
4th downstream partner TWN (8.59) AUS (7.83) TWN (7.38) USA (6.63) TWN (9.48)
5th downstream partner THA (5.49) TWN (7.58) THA (4.76) MYS (6.01) MYS (4.87)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.44 23.60 33.35 35.88 45.63
1st downstream partner CHN (14.10) AUS (24.04) MYS (17.44) CHN (22.22) CHN (21.01)
2nd downstream partner MYS (10.92) MYS (21.79) USA (15.82) MYS (19.51) MYS (16.83)
3rd downstream partner IDN (7.15) JPN (15.30) AUS (15.57) AUS (16.95) AUS (12.46)
4th downstream partner USA (6.49) CHN (8.43) CHN (11.90) JPN (10.95) USA (12.34)
5th downstream partner AUS (6.23) VNM (4.82) JPN (10.33) KOR (3.70) JPN (8.37)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.76 21.58 30.42 47.06 55.90
1st downstream partner CHN (30.17) JPN (23.62) CHN (24.21) CHN (44.70) CHN (40.34)
2nd downstream partner USA (7.87) CHN (19.08) USA (19.46) JPN (14.19) USA (13.53)
3rd downstream partner JPN (6.88) AUS (13.41) JPN (14.29) AUS (8.42) JPN (10.70)
4th downstream partner THA (5.63) SGP (10.73) AUS (7.81) SGP (6.89) AUS (6.12)
5th downstream partner ROW (5.23) THA (4.48) SGP (7.07) THA (3.78) SGP (5.57)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 22.55 37.81 36.39 51.65
1st downstream partner CHN (14.44) JPN (37.58) USA (29.34) JPN (26.88) USA (23.38)
2nd downstream partner USA (11.97) AUS (11.65) JPN (22.02) CHN (25.31) CHN (20.98)
3rd downstream partner JPN (10.05) MYS (10.86) CHN (11.28) MYS (9.85) JPN (18.47)
4th downstream partner KOR (7.19) CHN (9.69) MYS (7.42) AUS (9.73) MYS (7.51)
5th downstream partner MYS (5.80) CAN (4.59) AUS (6.91) KOR (5.56) AUS (6.69)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 59.83 61.95 64.38 66.51
1st downstream partner KOR (22.77) JPN (22.34) JPN (22.35) KOR (23.28) KOR (22.98)
2nd downstream partner JPN (19.73) AUS (20.79) KOR (20.85) AUS (23.26) JPN (21.32)
3rd downstream partner AUS (19.26) KOR (20.35) AUS (17.91) JPN (21.02) AUS (20.68)
4th downstream partner IDN (11.15) IDN (12.96) IDN (11.63) IDN (11.49) IDN (10.88)
5th downstream partner VNM (5.21) NZL (8.18) NZL (6.92) NZL (6.10) NZL (5.68)
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AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 26.37 31.75 53.18 58.56
1st downstream partner CHN (26.49) JPN (28.52) CHN (23.48) CHN (30.78) CHN (30.85)
2nd downstream partner KOR (14.12) CHN (19.06) JPN (21.41) JPN (21.01) JPN (17.92)
3rd downstream partner JPN (12.44) KOR (12.72) KOR (12.41) KOR (14.40) KOR (13.74)
4th downstream partner TWN (6.40) NZL (6.46) USA (6.38) TWN (6.83) TWN (6.67)
5th downstream partner IND (6.34) TWN (5.86) TWN (6.00) NZL (4.30) USA (4.74)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.36 39.51 49.31 50.27 60.06
1st downstream partner AUS (25.04) AUS (51.39) AUS (38.78) AUS (44.68) AUS (36.23)
2nd downstream partner CHN (13.57) JPN (13.83) USA (13.34) CHN (16.72) CHN (16.76)
3rd downstream partner ROW (7.64) CHN (7.47) JPN (10.82) JPN (11.43) USA (10.92)
4th downstream partner USA (6.63) SGP (4.48) CHN (10.33) SGP (4.32) JPN (9.61)
5th downstream partner JPN (6.47) MYS (4.28) SGP (4.17) MYS (4.19) SGP (4.11)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.87 7.30 74.05 12.19 78.93
1st downstream partner USA (56.69) USA (56.88) USA (75.47) USA (50.58) USA (71.13)
2nd downstream partner CHN (7.21) MEX (10.24) MEX (6.21) CHN (13.15) CHN (7.39)
3rd downstream partner MEX (3.78) JPN (8.57) CHN (4.41) MEX (8.00) MEX (5.70)
4th downstream partner GBR (3.52) CHN (6.18) JPN (3.27) JPN (7.35) JPN (3.29)
5th downstream partner KOR (2.93) KOR (2.75) KOR (1.52) KOR (3.99) KOR (2.14)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.82 10.40 80.06 13.54 83.21
1st downstream partner USA (60.31) USA (45.36) USA (74.03) USA (43.97) USA (71.85)
2nd downstream partner CAN (11.00) CAN (32.14) CAN 15.53) CAN (27.30) CAN (14.88)
3rd downstream partner CHN (4.06) JPN (3.92) CHN (1.96) CHN (8.26) CHN (3.80)
4th downstream partner ROW (3.68) PER (3.13) JPN (1.32) JPN (3.64) JPN (1.38)
5th downstream partner ESP (2.23) CHN (3.04) PER (1.04) PER (2.73) PER (1.02)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 99.05 18.80 29.11 42.52 52.83
1st downstream partner CHN (29.84) CHN (24.93) CHN (28.60) CHN (38.80) CHN (36.21)
2nd downstream partner KOR (7.82) JPN (22.96) USA (14.48) JPN (16.38) JPN (11.73)
3rd downstream partner USA (7.13) USA (7.49) JPN (13.71) KOR (8.14) USA (11.56)
4th downstream partner JPN (7.08) KOR (7.01) CAN (7.05) USA (5.58) KOR (7.15)
5th downstream partner BRA (4.92) MEX (5.63) MEX (6.54) TWN (4.76) CAN (5.60)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross exports to countries in G 100 25.92 40.54 46.10 60.73
1st downstream partner CHN (17.76) CAN (19.31) CAN (28.88) CHN (23.47) CAN (24.76)
2nd downstream partner CAN (15.95) CHN (17.01) USA (15.97) CAN (15.06) CHN (18.78)
3rd downstream partner USA (9.35) CHL (13.29) CHN (14.78) KOR (13.49) USA (13.66)
4th downstream partner KOR (9.14) KOR (10.94) CHL (8.41) CHL (13.21) KOR (9.51)
5th downstream partner CHL (7.99) JPN (10.03) KOR (7.45) JPN (8.44) CHL (9.27)
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TABLE B.2: Key upstream trade partners of CPTPP members (2011) by
formula (B.2)
JAPAN World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 15.37 28.07 36.72 49.43
1st upstream partner CHN (25.24) AUS (21.03) USA (21.25) CHN (37.27) CHN (32.12)
2nd upstream partner USA (8.66) CHN (19.84) CHN (19.90) AUS (12.80) USA (16.46)
3rd upstream partner KOR (8.46) USA (8.84) AUS (13.09) KOR (7.31) AUS (9.67)
4th upstream partner ROW (7.03) MYS (8.44) KOR (6.85) USA (7.26) KOR (6.59)
5th upstream partner AUS (4.84) KOR (8.31) MYS (5.88) MYS (6.01) MYS (4.94)
SINGAPORE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 16.22 29.29 24.46 37.52
1st upstream partner USA (11.43) JPN (34.82) USA (35.37) CHN (25.59) USA (28.62)
2nd upstream partner CHN (8.08) MYS (18.30) JPN (20.37) JPN (24.28) CHN (17.60)
3rd upstream partner ROW (7.94) AUS (12.21) MYS (11.39) MYS (13.78) JPN (16.41)
4th upstream partner JPN (6.65) CHN (4.41) AUS (7.24) AUS (8.55) MYS (9.84)
5th upstream partner IND(6.59) CAN (4.39) CHN (3.32) USA (3.75) AUS (5.85)
MALAYSIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 26.96 35.59 40.78 49.40
1st upstream partner CHN (14.56) JPN (32.24) JPN (23.27) CHN (26.91) CHN (22.29)
2nd upstream partner SGP (12.10) SGP (23.78) USA (20.52) JPN (23.34) JPN (18.56)
3rd upstream partner JPN (9.69) CHN (8.41) SGP (18.99) SGP (17.97) USA (16.25)
4th upstream partner USA (8.19) AUS (8.33) CHN (7.94) AUS (4.93) SGP (15.66)
5th upstream partner THA (6.34) VNM (5.17) AUS (6.05) THA (4.18) AUS (4.75)
VIETNAM World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 20.70 25.05 43.57 47.92
1st upstream partner CHN (24.32) JPN (21.56) CHN (17.57) CHN (38.34) CHN (35.07)
2nd upstream partner KOR (13.76) CHN (17.62) SGP (14.47) SGP (14.39) SGP (12.71)
3rd upstream partner TWN (10.02) KOR (10.42) KOR (10.49) KOR (9.20) KOR (9.44)
4th upstream partner THA (7.90) MYS (10.06) MYS (8.48) MYS (6.99) TWN (6.92)
5th upstream partner JPN (6.87) TWN (8.76) USA (8.37) TWN (6.97) MYS (6.39)
BRUNEI World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 41.71 62.03 49.35 69.67
1st upstream partner SGP (24.79) SGP (28.92) SGP (27.12) SGP (43.97) SGP (25.62)
2nd upstream partner MYS (18.07) MYS (27.58) USA (21.86) MYS (32.05) USA (20.19)
3rd upstream partner USA (14.05) JPN (12.33) MYS (21.13) CHN (11.35) MYS (19.88)
4th upstream partner CHN (6.40) USA (11.06) JPN (8.96) JPN (9.41) CHN (8.32)
5th upstream partner JPN (5.31) CHN (4.03) CHN (3.59) CAN (1.51) JPN (7.97)
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AUSTRALIA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 23.57 37.34 39.03 52.80
1st upstream partner CHN (16.27) CHN (17.11) USA (18.02) CHN (23.07) CHN (20.58)
2nd upstream partner ROW (10.17) MYS (12.35) CHN (15.99) MYS (10.17) USA (16.08)
3rd upstream partner USA (8.82) JPN (10.20) MYS (9.16) USA (8.83) MYS (8.20)
4th upstream partner SGP (7.91) SGP (9.11) SGP (8.31) JPN (8.70) SGP (7.87)
5th upstream partner JPN (5.38) USA (9.03) JPN (7.72) SGP (8.28) JPN (7.12)
NEW ZEALAND World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 34.98 45.01 45.89 55.92
1st upstream partner AUS (24.79) AUS (38.30) AUS (30.93) AUS (32.74) AUS (27.84)
2nd upstream partner CHN (11.51) CHN (10.14) USA (12.92) CHN (15.69) CHN (14.38)
3rd upstream partner SGP (7.55) SGP (8.69) CHN (10.08) SGP (8.21) USA (11.92)
4th upstream partner ROW (7.19) MYS (7.20) SGP (8.23) MYS (6.45) SGP (7.94)
5th upstream partner USA (6.79) JPN (5.11) MYS (5.87) USA (5.36) MYS (5.51)
CANADA World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.33 59.70 19.86 69.22
1st upstream partner USA (42.94) USA (31.95) USA (65.12) USA (32.25) USA (60.20)
2nd upstream partner CHN (10.72) MEX (16.89) MEX (9.82) CHN (21.54) CHN (11.3)
3rd upstream partner MEX (6.41) CHN (13.38) CHN (6.53) MEX (13.77) MEX (9.48)
4th upstream partner ROW (5.61) JPN (11.35) JPN (4.31) JPN (8.20) JPN (3.95)
5th upstream partner GBR (3.49) PER (7.03) PER (2.65) PER (4.84) PER (2.32)
MEXICO World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 10.72 62.20 23.49 74.96
1st upstream partner USA (43.18) USA (33.10) USA (64.98) CHN(36.05) USA (55.56)
2nd upstream partner CHN (18.16) JPN (17.75) CHN (9.25) USA (27.49) CHN (20.52)
3rd upstream partner DEU (4.50) CHN (17.66) JPN (7.35) JPN (11.51) JPN (6.24)
4th upstream partner KOR (4.29) CAN (9.79) CAN (5.94) CAN (6.51) CAN (5.02)
5th upstream partner JPN (4.25) MYS (4.06) KOR (2.12) KOR (3.63) KOR (2.35)
CHILE World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 11.75 32.64 25.68 46.30
1st upstream partner USA (19.05) USA (21.48) USA (40.27) CHN (25.18) USA (35.17)
2nd upstream partner CHN (13.51) PER (20.55) PER (11.86) USA (18.54) CHN (18.36)
3rd upstream partner ROW (10.16) CHN (15.85) CHN (11.83) PER (15.16) PER (10.00)
4th upstream partner BRA (8.48) JPN (6.47) MEX (5.56) MEX (5.39) MEX (5.29)
5th upstream partner COL (5.20) MEX (5.92) CA (4.07) JPN (5.22) ROW (4.43)
PERU World CPTPP CPTPP+USA CPTPP+CHN CPTPP+CHN+USA
% of gross imports from countries in G 100 14.71 34.19 30.45 49.92
1st upstream partner CHN (18.47) CHN (23.71) USA (34.36) CHN (29.34) USA (29.97)
2nd upstream partner USA (18.25) USA (21.34) CHN (17.02) USA (18.34) CHN (21.83)
3rd upstream partner ROW (10.15) MEX (14.90) MEX (14.15) MEX (12.76) MEX (12.96)
4th upstream partner MEX (7.07) CHL (5.88) CHL (4.12) KOR (5.45) KOR (4.23)
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